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This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the 
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically 
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it pre-
supposes free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a 
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to 
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not 
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains 
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or 
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes 
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This 
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appro-
priate, in the given context, to ask A for a justification 
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational con-
cept. Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars, 
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain 
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is 
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom; 
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of auto-
nomy. Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person 
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-, 
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts 
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct, 
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions 
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential 
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical, 
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an 
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and 
critical but non-relative. 
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1. FREEDOM: FROM BERLIN ONWARDS 
This thesis aims to expound and defend a certain view of 
social freedom which I shall call the responsibility view. 
Arguably, for reasons of methodology if not human psycho-
logy, a study of this kind is best begun by laying down 
some provisional ideas or hypotheses which are then put to 
the test: substantiated, amended or discarded as the work 
progresses. But as this thesis presents a conceptual 
analysis and not an autobiography, I see no reason to pre-
face it by an introduction of the basic ideas with which I 
started and the story of my struggle with them - nor will 
the original plan of my argumentation be mapped out here 
at the beginning. Rather, I shall present and develop my 
account in what appears to me to be the most logical 
order. For example, while it was plain from the start that 
a multitude of methodological difficulties would arise, 
discussion of them is postponed until chapters 8 and 9. My 
line of argument will follow a somewhat circuitous route, 
touching on many issues whose interrelations may not 
always be clear; but by the end all the different strands 
will have been drawn together, with chapter 10 containing 
a summary of the main results of the study. 
I hope my account of social freedom will be found to 
contain some novel and original features. There is no use, 
however, in trying to make light of my debt to numerous 
predecessors in the field, and of necessity this thesis 
will contain much polemical matter. But then, stating and 
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arguing for a position on the issue of freedom without any 
relevant interaction with contemporary debates would be 
less than stimulating. 
Admittedly, there is an element of truth in the dis-
couraging, if somewhat sardonic, remark at the outset of 
Felix Oppenheim's book, Dimensions of Freedom, that when 
one speaks of freedom, La Bruyere's words come to mind: 
everything has been said and we come too late to add any-
. 1) 
thing. Yet, philosophers evidently do not see dis-
cuss ions of social freedom as the flogging of a dead 
horse, for in recent years articles and books on the 
subject have appeared with almost dreary regularity. If 
there ever was a feeling in philosophical circles that 
"everything has been said" on t.he issue of freedom, the 
publication in 1958 of Isaiah Berlin's Inaugural Address 
to Oxford University, "Two Concepts of Liberty", created 
2 ) 
enough stir to dispel any such illusion. Berlin placed 
the notion of social freedom firmly on the agenda of 
current debate and paved the way for the spate of pub-
lications that were to follow. 
It is the aim of this first chapter to lay a part of 
the conceptual foundation for the discussion to follow by 
making some basic observations about the different kinds 
of freedom and to rehearse briefly some of the fundamental 
problems characterizing the discourse about social freedom 
from Berlin onwards. 
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1.1. Kinds of freedom 
At the outset of his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill 
announces that the problems he means to tackle are those 
of political or social freedom, not those concerning the 
3 ) 
"so-called Liberty of the Will." Mill was quite right in 
making this distinction: freedom of the will and social 
freedom are logically distinct in the sense that people 
who hold the same view of the former may hold different 
views of the latter. Moreover, few would deny that social 
4) 
unfreedom is compatible with freedom of the . 1 1 Wl~ ~. On the 
other hand, there is a strong case for saying that deter-
minism, whether 'hard' or 'soft', excludes the possibility 
of social freedom and that such freedom presupposes an 
underlying view of human agents as free and responsible 
for their actions in a sense that determinism can never 
account for. This is, for example, Berlin's opinion in his 
Four Essays on Liberty. Now, it is tempting, when writing 
about social freedom, to deal as succinctly with free will 
as B. Crick does: "I take 'freedom of the will' for 
5 ) 
granted - what else can one do?" Indeed, the free will 
problem will scarcely be of more concern for my thesis 
than it was for Crick, although it will be briefly touched 
upon again in connection with an analysis of the notions 
6 ) 
of autarchy and autonomy (6.3). 
There are discordant opinions as to how many concepts 
of freedom are abroad in everyday and/or philosophical 
discussion apart from the two mentioned above. Oppenheim 
-4-
7 ) 
locates and defines a number of these, but he may be too 
generous in his enumeration, as some of the concepts he 
distinguishes seem to be nothing but variations or meta-
phorical extensions of others. Thus, what Oppenheim calls 
"feeling free" may be little more than a metaphorical 
counterpart of social freedom: when I take off my heavy, 
woolen sweater, I feel as if I had been let out of jail, 
but there is hardly a reason to exalt this feeling to the 
status of a special concept of freedom. Still, as Oppen-
heim rightly shows, there are various kinds of freedom and 
many freedom-concepts which have nothing to do with social 
freedom. However, searching for the exact number of these 
does not seem to be a very fruitful endeavour and will not 
be pursued further here. Let it therefore be clear that, 
unless otherwise stated, the words 'freedom' and 'liberty' 
will be used interchangeably in the sequel to refer to 
social freedom and nothing else. 
A student ploughing through some of the current ele-
mentary literature in social and political philosophy may 
get the impression that there are two contending accounts 
of social freedom. On the first account (sometimes dubbed 
'libertarian'), freedom can be restricted only by legal 
rules and occurrences of force and fraud, while the second 
account (the 'socialist' one) claims that freedom depends 
not only upon the absence of such restrictions but upon 
the presence of effective alternatives for action. It will 
become evident in the course of the thesis that this dis-
tinction is oversimplified and misleading. Still, it 
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draws to some degree on Berlin's influential analysis of 
negative and positive liberty in his previously mentioned 
paper. 
Berlin distinguishes between two "political senses of 
freedom" as answering two logically distinct questions. In 
the negative sense, the question concerns the extent of 
"the area within which the subject ... is or should be left 
to do what he is able to do or be, without interference", 
and the answers to that give rise to a concept of liberty 
as the absence of external constraints: as "the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others". In the 
positive sense, the question is "what, or who, is the 
source of control or interference that can determine some-
8 ) 
one to do, or be, this rather than that?" Here, we are 
no longer concerned with the conception of a vacuum in 
which nothing obstructs us, but rather with the notion of 
self-direction or self-control, which relates to our 
desire to be in control of our own destiny. But, as Berlin 
is quick to point out, although the desire to be governed 
by oneself may be as deep a wish as that of a free area of 
action, and even historically older, "it is not a desire 
9 ) 
for the same thing". 
Although Berlin's terminology is now, by and large, 
accepted as common ground, there is still ample room for 
dispute. Three of the most vexing questions which crop up 
at various points in the present work are: a) whether 
positive and negative liberty constitute different con-
cepts or only variants of the same concept, b) what sort 
-6-
of thing is to be counted as a constraint on liberty in 
the negative model, and c) how 'large' or important such 
an obstacle must be to count as a constraint. 
Unfortunately, Berlin himself is not particularly 
clear on any of these issues; indeed, he never directly 
addresses c). As for a), he sometimes speaks as if posi-
tive and negative liberty have a common root or source and 
that they "start at no great logical distance from each 
10) 
other" . This has led John Gray to conclude that "when 
Berlin speaks of two concepts of liberty, he intends us to 
understand this as a reference to what Rawls would call 
11) 
two conceptions of liberty". But elsewhere Berlin 
clearly states that these are "not two different inter-
pretations of a single concept, but two profoundly diver-
12) 
gent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life". 
I find this latter contention more in line with Berlin's 
general view, according to which the notion of positive 
liberty has suffered a historical transformation to the 
detriment of its original nature. In light of his detailed 
description of its use and abuse in political discourse, 
it is difficult to see it simply as a variant of the same 
concept as negative liberty. 
Concerning b), Berlin's own view is even more equi-
vocal. He seems to vacillate between (i) the narrow view 
that coercion "implies the deliberate interference of 
13) 
other human beings", (ii) the more inclusive idea that 
coercion refers to the part "played by other human beings, 
directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of 
-7-
14) 
doing so, in frustrating my wishes", and (iii) the 
broad definition in his "Introduction" (written later) 
that the criterion of coercion is that it results from 
15) 
alterable or remediable human practices. Nevertheless, 
(i) is the view commonly attributed to Berlin. As can be 
seen from these examples, the value of Berlin's contri-
bution, influential as it has been, lies more in raising 
questions and stimulating discussion than in supplying 
decisive answers. 
So far, we have found little guidance as to which of 
the two proposed notions of social freedom is more appro-
priate. Berlin is inclined to emphasize negative liberty, 
if only because history has taught us that the positive 
notion lends itself more easily to political abuse. I 
shall not try to decide at this point whether there are 
really two concepts of social freedom and, if so, which of 
them is the 'correct' one. Indeed, I shall not spend much 
time on directly addressing these questions in the follow-
ing chapters, though answers to them will emerge by impli-
cation once negative theories have been scrutinized in 
chapter 2 and positive accounts in chapter 6. Let it 
suffice to say here that, of the two, the negative notion 
seems to have more intuitive appeal. Perhaps the reason is 
etymological. In Icelandic, for example, 'frjals', meaning 
'free', is derived directly from the word 'frI-hals' which 
means literally 'having a free neck', i.e., not being 
chained like a slave. According to C.S. Lewis' Studies in 
16) 
Words, much the same applies to the English equivalent. 
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These etymological facts may indicate that 'freedom' is by 
nature what Austin calls a "trouser word", taking its 
meaning from something that could have been present (here 
=: restrictions) but is not. Austin in fact claims that 
"'free' is only used to rule out the suggestion of some or 
17) 
all of its recognized antitheses." But if 'freedom' is 
categorized as a "trouser-word", whose meaning is negative 
by definition, it may appear almost too easy to reject out 
of hand the positive notion of freedom which has been held 
in high esteem by many distinguished philosophers. 
1.2. One generic concept? 
Some writers have suggested that there is an easy way out 
of this difficulty, viz., to find one generic concept 
underlying both notions of social freedom. Thus, Joel 
Feinberg in his Social Philosophy proposes a definition 
which, while grounded in the negative notion, is also 
supposed to include the essential elements of the positive 
one. A constraint on freedom, he says, "is something-
anything - that prevents one from doing something. There-
fore, if nothing prevents me from doing ~, I am free to do 
~; conversely, if I am free to do ~, then nothing prevents 
me from doing X." On this account Feinberg claims that 
"freedom to" and "freedom from" are logically linked, and 
that there can be "no special 'positive' freedom to which 
18) 
is not also a freedom from." But what prevents me from 
-9-
doing X? Feinberg answers that question by invoking four 
categories of constraints: internal positive constraints 
such as headaches, obsessive thoughts, and compulsive 
desires; internal negative constraints such as ignorance, 
weakness, and deficiences in talent and skill; external 
positive constraints such as barred windows and locked 
doors, and finally external negative constraints such as 
19) 
lack of money, transportation and weapons. 
The major fault with Feinberg's account is that it 
fails to do justice to his own reference to Helvetius, who 
remarked that "not to fly like an eagle or swim like a 
20) 
whale" does not constitute lack of freedom. That is, 
Feinberg's account is too permissive, for his categories 
obliterate the distinction between constraints and mere 
inabilities. A patient suffering from multiple sclerosis 
who is confined to a wheelchair after an attack of it but 
then recovers and can walk again - as is common in the 
course of that disease - has not regained his freedom to 
walk but his ability to do so. There is every reason to 
honour this distinction; it is very common in our language 
and will be brought up at various points in my thesis. 
Incidentally, as Oppenheim points out, being free to do 
what one cannot do is usually of no value to the agent, 
"but having a freedom is not the same as valuing a freedom 
21 ) 
one has." 
Much the same may be said about an attempt by G. Mac-
Callum to challenge the view that we can usefully distin-
guish between two kinds of social freedom. Admittedly, 
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MacCallum's basic insight, that freedom is a relation, not 
a property, is of great importance. Although 'I am free' 
may look like 'I am alive', it is surely more akin to 'I 
am tall' and since Frege we have a clear sense of 
relational predicates which Plato e.g. lacked when he 
tried to understand tallness as a property_ Freedom is not 
something that one happens to possess or stumble across 
like a chest of gold, it is a relation between agents. 
MacCallum further insists that the freedom relation is 
triadic: freedom is always of something (an agent or 
agents (x)), from something (y), to do, not to do, become, 
or not become something (z), where y "ranges over such 
'preventing conditions' as constraints, 
22) 
restrictions, 
interferences and barriers." Berlin has pointed out 
that the third variable in the definition may be unneces-
sary, as a man struggling against his chains or a people 
against enslavement "need not consciously aim at any 
23) 
definite further state"; and for him this seems to 
indicate that freedom be better understood as a dyadic 
relation than a triadic one. But I believe Berlin's point 
here to be mistaken. The freedom of the parties involved 
to throw off their chains or to escape from their enslave-
ment is at least being restricted; whether or not they are 
aiming consciously at any particular "further state" now 
(or even whether or not they are aware of their own 
enslavement) is not at issue. 
More detrimental to the value of MacCallum's proposal 
is the point made by Oppenheim, that he allows 'y' to 
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cover the agent's own disabilities, or impersonal (physi-
cal) conditions, which leads to the conclusion, deemed 
unacceptable above, that one is necessarily unfree to do 
24 ) 
what one cannot do. Oppenheim himself suggests a tria-
dic definition somewhat similar in form to MacCallum's: 
25) 
with respect to P, R is unfree to do X; but the vital 
difference is that Oppenheim's 'p' only ranges over 
(other) persons. I believe these writers are correct in 
seeing freedom as a triadic relation. However, as we have 
already noticed, the ranges of the term variables must be 
defined with adequate specificity if the proposed relation 
is to be that of social freedom. The simple logical point 
that freedom happens to be a triadic, not a dyadi~ 
relation does not suffice to show that the negative and 
positive notions are variants of one and the same concept. 
It may still be that the term variables of one (or both) 
of them cannot be specified in a way that accords with the 
proper concept of social freedom. Indeed, this will prove 
a reason for rejecting positive theories later in the 
thesis (6.5). 
1.3. Agency and responsibility 
Even if translatability into a triadic schema is a neces-
sary condition of the intelligibility of any claim about 
freedom, it is not a sufficient one, since only certain 
kinds of hinderances are commonly regarded as infringe-
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ments of a person's liberty. I am not unfree to do x 
merely because I am unable to do so: I am not unfree to 
visit my friend merely because I am trapped by a landslide 
and cannot go. Thus, it seems prima facie to be an un-
avoidable premise of any plausible account of social free-
dom that the restriction of B's actions be attributable to 
some agency (human or otherwise) , i.e., that it can be 
traced back to an agent, A, who has imposed the restric-
tion. For instance, a criminal, caught on the run by a 
police dog, 
to the dog' 
would not be considered 'unfree with respect 
(to use Oppenheim's terminology) but to the 
policeman who controlled the dog. Why? Simply because the 
dog is, rightly or wrongly, thought to lack agency - or at 
least the kind of agency required. 
Let us try to bring out more clearly what this con-
nection between the constraining agent and the 'victim' 
must amount to by considering a further example. Suppose a 
runner B is overtaking his competitor A on the last metres 
of a long distance run. A deliberately pushes B with his 
elbow so that B falls. In that case, there is no denying 
the fact that A has constrained B's freedom to finish the 
run - at least as the victor. But let us now suppose that 
A, losing his balance for a while, pushes B accidentally. 
As previously, B falls, but would we say now that he is 
unfree to finish his run? I think not. His chance of 
finishing the race is ruled out, not because his freedom 
has been undermined, but rather his ability to do so, just 
as if he had been hit by lightning or had suffered sun-
-13-
stroke. If true, this is a very important conclusion since 
the direct material cause is exactly the same as in the 
first example (A's elbow), and even the most accurate 
slow-motion playback of the events would not bring to 
light any difference. 
What does it then mean that the infringement must be 
attributable to an agency? Why is B unfree in the first 
case but not in the second? Could the reason be that while 
A is the cause of B's fall in both cases, he is only 
morally responsible for it in the first? This answer is 
argued for by Benn and Weinstein in a paper published in 
1971. There, they also claim that we are not simply pur-
porting to describe a state of affairs when we say that 
someone is not free, we are also typically advancing a 
charge or making an accusation that we expect those 
26) 
against whom we advance it to deny, rebut or accept. 
A great deal will be said in the following chapters 
about Benn & Weinstein's suggestions and about the ideas 
of some of the philosophers who have followed in their 
footsteps in arguing for a 'responsibility view' of free-
dom: a view which claims that only those impediments for 
which A is morally responsible can constrain B's freedom. 
In the end, the success of this work depends on the possi-
bility of formulating such a view in a plausible, coherent 
way; something which I believe no one has accomplished so 
far. As a starting point, let us examine the question why 
a responsibility view might be considered superior to 
other, more traditional, accounts of negative liberty. 
-14-
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2. NEGATIVE FREEDOM: THE NATURE OF CONSTRAINTS 
Although all negative accounts concur in defining freedom 
as the absence of constraints, it is common knowledge that 
they differ substantially among themselves. The basic 
question to ask about each of them is what it allows to 
count as a constraint on freedom. Thus, we are often told, 
it is possible to distinguish between narrower and broader 
accounts of negative liberty. While that is true, this 
distinction is itself not as unproblematic as we are some-
times given to believe. 
the terms 'narrow' and 
There is a certain elasticity in 
'broad' as they are used in this 
context. It is e.g. not enough to know how specific any 
given account may be about the nature of the proposed con-
straints, for it cannot be assumed that the stronger or 
more specific its demands, the narrower it is. At least 
one other question has to be asked, viz., about the neces-
sary size or seriousness of the obstacles described. For 
instance, Hobbes' famous account of liberty, which I shall 
examine shortly, is commonly considered narrow not because 
of the strict conditions it sets upon the nature of con-
straints (in fact, it does anything but that), but because 
it requires the size of constraints to be such as to make 
a proposed action literally impossible. 
The present chapter investigates what different 
theories of negative liberty have to say about the nature 
of constraints, while discussion of their 'size' will be 
postponed until chapter 3. In 2.1, Hobbes', Nozick's and 
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Berlin's accounts are examined and found to be flawed. 
The need to cast a light on the purpose of freedom-talk 
then manifests itself and is pursued in 2.2. As an outcome 
of those considerations, a responsibility view of freedom 
emerges in 2.3. Subsequently, the most carefully argued 
version of it, that of David Miller, is explained and 
defended against certain objections. In general, this 
chapter aims to prepare the ground, and then to advance 
the case, for such a responsibility view; only later shall 
we see that all versions of it so far have shortcomings 
which need to be ameliorated. 
2.1. Varieties of negative freedom 
It is often said that philosophical theories are prized in 
proportion to their incomprehensibility. Not so with 
Hobbes' celebrated account of liberty, its clarity is bey-
ond compare: "Liberty, or Freedome, signifieth (properly) 
1 ) 
the absence of Opposition" and nothing more. The 
underlying idea is of a self-activated agent moving 
through space. If nothing obstructs his path, he is free. 
If, however, he comes up against external, physical 
obstacles that restrict his movements, he is unfree. What 
we have here is a definition of liberty as unimpeded move-
ment or corporeal freedom - some would say of negative 
freedom pure and simple. Since it sets no requirements as 
to the source of the obstacle, only its location in space, 
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it yields, in that respect, a most permissive definition 
of a constraint on freedom. 
A basic problem about Hobbes' account lies in the 
fact that what freedom-talk is meant to be about is surely 
not free movement but free action. For instance, while I 
might be either free or unfree to enter my neighbour's 
garden, my cat never acts, only behaves; hence, we would 
say that it simply can or cannot enter it. Moreover, even 
if in a hurricane I were blown up against the fence 
surrounding the garden, my situation would not be 
described as that of being unfree to move further. This 
indicates that a constraint on freedom must restrict an 
agent (with the required kind of agency) from acting, not 
merely any self-activated being from moving. Another 
problem is that Hobbes does not respect the distinction 
between freedom and ability. The mere presence of a part i-
cular tree, which makes me unable to walk in a straight 
line through the wood, does not curtail my freedom to do 
so. Also, suppose C has been tethered by A to a location 
through which B is to pass. CiS body there makes B unable 
to move on, but we would definitely want to say that it is 
2 ) 
A, not C, who constrains B's freedom. So, it seems that 
the location of the obstacle (be it human or non-human) in 
space is not so important after all - that what we are 
hunting for is rather its source or origin. 
Oppenheim's theory of causal responsibility might be 
3 ) 
brought to bear here in saving Hobbes' account. Perhaps 
C is not the constraining agent in the above example 
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because he is not causally responsible for B's unfreedom 
although he plays, in a straightforward sense, a causal 
role in impeding B's action. This is what Oppenheim would 
be disposed to say - but his theory is based on a strict 
distinction between acts and omissions, the claim being 
that a person can only be held causally responsible for 
the results of his acts. Unfortunately, such a 'causal 
theory' is bound to be beset with the same difficulties as 
th~ act-omission distinction in general, and it does not 
yield plausible results when applied to particular cases 
where a person's options are restricted (pp. 38f.). 
Besides, since Oppenheim's theory is concerned with 
action, not movement, it has departed to such a signifi-
cant extent from Hobbes' account that it is hardly correct 
to speak of it in the same breath. 
The house of delusion may be easy to build but it is 
draughty to live in. Hobbes' 'pure' negative liberty 
account would apply to any self-activated movement, that 
of automatons as well as that of men. It does not acknow-
ledge certain fundamental distinctions that form the basis 
of all freedom-talk: between freedom and ability and 
between behaviour and action. More generally, it pre-
supposes a deterministic, mechanical universe instead of 
"taking free will for granted". So, if we give any cre-
dence at all to what people think and say about morality, 
we are bound to consign Hobbes' account to the philosophi-
cal scrapheap. 
It is always debatable what is to count as an 
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'extreme' view in philsophy. However, if Hobbes' account 
is extreme, a second variety of negative freedom, now to 
be considered, is at least equally so, while being as 
different from Hobbes' as chalk from cheese. Some 
writers, disillusioned with a mechanical, descriptive 
model of freedom, have been driven to view freedom as a 
moralized concept, directly linked to moral rights and 
justice. Maybe Rousseau's well-known suggestion, that only 
4 ) 
"ill will" but not "the nature of things" maddens us, 
has some bearing on questions of freedom; maybe nothing 
counts as a constraint unless it involves a moral offence. 
It has long been the view of the law that our freedom 
to do x is only restrained if x is something which we have 
a right to do. I do not take my neighbour to court 
because he forbids me to use his property or sleep with 
his wife. In law, such obstacles would not count as 
restrictions of my freedom. However, the question is 
whether the sort of freedom to which we have a right on 
the basis of laws or a constitution is of the same sort as 
the freedom in which we are interested here, i.e., whether 
legal and social freedom can be equated. The most notable 
attempt to define freedom as non-interference with 
(absolute) legal or moral rights is that of Nozick. For 
him, an obstacle counts as a constraint on freedom if and 
only if it is a violation of legal or moral rights for 
which an agent can be held culpable. Placing limits on 
other people's opportunities, or not providing them with 
palatable alternatives, is not a constraint on their free-
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5 ) 
dom, as long as we are acting within our rights. Not 
surprisingly, Nozick's idea of rights hinges on his gen-
eral theory of justice: the rights in question are the 
unconditional rights men are entitled to in a just 
society. 
Now, if a moralized definition of freedom were cor-
rect, interference with a person's rights would always 
constitute an infringement of his liberty, and vice versa. 
However, this is obviously not so, at least not in the 
latter case. A jailor mayor may not be violating a moral 
right of the convict he is locking up in his cell. For 
instance, if the prisoner is jailed by virtue of a just 
conviction, we would undoubtedly want to say that his 
moral right is not being violated; yet, his liberty is 
obviously infringed. Hence, a moralized definition of 
negative freedom is wrong. This simple counter-example, 
6 ) 
which has been invoked by various authors, seems here to 
constitute a decisive refutation. It might perhaps be 
objected that it circumscribes the sense of freedom 
relevant to the political questions in which Nozick is 
interested. But that would not be a strong objection, for 
what sort of freedom is relevant to political question if 
not social freedom - and what sort of freedom is being 
restricted when a man is locked up in jail if it is not 
social? Still, however decisive this refutation is, it 
only suffices to undermine a moralized definition of the 
kind that Nozick has suggested, not necessarily a moral 
definition of any kind. More will be said about that 
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later in the chapter. 
Although the simple Hobbesian account has held strong 
fascination for some liberal thinkers, the traditional 
liberal view, to which I now turn, is that an obstacle 
presents a constraint on freedom if and only if it has 
been deliberately imposed by human action. This is the 
position commonly attributed to Berlin (p. 7). Initially, 
this definition seems to avoid the extremes of the two 
accounts examined hitherto: it is action, not movement 
or behaviour, with which we are concerned, and what 
matters are not the moral rights of the constrained 
7 ) 
persons but the intentions of the constraining agents. 
It is no coincidence that this is the traditional 
liberal view of freedom, for it fits together well with 
liberal ideals. It enables us to distinguish, as Berlin 
8 ) 
does, between liberty itself and the conditions for it. 
If a person is not deliberately prevented from voting in 
an election, for example by laws that deprive certain 
segments of the population of the right to vote, then he 
is free to do so, irrespective of whether he has the 
educational background necessary to make a rational choice 
between candidates, the economic means to travel to the 
polling-station or is healthy enough to go there. These 
are the conditions for liberty, not liberty itself. More-
over, inadvertently preventing a person from doing x does 
not make him unfree; neither do institutional arrange-
ments, such as the laws of property, as long as they are 
not deliberately contrived to impede particular indivi-
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duals. A man who has acquired great wealth through good 
fortune or hard work has not necessarily constrained the 
freedom of his fellow-men, although as an indirect result 
some of them might be worse off than they would have been 
had he not been around. He has only constrained them if he 
has deliberately put obstacles in their path. That he 
might have foreseen the indirect consequences of his 
actions is not enough as long as these consequences were 
not intended. So, the liberal account of negative freedom 
seems to be in harmony with liberal political philosophy 
in general. 
It should be observed that, unlike Oppenheim's causal 
responsibility theory, this liberal conception of freedom 
does not depend on an act-omission distinction. In the 
former, omissions can never give rise to unfreedom. In the 
latter, it is possible that A refrains from doing x (which 
he might easily have done), thereby allowing an obstacle 
to be placed in B's path, and if such an omission is 
intentional, it will count as a constraint on B's freedom. 
However, this omission must be part of the causal chain 
leading to the obstacle's creation; the liberal conception 
does not allow that A's intentional non-removal of an 
already existing obstacle constitutes a restriction of B's 
freedom. Even so, the difference from Oppenheim's theory 
is one more point in favour of the liberal conception, 
again making it easy to see why it has gained its reputa-
tion as a plausible middle-ground proposal. It undoubtedly 
captures many of our intuitions about the nature of un-
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freedom. Yet, I believe that it retains aspects of the 
'pure' negative account which ought to have been omitted 
and omits aspects of a moralized view which ought to have 
been retained. 
What is so appealing about the view that only 
intentionally imposed 
freedom? Perhaps that 
trated at the end 
obstacles constitute constraints on 
it accords with the insight illus-
of chapter 1 by the stories of the 
runner who fell. We saw that an accident, inadvertently 
brought about by a human being, does not count as a con-
straint on freedom any more than a natural disaster. Thus, 
we were led to ask whether moral responsibility had to be 
located for us to want to describe B's fall as a case of 
unfreedom. Maybe that is true and maybe intention holds 
the key to moral responsibility. How could it? A likely 
answer is that the difference between consequences which 
are a) foreseeable and intentional and b) foreseeable and 
unintentional, is 
well-known doctrine 
of great moral import - witness the 
of double effect. Now, this dis-
tinction has been thought by many to be of much signifi-
cance, but I tend to doubt its value and, consequently, to 
be sceptical of the double effect doctrine (see also 4.4). 
This is not simply for reasons of personal prejudice but 
because of what I would call the moral arbitrariness of 
the distinction as applied to specific cases. 
There are some striking stories from Miller, dis-
cussed later in this chapter, that will illustrate my 
point, but for the moment we can envisage the following 
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scenario. Two adventurers are looking for precious stones 
in a cave. One 
while the other 
of them (B) goes deep inside the cave, 
(A) starts digging a hole at the mouth of 
it. A should know that this might very well loosen a big 
rock which would trap B inside, but he does not intend it 
to happen (directly or obliquely), he simply does not pay 
any attention to this possibility. Suppose the rock falls. 
B, who is trapped, shouts to A in anger, demanding an 
explanation why A took away his freedom. A answers: 'I 
didn't take away your freedom, you are just unable to 
leave. The fact is that I didn't intend to constrain your 
freedom though, admittedly, I should have seen that my 
digging this hole could cause the rock to fall.' Now, is B 
going to be satisfied with this answer - or more import-
antly, 
not. 
are we going to be satisfied with it? Obviously 
A tries to cash in on a distinction that is arbit-
rary with regard to moral responsibility, much in the same 
way as another distinction generally is: that between acts 
and omissions. Suppose the rock falls by accident without 
A's contribution. If, following that, A fails to make a 
reasonable attempt to extricate B, he is clearly respons-
ible for B's condition. The difference between a) A's 
deliberately trapping B inside, b) it happening as a fore-
seeable but unintended consequence of A's action, or c) 
A's failing to help B after he has been trapped by acci-
dent, does not seem to be of any importance as far as 
moral responsibility is concerned and, therefore, we may 
wonder why it should give rise to varying judgements about 
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B's (un) freedom. 
Here it could be objected that I have systematically 
misconstrued the liberal argument in order to give myself 
a handle against it. I have spoken as if the significance 
and appeal of the liberal conception must lie in its doing 
justice to the link between unfreedom and moral responsi-
bility. By showing that the spheres of intention and 
responsibility do not coincide, I claim to have scored a 
major point. However, what I have been doing all the time 
is to saddle the liberal thinker with an additional view: 
his claim was not that constraints on freedom are to be 
explained in terms of moral responsibility, but simply 
that a restriction must be brought about intentionally for 
it to present such a constraint. Responsibility is but a 
red herring in the discussion. Because the necessary 
intention is missing in case b) above, it does not involve 
unfreedom; neither does case c) since the entrapment there 
was not brought about by A's acts or omissions in the 
first place. 
Then, however, the question remains: what is so 
important about intention in this context if it is neither 
the relation to acts (as opposed to omissions) nor the 
link with moral responsibility? Perhaps, the answer may 
be, it is simply a fact of ordinary language that 
intention is always taken as a necessary condition of un-
freedom. But then case b) continues to pose a problem for 
the liberal thinker, for there ordinary language requires 
that we judge A to have constrained B's freedom - which 
-26-
contradicts the liberal conception. Besides, even if that 
conception always happened to accord with ordinary 
language, we could still ask for a rationale of the con-
cept of social freedom, which might then possibly under-
mine common usage. The examples of the runner seemed to 
indicate that this rationale is of a moral kind, a point 
which will be elaborated on once I start to examine the 
views of those who base their definition of freedom 
directly on moral responsibility. However, it should 
already be clear why I suggested that the liberal theory 
of freedom retains too much of the 'pure' non-moral 
account. It 
tion that is 
grounds its fundamental tenet on a distinc-
arbitrary from the point of view of moral 
responsibility, without suggesting any other rationale of 
freedom-talk, and without even having ordinary language 
going exclusively in its favour. Berlin seems to have 
realized these faults, witness his proposals (ii) and 
(iii) which go much further than a traditional liberal 
conception allows (pp. 6f.). However, it is not clear from 
other parts of his work that he has realized all the 
implications of his own realization. 
2.2. Freedom as a principle 
Before turning to an unmitigated responsibility view of 
negative liberty, it might be useful to delve further into 
the purpose and nature of freedom-talk. It has been 
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suggested by writers such as Benn & Weinstein, Connolly, 
and Miller that our language embodies a presumption 
against impairing the choices of others or obstructing 
their activity. We are interested in deciding when 
obstacles are properly seen as constraints on freedom, 
because our understanding that people should be regarded 
and treated as agents teaches us that a person's freedom 
should not be constrained, other things being equal. Thus, 
a question about the restriction of freedom comes to be 
closely linked with a question about justification. Saying 
that A restrained B's freedom is placing the onus of 
justification on A: it is making a claim that stands in 
need of a rebuttal. This is why Benn talks about freedom 
as a principle, upholding the importance of non-
9) 
interference and of respect for persons. Connolly 
defines 'principle' in this sense as "a general rule that 
places, for its adherents, the onus of justification on 
those who would break it; to accept a principle is to 
acknowledge at least a prima facie obligation to abide by 
it." He adds that most people in our society accept the 
principle of freedom: that every person should be allowed 
to do as he chooses unless overriding reasons can be found 
10) 
that justify limiting him in certain respects. 
On this account, a constraint on freedom fits 
Kovesi's definition of an open or incomplete moral term. 
It refers to something that is considered wrong prima 
facie and challenges us to bring forth some relevant 
justificatory considerations. 'Lying' is Kovesi's own 
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example. We might want to say: 'This is an act of lying, 
but go ahead and do it', but only if we can give some good 
11) 
reasons which override its prima facie wrongness. When 
Oppenheim claims that it is not the case that everyone or 
even most people within the same culture adopt the same 
moral point of view with respect to such concepts, he 
misses Kovesi's point completely. According to Oppenheim, 
there might well be people who think that stealing is 
acceptable, admiring Robin Hood for stealing from the rich 
12) 
to help the poor. My reply is that if anybody thinks 
that stealing is acceptable in general, then that person 
has misunderstood the rationale behind the concept of 
stealing. He would be better advised to say that there is 
no such thing as stealing; you simply take things from one 
person and give them to another. More likely, however, 
what such a person wants to say is simply that stealing is 
justified in many cases, perhaps in more cases than others 
will grant, and there is nothing in that statement which 
goes against Kovesi's definition of an open moral term. 
So, even if freedom is a principle in the above-described 
sense, the presumption against impairing the choices of 
others may be successfully rebutted in many cases. Inter-
ference with a person's freedom may always be an evil, but 
it is surely sometimes a necessary evil. 
The strongest challenge to the claim that there 
is a philosophically-relevant 'presumption of freedom' 
embodied in our language has been 
13) 
mounted by D.N. 
Husak. He draws a parallel to legal practice and 
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points out that there are two kinds of presumptions common 
in law: procedural and substantive. Presumptions of the 
former kind allocate the burden of proof: in that case a 
litigant has either the duty of going forward with 
evidence for a proposition p or the risk of non-persuasion 
with respect to p. If the litigant fails to convince the 
judge/jury of the validity of p, judgement is rendered 
against him. Presumptions of the latter kind create rules 
of inference, in which case p is regarded as a proof of q 
in the absence of credible evidence against q, or if the 
evidence for and against q is of equal weight. For 
example, p could be 'A has been missing for three years' 
and q 'A is dead'. Thus, procedural presumptions simply 
tell us who must do what in court, whereas the substantive 
ones can in some cases tip the scales of argumentation. 
Now, the problem that Husak sees is this: A 
judge or a jury must arrive at a verdict. Their purpose 
is to decide what to do in a given case. On the other 
hand, the aim of philosophy is to arrive at the truth 
about what to believe. There is not a need for procedural 
presumptions in philosophy as there is in law; in philo-
sophy we are not required to pass judgement here and now, 
we can suspend it until the relevant evidence has been 
obtained. Hence, the 'presumption of freedom' cannot be of 
the procedural kind. Suppose, then, that it is sub-
stantive. Arguments for the presumption tend to suggest 
that the mere fact that a given act is a deprivation of 
freedom is a reason for viewing it as objectionable. 
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Although that reason can be outweighed in certain cases, 
it still remains a reason against the deprivation. But 
then, Husak points out, the presumption of freedom 
functions unlike a substantive presumption in law which 
plays no role as evidence once (credible) contrary evi-
dence is introduced. Also, the former may lead to "double-
counting" : interfering with B's plan being considered 
wrong both because it disrespects his agency and because 
there is a presumption against unfreedom. In general, 
Husak claims that once a sUbstantive presumption of free-
dom has been created, the likeliehood of performing the 
required balancing of reasons incorrectly increases. 
14) 
Hence, there is a reason not to create it. 
The fault in Husak's argumentation lies in his 
insistence on modeling the presumption of freedom on legal 
practice. His position implies that if we know nothing of 
/ the effect of A's action on B except that it constrains 
his freedom, then we are not to pass a judgement, as a 
court of law would be required to, but rather to suspend 
judgement until more details of the case have been 
revealed to us. This is like saying: if you know nothing 
about the statement A made to you except that it was a 
lie, then you ought not to consider his action wrong, even 
prima facie, nor ought you to impugn his motives in any 
way until you know more about the relevant facts. But this 
evidently forbids us to define a lie as a lie (prima facie 
wrong) until we know why it was made. Thus, Husak's posi-
tion uses words we know ('constraint on freedom', 'lie') 
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in the way we use them, and then tells us that we are not 
to use them in this way. What Husak fails to see is that 
the alleged presumption of freedom is not something we 
decide to create or adopt, like a particular piece of 
legislation. It is embedded in our language as essential 
to the purpose of the concepts we use. Moreover, this pre-
sumption is not sUbstantive in the sense of serving as a 
distinct piece of argument: 'Constraining B's action was 
beneficial in such-and-such a way, the negative elements 
weigh about the same the presumption then tips the 
scales in favour of a negative judgement.' That is not how 
we think or argue at all. The presumption against the 
restriction of freedom is not something over and above the 
particular reasons against it; it represents the general 
case against interference constituted by these reasons, a 
case that may simply rest upon evidence accumulated 
during the long course of human existence. 
This is also why Benn is wrong in thinking that the 
presumption/principle of freedom must be understood in 
deontological terms, as part of a non-"value-centered" 
15) 
obligation to show respect for persons. In On Liberty, 
expounds his substantial, political principle of 
liberty about the "fitting adjustment between individual 
16) 
independence and social control", and he does so on 
consequentialist lines, with "utility as the ultimate 
17) 
appeal on all ethical questions". When he starts to 
argue that certain reasons for intervention (paternal-
istic, moralistic and emotional) should be ruled out in 
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advance as irrelevant, he is simply making the empirical 
judgement that the utility promoted by acting on these 
reasons is, as a matter of fact, always outweighed by 
their baneful effects on individuality and, hence, real 
happiness. There is nothing deontological about this 
specific principle as formulated by Mill. If it should be 
followed unconditionally, it is only because accepting it 
as such would have the best consequences. I do not see any 
reason why a more general 'principle' of freedom in our 
language could not (contra Benn) have similar roots -
being based on the accumulated experience of countless 
generations that constraining people's activity is usually 
18) 
bad. In the end, however, my understanding of what this 
general principle really amounts to will turn out to be 
slightly different from that of previous responsibility 
theorists (4.3). 
2.3. A responsibility view of negative freedom 
Dissatisfaction with the traditional liberal conception, 
and the realization that freedom is a principle, a pre-
sumption against the violation of which is embodied in our 
language, seem to have been the main spurs to Benn & Wein-
stein's pioneering paper "Being Free to Act and Being a 
Free Man", published in 1971. There, most of the basic 
ideas underlying a responsibility view of freedom are 
adumbrated, ideas later taken up and expanded upon in many 
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ways by writers such as Connolly and Miller. Earlier, 
Benn may have favoured the view that only intentionally 
19) 
imposed obstacles curtail freedom. However, in this and 
subsequent papers he observes that people can be con-
strained by "unreasonable social and economic conditions 
20) 
maintained by people with the power to change them": 
by people who do not necessarily intend to tread on their 
fellow-men's toes but do so through their negligence or 
avoidable omissions. 
In Benn & Weinstein's basic conception, freedom 
amounts to the non-restriction of options. They agree with 
MacCallum that freedom is a triadic relation. The free 
agent is free to do something relative to some possible 
frustrating condition. Talk of freedom presupposes an 
agent in a standard choice-situation where different 
options are open to him. If an option is closed or made 
ineligible to him by the acts/omissions of a rational 
being, who can be held responsible for the restriction, 
then the person is unfree. 
Benn & Weinstein undoubtedly mangaged to clear up 
many of the issues that their predecessors had left dark, 
but their account is not a very systematic one, nor is it 
illustrated with detailed examples. For a fuller version 
one may turn to the responsibility view formulated in 
David Miller's 1983 paper, "Constraints on Freedom". 
Miller's analysis is, I think, the most impressive which 
has been published so far, although, as we shall later 
see, it is not completely watertight. Let us start by 
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introducing the six examples he uses throughout the paper 
to illustrate his arguments and which are also taken up by 
Oppenheim in an interesting reply. One way of appre-
ciating the difference between two kinds of obstacles -
constraints and non-constraints - is to imagine situations 
involving the same obstacle, but differing in the details 
of its history. This particular series of thought experi-
ments concerns an unfortunate person, B, who possesses a 
room with a door which can only be opened from the outside 
and who repeatedly becomes trapped in it; in most of the 
examples, A, 
21) 
a janitor in the same house, also plays a 
role. 
1. B is working in his room. A, knowing that B is 
inside and wishing to confine him, pushes the door shut. 
2. A walks along the corridor and, without checking 
to see whether anybody is inside, closes the door. 
3. The wind blows the door shut. It is A's job to 
check the rooms at 7 p.m. each evening, but he is engaged 
on a private errand, and this evening he fails to do so. 
4. The wind blows the door shut. At 6.30 p.m. B calls 
to a passerby to unlock the door, but the passerby, who 
knows about A's duties, is busy and pays no attention. 
5. A comes to B's room and looks round it. B has con-
cealed himself in a cupboard and A closes the door without 
having seen him. 
6. The wind blows the door shut. There is no one 
assigned to check rooms, and no passerby within earshot. 
To be sure, all will agree that in case 1 B is 
rendered unfree to leave his room by the deliberate action 
of another human being, whereas in 6 the cause of the 
imprisonment is entirely natural and we would say that B 
is free but unable to leave. The intermediate cases are 
clearly more complex and bring out the pith of Miller's 
position. In 2 and 5 A's action is the main cause of the 
confinement, but in Miller's analysis only 2 constitutes 
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an infringement of freedom. There, A behaves in a negli-
gent fashion. He ought to know, being a janitor, that 
shutting doors without checking first if anybody is behind 
them is likely to lead to disaster. In case 5, by con-
trast, A does everything that could reasonably be expected 
of a janitor. B's imprisonment results from his own un-
fore~eeable eccentric behaviour, notwithstanding the fact 
that A's action is its direct cause. In both cases A is 
causally responsible for B's confinement, but I think we 
have to agree with Miller that it would not accord with 
common usage to claim that in 5 he has restricted B's 
freedom. The reason for this can only be that we are, in 
fact, not interested in causal responsibility when con-
sidering obstacles to freedom but moral responsibility. 
This also confirms the original insight from the end of 
chapter 1 where the stories of the runner were discussed. 
Let us look, finally, at cases 3 and 4. Notwith-
standing that in case 3 the main cause of B's imprisonment 
is a natural event, a contributory cause is the janitor's 
omission, his failure to check the room at the appropriate 
time. Similarly, the failure of the passerby to answer to 
the call is a contributory cause of B's confinement in 4. 
Still, Miller sees a world of difference between the two 
cases. The janitor has an obligation to check rooms; the 
passerby has no obligation to fulfil another man's 
duties, and although his conscientiousness leaves some-
thing to be desired, he can hardly be held responsible for 
the outcome. Hence, Miller concludes that whereas B has 
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been rendered unfree to leave in case 3, in 4 he is free 
to leave although he cannot do so. 
In sum, then, Miller's answer to the question of what 
causal history an obstacle to action must have in order 
for it to count as a constraint on freedom, and at the 
same time the upshot of his theory, is that the origin of 
the obstacle must be attributable to an agent who can be 
held morally accountable for its existence, i.e.: 
(x) (Ox & Cx) < - > (3 y) (Ay & Ryx) ), 
where 0 = (1) is an obstacle, C (1) is a constraint on 
freedom, A (1) is an agent, and R = (1) is respons-
22) 
ible/accountable for (2). This brings out the outstand-
ing characteristic of a responsibility view of freedom. 
As we have already seen, when A is morally 
accountable for 0, he can be called upon to justify its 
existence and if he cannot do so, he is liable to being 
considered culpable for o. The examples are supposed to 
show (and this in part specific to Miller's version) that 
A can be called upon to justify the existence of 0 if and 
only if a) he imposes 0 intentionally, having a prima 
facie obligation not to create it, b) he imposes 0 negli-
gently, having a prima facie obligation not to let it be 
created, or c) fails to remove 0 despite having a prima 
facie obligation to do so. The inclusion of b) and c) may 
be somewhat unexpected at first sight, especially to those 
used to the liberal conception, but Miller's convincingly 
argued point is that they are necessary to enable us to 
capture some of the most subtle ways in which the 
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omissions of one can contribute to the obstacles faced by 
others. 
It is vital at this juncture to be quite clear on the 
difference between a) a moral and a moralized account of 
freedom, and b) moral and causal responsibility. A 
moralized account (like Nozick's) links constraints on 
freedom with moral wrongness or culpability; a moral 
account (like Miller's) links them with moral responsi-
bility. It must be reemphasized that holding A morally 
responsible for a state of affairs is not saying that he 
is blameworthy: "Responsibility ... opens the door to 
23) 
questions of praise and blame without deciding them." 
Perhaps the janitor's errand in case 3 was of such vital 
significance that he cannot by any means be blamed for 
failing to do his professional duty; he could, for 
example, have been taking his critically-ill wife to 
hospital. But that does not change the original conclusion 
about his being morally responsible for B's unfreedom. A 
failure to grasp this difference leads Oppenheim badly 
astray in his reply. He adduces as critical ammunition 
against Miller the story I used earlier: of the prison 
guard who locks up a justly convicted criminal in his 
cell. Oppenheim claims that in Miller's account the 
prisoner is free to leave in such a case since the guard 
24) 
is not morally responsible for his confinement. This 
is, of course, misconstruing the very point of Miller's 
definition. The guard may well be morally responsible for 
the imprisonment, by locking the door of the cell, but 
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this does not mean that he is blameworthy for it, that he 
is doing the wrong thing. Responsibility is not the same 
as culpability. Oppenheim's example, as we saw, is telling 
against a moralized definition, but not against a moral 
definition. 
To illustrate more clearly the difference between 
moral and causal responsibility, the best I can do is to 
recount Oppenheim's analysis of Miller's examples, since 
he holds that any obstacle for which human agents are 
25) 
causally responsible should be counted as a constraint. 
Oppenheim, who is a non-cognitivist, is working with an 
operationalist model of freedom (8.4). To accept the moral 
dimension of what he takes to be a non-moral concept would 
be to wreck the point of his whole enterprise. The follow-
ing schema summarizes the conclusions Miller and Oppenheim 
reach on the six cases: (Who shut the door? J=Janitor, 
W=Wind. Constraint on freedom? Y=Yes, N=No) 
Miller Oppenheim 
J ( 1) Deliberate wish to confine Y Y 
J (2 ) Closes door without checking Y Y 
W (3 ) Omission despite obligation Y N 
W (4 ) Passerby turns a deaf ear N N 
J (5 ) B in the cupboard N Y 
W (6 ) No janitor or passerby N N 
As seen from this schema, their difference of op~nion 
leads to discrepancies in the interpretations of cases 3 
and 5 (and, as can be imagined, the arguments behind the 
conclusions in the other examples are also different 
although the final verdicts happen to be the same). For 
Oppenheim, 5 is a relationship of unfreedom such as that 
between the guard and the prisoner. A is the cause of B's 
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imprisonment, and whether he is blameworthy, responsible 
or not is beside the point. In connection with case 3, 
Oppenheim claims that on Miller's account B will be 
counted unfree to leave with respect to everyone who does 
not unlock his door, including those unaware of his pre-
dicament - and that this account thereby shrinks the scope 
of mere inability (as opposed to lack of freedom) almost 
26) 
to vanishing point. Thus, Oppenheim does not take 
seriously Miller's contention that only those who are vio-
lating a (prima facie) obligation towards B render him 
unfree in this case. 
I would not have spent so much time explicating 
Miller's account if I did not think that its basic 
insights were correct. His responsibility view overcomes 
many of the problems we have seen facing other accounts of 
negative liberty: the Hobbesian one, the moralized defini-
tion and the liberal conception. Moreover, it is much less 
at variance with common usage and intuitions than, for 
example, Oppenheim's theory, as shown by their respective 
answers above. A responsibility view has the additional 
advantage of enabling us to include under our concept of 
constraint certain features of modern society, notably 
economic inequalities, which are for various reasons 
excluded by other negative-liberty theories. 
However, even a detailed account such as Miller's 
leaves many questions unanswered, and some of the 
answers it gives may prove to be inadequate or wrong. Many 
such problems will be addressed in the following 
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chapters, but I shall end this chapter with an observation 
which is often taken to be a cause of some embarrassment 
for negative theories in general, and that would include a 
responsibility view of freedom. The observation is that 
the language of constraint is wholly inappropriate for 
actions that a person is forced to perform. For instance, 
an election cannot be considered 'free' if people are 
forced to vote; yet they are not constrained from voting. 
The conclusion of one of G. Cohen's favourite argu-
ments is that "one is in general free to do anything which 
one is forced to do". The two premises which are supposed 
to support this conclusion are that (i) if one is unable 
to do something, one cannot be forced to do it, and (ii) 
if one is unfree to do something, one is unable to do 
27) 
it. The conclusion follows from these premises, i.e., 
the argument is valid, but the second premise is wrong 
since we have seen that there is no necessary connection 
between inability and unfreedom. This will be further 
demonstrated in the next chapter when I discuss the 'im-
possibility view' of unfreedom. However, what is true is 
this: if a person is not constrained from doing x, he is 
free to do x; when he is forced to do x, he is not con-
strained from doing x; hence, he is free to do x when he 
is forced to do it. This argument is both valid and sound 
- but should it be of great concern to negative theorists? 
Oppenheim obviously thinks so, and to solve the 
problem he draws one of his operationalist distinctions: 
between being unfree and not free to do something. A 
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person is "unfree" to do x if he is restrained from doing 
x; a person is "not free" to do x if he is either unfree 
to do x or unfree to abstain from doing x. Hence, every-
body who is unfree to do something is not free to do it, 
but not vice versa since Belgians are, for example, not 
unfree to vote - but they are not free with regard to vot-
ing as voting is mandatory in Belgium: they are forced to 
28) 
vote. 
I do not think this distinction is helpful: it has no 
foundation in our language and simply confuses the issue 
at hand. (The former may not worry the operationalist but 
the latter should.) What would a Belgian person say if we 
asked him the simple question 'Are you free to vote?'? He 
would probably say 'Yes', or even 'I am more than free to 
vote; I am forced to do it!". He would not answer 'No' 
unless he understood the question to mean something like 
'Are you free with regard to voting?', or 'Do you vote 
freely?', which could be taken to imply both 'Are you free 
to vote?' and 'Are you free to abstain from voting?'. 
In general, discussions of this 'problem' seem to be 
making much ado about a trivial verbal point. Acknowledg-
ing that I am free to do x when I am forced to do it is 
not a concession for the negative theorist; he would 
simply add 'But then you are of course not free not to do 
x'. What the objector is trying to cash in on is the con-
tingent fact that the freedom to do x is usually not of 
much value to us if we are not also free to abstain from 
x-ing. Moreover, it is true that in most cases when we ask 
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if B is free to do x, what we are really interested in is 
whether he does x freely in the above sense, i.e., whether 
he is free with regard to x-ing. But clearly neither fact 
supports the claim that 'the language of constraint' has 
been shown to be inappropriate in a number of cases. 
Here it should also be noticed that if B is forced to 
do x, he is no less unfree not to do x although his desire 
happens to coincide with the only course of action open to 
him, namely, to do x. Otherwise, the successfully mani-
pulated slave would be the freest person in the world. In 
general, as Berlin has pointed out, there is no connection 
between freedom and desire; I do not become freer just by 
29) 
curtailing or changing my desires. 
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3. OBSTACLES AND THEIR SIZE 
In the preceding chapter, the problem of what is to count 
as a constraint on freedom in the negative model led to 
the conclusion that a necessary condition of a constraint 
is that an agent is morally responsible for its exist-
1 ) 
ence. Thus, a responsibility view of freedom emerged as 
the most promising theory of negative liberty. As yet, I 
hesitate to say the responsibility view since we shall see 
in the sequel that the ideas expressed by different 
responsibility theorists sometimes conflict in important 
respects. I myself shall be led to dissent from, and hope-
fully improve upon, certain elements inherent in all these 
previously-presented accounts. Hence, the responsibility 
view that will be defended in this thesis is, in the last 
1 . ana~ysls, a new one, departing to a lesser or greater 
extent from those of other writers. 
For such a view to be viable, many pressing questions 
about the nature of moral responsibility need to be 
answered. How far does it extend? How uncontroversial can 
it be? For the most part, these problems will be left to 
subsequent chapters. Here in chapter 3, I shall focus on 
a question that may not be as profound as some, but still 
demands an answer. Somebody might say: a definition of a 
constraint requires two necessary conditions of which you 
have furnished one - regarding its nature. But the remain-
ing question is how large or serious an obstacle must be 
to count as a constraint. Surely, there are obstacles 
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which satisfy the responsibility condition but are simply 
too small or trivial to count as constraints. 
In order to pursue this point, I examine in 3.1 five 
accounts of the necessary 'size' of a constraint, ranging, 
at one extreme, from the view that it must be an obstacle 
which renders an action impossible, to the view at the 
other extreme, according to which any unwelcome feature 
attached to an action can count as a constraint. All 
these accounts are found wanting in certain respects, and 
of particular note will be their failure to accommodate 
the common-sense view that whereas threats can restrict 
freedom, offers or requests cannot. Hence, some space is 
devoted in 3.2 to a discussion of the different kinds of 
proposals and to the notion of an obstacle, since that is 
found to hold the key to many of the problems posed. It 
will be argued that a number of writers, some of whom are 
responsibility theorists, have put the cart before the 
horse by trying to define a constraint on freedom without 
first giving due weight to the question what is, more 
generally, to count as an obstacle to choice or action. 
Finally, in 3.3 my conclusions are used to show the inade-
quacy of some current views about the threat-offer dis-
tinction. 
3.1. Five views on size 
The first account I shall consider is a) the impossibility 
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view, according to which a given action has to be rendered 
literally impossible for the agent to count as con-
strained. Thus, it is supposed to be illogical to say that 
a person was not free to do something which he in fact 
did. If prisoners manage to escape from jail by climbing 
down the drain-pipe, then they were free to escape, how-
ever great a risk they took in doing so, or however un-
likely such a feat appeared beforehand. This view is 
usually advanced by thinkers who are stuck in the grooves 
of the behaviouristic model of negative liberty as freedom 
of movement (2.1), thinkers such as Hobbes, Parent and 
Steiner, but they have found some unlikely allies, witness 
the Marxist G. Cohen (p. 40). No writer inclined to a 
responsibility account of freedom has, to the best of my 
knowledge, supplemented it by the impossibility view. How-
ever, there would be no logical inconsistency involved in 
doing so, i.e., holding that the two necessary conditions 
of a constraint on freedom are that (i) an agent is 
responsible for it and (ii) it renders the proposed action 
impossible. 
The main point in favour of the impossibility view is 
its simplicity, a grace not easily matched in philo-
sophical analysis, but its major drawback is that it sets 
ordinary language and intuitions utterly at naught. Could 
we say (or imagine) that a man imprisoned in a ten-foot-
square cage is unfree to leave (as he cannot possibly do 
so) I whereas a man placed inside a square of the same size 
marked out on the ground, and told that moments after he 
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steps out of it he will be shot, is free to leave his con-
2 ) 
finement? The mere asking of this question is enough to 
show the true state of the case. Surely, a man behind 
prison bars (although possibly able to escape) and a man 
who will be instantly killed if he performs some action, 
are both paradigmatic cases of unfreedom. The impossi-
bility view forfeits this fact - and that is too high a 
price to pay for simplicity. Perhaps we might, as Crocker 
has suggested, call the unfreedom under which B's being 
unfree to do x entails that B does not do x, 
3 ) 
a "decisive 
unfreedom" , but the fact remains that other, less 
"decisive", unfreedoms are in no way less real. Just as 
there are many circumstances in which we cannot do what we 
are free to do, so there are many in which we are unfree 
to do what we can do. Or are we really willing to hold 
that laws, for instance, do not restrict our freedom since 
it is generally 'possible' to violate them? 
To rebut these objections, one of the things that an 
advocate of the impossibility view mus~ do is to produce 
arguments for the counter-intuitive claim that threats 
cannot constrain our freedom. Steiner does so in his paper 
"Individual Liberty". There, the point is that all types 
of "interventions", as Steiner calls offers and threats 
collectively, affect the individual's practical delibe-
ration in the same way: changing his desire to do x into a 
desire not to do x. But as desires are irrelevant to free-
4 ) 
dom, neither threats nor offers curtail liberty. Day has 
challenged Steiner's argument, claiming that its first 
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premise is wrong. For example, when a highwayman points a 
gun at a traveller and says to him 'Your money or your 
life', he does not change the traveller's desire, which 
is, both before and after the threat, to keep the money 
and his life. The threat only makes him realize that he 
5) 
will not be able to do what he wants to. Day's point 
about the desire is right, but his own analysis of the 
highwayman case invites problems (pp. 52f.). 
I believe a simpler objection to Steiner's view can 
be made. The reason why the highwayman's threat counts as 
a constraint is that it affects a possible choice; an 
option that was eligible for the traveller is not so any-
more. If Steiner denies that an option has been closed on 
the grounds that the traveller could still say no, he is 
presupposing the impossibility view which his argument was 
meant to support, and is thus begging the question. If, 
however, he claims I am begging the question against him 
by assuming that making an option ineligible is a con-
straint on freedom, the answer is that I am simply uphold-
ing the common-sense view that his argument above was 
meant - but failed - to undermine. This leaves us with 
little more than an articulation of Steiner's own belief 
that the impossibility view must somehow be right. Now, 
Weber's dictum, that academic men feel as proprietary of 
their preferred vocabularies as of their toothbrushes, may 
be true. But claiming that a person cannot be considered 
unfree to act unless the action is rendered impossible, 
seems at any rate as unreasonable as employing a wire 
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brush to clean one's teeth. 
So much for the impossibility view. Next we turn to a 
view that looks like a natural outgrowth of my objections 
to a) and is, besides, invested with more importance for 
this study since it is the alternative suggested by Benn & 
Weinstein, and Connolly. Thus, in b) the unreasonableness 
view, a person is constrained if the proposed course of 
action is rendered impossible for him or made in-
eligible, i. e . , such that it would be inappropriate for 
the normal (reasonable, prudent) man to choose it. Never-
theless, a person might in certain contexts opt to perform 
the action: he could be a hero, saint or martyr, but that 
does not change the fact that he is, for ordinary, practi-
6 ) 
cal purposes, rightly considered unfree to do so. This 
view handles pretty well the cases that left a) stranded: 
of the prisoners, the man in the 'imaginary' cage and the 
traveller. All of them could try to defy their con-
straints, but none of them would, as normal adults, be 
expected even to try to, let alone succeed in doing so; 
hence they are unfree. 
The virtues of this view are striking; so, unfortu-
nately, are its vices. One difficulty concerns ignorance. 
Suppose a terrorist announces that he has chosen one 
particular citizen of New York to be killed in revenge for 
some governmental intervention abroad. John Smith happens 
to be this person, but as he does not know it, this threat 
does not make it unreasonable for him to walk the streets 
(where hundreds of people are mugged and killed anyway) ; 
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yet, surely it is a constraint on his freedom. It does not 
help to say that Smith is here constrained in a sense that 
differs from the ordinary: if A locks B in a room, B seems 
to be (socially) unfree to leave in exactly the 'same 
sense' whether or not he knows that the room is locked. 
The severity of this objection can be lessened by the 
modification that an obstacle, for which an agent is 
responsible, counts as a constraint if the (normal) sub-
ject, were he to know of its existence, would find it un-
reasonable in consequence to perform certain actions. 
Another problem is, however, that on the unreason-
ableness view weak threats do not curtail freedom. I am 
not here thinking of silly threats, such as 'If you don't 
buy me candy, I will tell the sun not to shine on you', 
but real ones such as 'If you do x, I won't give you your 
usual cup of coffee'. If x is something that the subject 
really cherishes, such a threat will hardly debar him from 
doing it. In this sense, many laws constitute weak threats 
since experience tells us that breaking them is a live 
option for normal persons. The problem for the unreason-
ableness view is that it seems more natural to say in such 
cases that the intended threat or legal sanction does not 
constitute a serious constraint on people's freedom than 
to say that it does not restrict their freedom at all. 
Moreover, some threats are of the nature that a normal 
person is not expected to find it reasonable to comply 
with them, however strong the threatened sanction is. On 
Aristotle's view, for example, matricide should never be a 
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live option for a normal person, not even for a person 
threatened with severe sufferings if he did not perform 
7 ) 
it. But surely, such a threat would be a constraint on 
his liberty. 
There is also a question concerning the invocation of 
the 'normal' or 'average person' criterion. If my enemy 
lights a fire in front of my door, am I still free to 
leave the house if the average person would find it 
'eligible' to jump over the fire? What if I happen to be 
endowed with less-than-average physical ability - am I 
then unfree? The answer could either be 'No, you are free 
but unable to cross it' or 'Yes, since what matters is the 
normality of your reasoning, not the normality of your 
athletic ability'. But neither answer seems satisfactory 
for they both imply, counter-intuitively, that we need to 
know a great deal about the individual characteristics of 
person B before we can tell if an obstacle, for which A is 
responsible, is a constraint on B's freedom. 
Finally, in taking the unreasonableness view, Benn & 
Weinstein, who want to insist that in general threats, but 
not offers, restrict freedom, are forced to concede that 
certain offers do, namely those which make it ineligible 
8 ) 
to reject them. If I am offered such a high sum of money 
for my house that it would be absolutely unreasonable of 
me to decline, then that offer satisfies both the proposed 
criteria for a constraint: an agent (the bidder) is 
accountable for it, and resisting it is ineligible for me. 
Hence, I am unfree to say no. The question of 'irresist-
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able offers' will be raised again in 3.2, but here it 
suffices to say that this and the other problems discussed 
above go some distance toward undermining the plausibility 
of the unreasonableness view. 
Day has proposed a third alternative: 
9 ) 
c) the con-
junctive impossibility view. For him, b) involves a 
paradox since it entails that a person can do a thing 
whfch he is unfree to do. In this, Day concurs with the 
presupposition of the impossibility view: a constraint on 
freedom must make a proposed action impossible. However, 
Day's point is that we should not look at anyone simple 
action but at the complex (i.e., conjunctive) action which 
is, in the highwayman case, that of having both one's 
money and one's life. The highwayman makes that complex 
action impossible for the traveller: before the threat he 
could unconditionally have both, but after the threat he 
cannot. Thus, the traveller's freedom is constrained. Day 
claims that this view explains why threats, but not 
requests or offers, can restrict freedom: the latter do 
not make the recipient unable to do anything which he 
could unconditionally do beforehand. However, I am not 
sure that Day is right in this. If I propose to a girl, it 
is impossible for her to conjunctively avoid disappointing 
a suitor and to remain unmarried - which she could before-
hand. Consequently, my proposal, ruling out a conjunctive 
action, will on Day's criterion count as a constraint on 
her freedom. Taken at face value, the conjunctive impossi-
bility view entails, as Miller notes, that any disadvan-
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tageous change in the environment curtails a person's 
10) 
freedom. That is surely much too permissive. However, 
if we add to it a responsibility view of the nature of 
constraints, the similarity to Miller's own account ((e), 
below) becomes striking. 
Dworkin and Frankfurt's so-called "second-order pre-
ference theory", which has recently attracted wide atten-
tion in connection with the free will controversy, could 
also be seen to provide a solution to the size/seriousness 
problem. I shall call this solution d) the identification 
view. In the context of a responsibility view of freedom, 
it could be spelled out as follows. Since an agent is 
responsible for any request, offer or threat he makes, all 
may seem to restrict a recipient's freedom. However, what 
must be noticed in these cases is, as always, not only A's 
responsibility but also the attitude B takes toward the 
reasons for which he acts: whether or not he identifies 
himself with these reasons - assimilates them to himself. 
A man asked by a relative for a loan might be glad to hand 
over some money to him, and is thus not unfree to refuse, 
whereas the victim of a highwayman does so grudgingly and 
with pain. He does not identify himself with the desire to 
11 ) 
hand over the money and, hence, does so unfreely. 
Generally speaking, in this view, having an effect on B's 
choices only counts as freedom-constraining when there is 
disharmony between B's current "first-order desire" to 
accept the effect and his more fundamental "second-order 
desire" to evade it. 
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The problem about this solution is that it again 
invokes a reference to the subject's desires. Only if B 
feels that the effect A is having upon him is undesirable, 
is A constraining B's freedom. Furthermore, the identifi-
cation view (at least as formulated by Frankfurt) turns a 
blind eye to manipulation: the most serious, if most 
subtle, form of unfreedom which, as Rousseau put it, 
12) 
"penetrates into a man's inmost being" . If B's funda-
mental desires cohere with his current first-order 
desires, it does not matter how the former were originally 
acquired. Consequently, the successfully manipulated 
slave, who has been led to believe by his that all 
the obstacles he faces are for his own good, is free. 
Later, the Dworkin/Frankfurt model will be re-examined in 
connection with questions about free will and autonomy 
(6.3), and there attention will be called to a correlative 
defect. 
After having seen the various weaknesses of the views 
surveyed so far, we may start to wonder if the notion of 
size (seriousness, weight, significance, etc.) is really 
of any value in discussions of social freedom - or if it 
is simply a red herring. Here, the fifth and final view 
which I shall consider may come to our aid. Thus, e) 
Miller's irrelevance-of-size view is not so much a new 
thesis as the claim that a separate account of the size of 
an obstacle is superfluous. For Miller, the moral respon-
sibility condition is not only a necessary but also a 
sufficient condition for a constraint; we need look no 
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further. Mere size turns out to be of no intrinsic import-
ance; at most there will be a contingent connection, he 
says, between the obstacle's size and its counting as a 
constraint, based on the fact that we are more likely to 
have an obligation to remove large obstacles than small. 
But "any obstacle, however small, may potentially be 
13) 
regarded as a constraint on freedom." 
Strangely enough, some of the things Oppenheim has to 
say about obstacles to freedom accord well with Miller's 
irrelevance-of-size view. While adhering in general to a 
version of the impossibility view (B is unfree to do x if 
A prevents him beforehand from doing x), Oppenheim supple-
ments it with a punishability condition. Thus, B is also 
unfree to do x if A will punish him afterwards if he does 
x. Even a small penalty attached to an action restricts 
B's freedom in this way; however small it is does not 
matter. But as always, Oppenheim carries this view to its 
operationalist extreme by assigning a degree of unfreedom 
to any given action in strict proportion to the actual 
probability of a penalty being applied. Thus, he claims 
that if 40 percent of all speeders in a certain state are 
fined, then drivers there are unfree to a degree of 0.4 to 
14) 
speed. This way of speaking would, generally, be most 
bizarre, and even more so in the case of an action such as 
speeding which is prohibited by law. As a matter of fact, 
if all obstacles were on a par with legal prohibitions, 
the 'size'-problem would hardly have arisen, for it seems 
obvious that a law against doing x makes us unfree to do 
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x, however 'weak' the threatened sanction is, or however 
unlikely it is that we will be caught. 
Miller and Oppenheim seem to be right in that the 
tiniest obstacle can sometimes count as a constraint on 
freedom, but the latter is wrong in claiming that in such 
cases, we do not consider ourselves constrained, period, 
but constrained to a degree of 0.1, 0.4, etc., according 
to the above criteria. The correct view here is clear 
and in accordance with common usage: if there are no con-
straints upon my performing x, I am free to do so; if I am 
constrained, I am not free to do x, however 'small' the 
constraint is. The cases examined earlier when dealing 
with the unreasonableness view should have convinced us of 
this fact: even a weak threat can restrict freedom, and a 
fire lit by an enemy in front of my door to prevent me 
from stepping outside is a restriction of my freedom, how-
ever likely or unlikely, reasonable or unreasonable it is 
that I shall cross it. To be sure, in certain contexts we 
might say 'I am less free to do x than y', but that 
expression would probably mean that while we are neither 
free to do x nor y, the constraints in the former case are 
more severe than in the latter. 
A possible cause of confusion on what it means to be 
constrained (not free) is the technical word 'unfree' 
which is, notably, never used in ordinary language, and in 
this thesis only intermittently as a short for 'not 
15) 
free' . Once philosophers start invoking this term, 
people get the impression that 'being unfree' must be 
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something much more serious than 'not being free', and 
thus a crucial question is begged in favour of the 
impossibility or unreasonableness views. 
Before finishing the discussion of the irrelevance-
of-size view, let us look at two more possible objections 
to it. Charles Taylor tries to cash in on the fact that 
some goals are seen as highly significant for human 
behaviour while others are considered less so. Thus, 
Taylor claims there is a world of difference between the 
authority's decision a) to put up new traffic lights at an 
intersection close to my home, and b) to forbid me to wor-
ship according to the form I believe in. Whereas the 
latter would be a serious blow to my liberty, the former 
is so trivial that it could not be called a restriction of 
16) 
freedom, at least not in a "serious political debate". 
It has already been pointed out that the desires people 
happen to have are not crucial to ascriptions of unfree-
dom; for instance, even if I am an atheist, a ban on a 
form of worship would still infringe upon my liberty. So 
what Taylor must show in the case of the traffic lights is 
something much more radical, namely that altering our 
rhythm of movement through the city is such an insignifi-
cant obstacle that no one could possibly be concerned 
about the installation of new traffic lights in his neigh-
bourhood - that no one could possibly consider that a con-
straint on his freedom. This is, however, much too strong 
a claim to make since most of us know people who would be 
more upset with a one-minute delay at an intersection 
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on their way to work than at a ban on some (outlandish) 
type of worship. There is simply nothing in the nature of 
a restriction imposed by traffic lights which can exclude 
it from reckoning as a possible constraint on freedom. But 
could not Taylor's general thesis about significance hold 
good although his particular example fails? I have yet to 
be convinced that it does, unless it is simply taken to 
mean that some restrictions are too insignificant to count 
as serious incidences of unfreedom - a point that is true 
but trivial. 
Benn & weinstein pursue a somewhat more palpable line 
of reasoning about the non-triviality of the alleged con-
straint by introducing a second reasonableness clause into 
their theory. They claim that while we can say that a 
person is free or unfree to do something without his 
having an actual interest in doing so, it is only apposite 
to use these terms if the proposed action is "a possible 
object of reasonable choice", i.e., if it is possible to 
see some point in performing it. The presumption against 
impairing choices does not arise unless such a point can 
be discerned. For instance, we are told that a man's want-
ing to torture his cat is not a reason for letting him do 
it; nor is cutting off one's ears a a suitable object of 
17) 
choice in this sense. 
Now, as we shall see later (6.3), there is a sense in 
which a person must be 'autarchic' for us to hold him 
freedom-evaluable in the first place. It may be that 
animal molesters or 'Van Goghs' are often insane and, 
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hence, not autarchic. However, it is apparently not this 
specific point about insanity that Benn & Weinstein are 
making but a more general one, along Anscombean lines, 
about the concept of wanting. For us to call an obstacle 
to a possible choice a constraint on freedom, the choice 
must relate to something wantable. As Anscombe puts it, 
"to say 'I merely want this' without any characterization 
is to deprive the word of sense". But as she notes, almost 
anything can count as "wantable", 
18) 
context, even "a saucer of mUd". 
given the appropriate 
In the examples above, 
the torture of the cat might be part of a performance in 
the Museum of Modern Art and the man cutting off his ear 
as part of a religious ritual; then there would be a point 
in performing these actions. A natural first step to find 
out if such a point exists is to ask the person: insist on 
his giving us a reason why he should want x. However, that 
procedure does not sit very easily with other things Benn 
rightly says about the burden of justification falling on 
the person interfering (not the one interfered with): "un-
less Ian can supply some reason why Alf should be stopped, 
Alf is free to go ahead. 
19) 
He doesn't have to have a 
reason." So, on the one hand, Alf does not need to have 
a reason for doing x before we can call obstacles to x 
constraints; on the other hand it is "incongruous to talk 
of unfreedom to do things that there could be no point in 
20) 
doing" - and wanting to do them is not enough. There is 
no logical contradiction here, but the two claims are 
practically at such odds with one another as to deprive 
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this second reasonableness condition of any importance in 
locating constraints. 
None of the objections considered so far poses a 
serious threat to the irrelevance-of-size view. Moreover, 
it seems to be the natural standpoint for those who favour 
a responsibility view of freedom. To conclude this 
section, a word might be said for the fascination that the 
unreasonableness view still holds for many responsibility 
theorists. Perhaps the reason lies in a conflation of the 
ideas of constraint and coercion. While some writers (such 
as Berlin) use them interchangeably, the latter concept is 
more at home in legal contexts where it has a specific 
function to perform. That function is to exculpate a 
person from moral blame and, consequently, often legal 
sanction. The rapidly growing mountain of literature on 
21) 
moral and legal coercion cannot be dug into here. Let 
it suffice to say that a man claiming to have signed a 
document under duress, because he had been threatened with 
22) 
a pinprick, would be laughed out of court, and that 
another man, extenuating his decision not to save a 
drowning child in a pond outside his office because he had 
been warned by his employer not to leave his desk, would 
not get a very positive response there either. This does 
not mean that a threatened pinprick or a strict order from 
your boss cannot constitute constraints on your freedom 
(in both these cases they do) , but it means that neither 
of them will count as coercive. 
Coercion is best understood as a subclass of con-
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straints on freedom, and a brief glance at traditional 
legal procedures indicates that the criterion most 
commonly used in picking out instances of coercion is none 
other than the unreasonableness view. In general, a sus-
pect can successfully defend his case if he can prove that 
the constraint on his freedom was of such grave a nature 
that it coerced him, i.e., made any other course of action 
ineligible for him as a reasonable, normal person. If, 
however, the constraint (such as the pinprick) is not 
deemed coercive, the fountain of pity dries up. Stressing 
the importance of the unreasonableness view in such con-
texts is fine, but precisely because of its use there, it 
is inadequate as an account of the much wider notion of a 
constraint on freedom. Needless to say, it is the latter 
that I am mainly concerned with in this thesis. 
3.2. Threats, offers and obstacles 
The discussion in the preceding section seemed to indicate 
that the basic insight of Miller's irrelevance-of-size 
view is right: A's moral responsibility for an obstacle to 
B's action is a sufficient, as well as a necessary, con-
dition for the obstacle's counting as a constraint on B's 
freedom. However, there is one problem with Miller's 
position that we need to consider. Recall that on the un-
reasonableness view (and arguably also on the conjunctive 
impossibility view) both offers and requests can constrain 
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freedom. That, I remarked, goes against common-sense. Now, 
the problem is that Miller's view can easily be seen to 
carry the same implication. A bidder is surely in general 
responsible for his offers to me; sometimes his offer (or 
request) may affect me adversely, by presenting me with a 
difficult choice, one which I find it hard to refuse, etc. 
So, it follows that offers and requests can restrict my 
freedom - along with almost any disadvantageous effect on 
B that A is responsible for. It is true that sometimes our 
intuitions or common-sense views may have to be discarded 
if good reasons are found for their inadequacy. Here, how-
ever, I shall argue that this is not the case: there is 
no ground to abandon the common-sense view that offers (as 
opposed to threats) are not freedom-restricting. 
The resolution of this issue may lie in the notion of 
an obstacle, one which is conceptually prior to that of a 
constraint: for something to count as a constraint, it 
must be an obstacle in the first place. Views a)-d) dis-
agreed among themselves as to how 'large' an obstacle must 
be to count as a constraint, without defining an 
'obstacle' . Miller rightly dismissed the size-question as 
irrelevant to the definition of a constraint, but he did 
not, any more than the others, pay attention to the notion 
of an obstacle. By ameliorating that shortcoming, I 
believe the irrelevance-of-size view can be made even more 
plausible than it is in Miller's formulation. 
The aim is not to give some new, fancy definition of 
'obstacle' which narrows its ordinary meaning; anything 
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which impairs our possibility to choose or do x rightly 
counts as an obstacle, whether it is a natural or a man-
made impediment. (I say 'choose or do' here for the sake 
of clarity. If we follow Aristotle in seeing choice itself 
as a type of action, we can omit the first part). Even not 
being sent to the moon or not being able to fly like a 
bird can create obstacles to our choices. The class of 
obstacles is thus very broad, much broader than that of 
constraints on freedom, for which an agent must be 
accountable. But the former class is not so broad as to 
include any effect on the subject. An obstacle must im-
pair, must narrow down possibilities or close options. Can 
an offer do these things? The simple answer is no, for the 
very nature of offers is to open new possibilities and 
extend the range of options, not to narrow this range. An 
offer is a proposal of the form 'If you do x, I'll let y 
happen to you' where y is something which creates a new 
option for us or makes an old one more eligible. Simi-
larly, a request does not as such close any options. In 
case we choose to decline, we have exactly the same range 
of options at our disposal as we did beforehand. If that 
is not so, what we are declining is not a genuine 
request/offer, but a threat in disguise. Thus, in the case 
of real offers or requests, the question whether someone 
is responsible for them, in connection with talk of poss-
ible unfreedom, need never so much as arise, for they do 
not present obstacles to our actions in the first place. 
This is not to say that offers do not sometimes carry 
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implications which make life more difficult for the reci-
pient after he has turned them down. But that does not 
mean that they constitute, qua offers, obstacles to his 
choices or actions. To take a parallel example, I may give 
you a written exposition of my view on freedom. You read 
it and say 'I hate your view!' 'Why?' 'Because there are 
so many printing errors in it!' If that is your answer, I 
can rightly 
What you hate 
accuse you of making a conceptual mistake. 
is not my view, but the printing errors in 
the exposition of it. Similarly, a person might not like 
receiving a particular offer - or offers in general. He 
might not even like being talked to at all. However, it 
would be a conceptual mistake to say that an offer made to 
such a person is an obstacle to his choice qua offer, 
although it might be so qua nuisance for him. If I know of 
his idiosyncrasies, and can be held resposible for annoy-
ing him, I am constraining his freedom, but the obstacles 
I create do not lie in the nature or the content of my 
offers but in his aversion to being approached in a 
certain way. 
Since Miller does not have a clear notion of an 
obstacle to work with, my counter-example to Day's con-
junctive impossibility view (of the girl who received a 
marriage proposal) also cuts against his irrelevance-of-
size view. Miller must construe this request as a con-
straint on her freedom because she might possibly neither 
want to get married nor to disappoint a suitor. However, I 
would say that the proposal is not qua request a con-
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straint on her freedom, for a request cannot ex hypothesi 
create an obstacle, but of course the proposal could be 
such a constraint qua nuisance to the girl. 
It should also be noticed that in certain cases the 
reward offered may, although the offer does not, con-
stitute a constraint on freedom. We can imagine an adver-
tisement: 'Relive the past, spend a day in the castle 
prison, chained to a wall'. If we care to be constrained 
in this way, just for the experience, we will accept the 
offer, but that does not mean that the offer itself is a 
constraint. On the contrary, it extends our scope of 
options instead of being an obstacle to them. This shows 
that advertisements do not curtail freedom (not counting 
subliminal advertising which is really a form of mani-
pulation) merely on the ground that what is advertised is 
potentially harmful (drugs, etc.). Furthermore, it should 
now be clear why silly theats ('If you don't buy me candy, 
I'll tell the sun not to shine on you') do not restrict 
freedom. It is because, although the person making them is 
responsible for doing so, they do not constitute real 
obstacles. In this, silly threats are distinguishable from 
weak threats (p. 50) which are potentially freedom-
restricting since they create real obstacles, although 
these are not considered very serious. 
Probably not everyone will be convinced that the 
argumentation above is sufficient to show that offers can-
not constrain freedom. 
which go against my view. 
Let us look at two contentions 
Firstly, many philosophers in-
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sist that there are such things as irresistable offers 
which can curtail our freedom. Thus, Benn claims that a 
special feature of character or situation can, in some 
cases, make declining an offer a course of action that we 
would not expect a reasonable man to take. Hence, the per-
son has a good reason to say 'I cannot refuse' or 'I have 
23) 
no option but to accept'. What Benn may have in mind is 
a case such as the following. Suppose an American billion-
aire offers me a million dollars if I run stark naked down 
Market Street during the rush hour. (Running naked in 
public is not a thing that appeals more to me than to most 
people.) In this case, I would have to do a thing that is 
highly distasteful to me to receive my reward. I might 
have to ponder a lot until I reached the final decision -
which would probably be to run. As I might explain, the 
prospect of receiving this enormous sum of money, even if 
accompanied by some embarrassment, would simply be 'irre-
sistable' to me. Secondly, there are philosophers who 
insist that some offers not only constrain our freedom but 
do so in the strong sense of being coercive. Feinberg 
takes an example of a woman who is badly off financially 
but a paragon of morality. She receives an offer from her 
employer to pay for an expensive surgery that alone can 
save her child - if she becomes his mistress for a period. 
This case satisfies Feinberg's criteria for a coercive 
offer: it offers a prospect that is not simply much pre-




Plainly, there is a possible interpretation of irre-
sistable offers as those which are so good that it would 
be stupid to reject them. If I am offered twice the market 
price for my rusty, old car, I would probably be a fool to 
refuse. This reading of 'irresistable' is quite innocuous 
and does not entail any constraint on freedom. Perhaps it 
could be applied to the case of the naked runner above; 
perhaps the billionaire's offer is simply too good to 
refuse for most people. But if I happen to value my 
dignity more than the normal person would, I can simply 
reject the offer and my freedom has not been constrained. 
However, we would hardly say that the employer's offer is 
too good for the woman to refuse; on the contrary, we 
would consider it a 'terrible offer', but still one which 
she somehow seems forced to accept. Once again, some con-
ceptual clarifications are required. 
Let us distinguish between two kinds of proposals: a) 
'If you do x, I'll let y happen to you' and b) 'If and 
only if you do x, will I let y happen to you'. I shall 
call the former tentative proposals and the latter final 
proposals. These are not the only kinds of proposals 
possible, but for our present purposes this distinction 
will do. Tentative proposals, which do not create 
obstacles to our choices, are offers. The reason why they 
do not impair any choice is partly a logical one: 'If you 
fetch the paper for me, you'll get a candy' does not 
entail 'If you don't fetch the paper, you won't get a 
candy', for the person might get the candy whether or not 
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he fetches the paper, e.g. by doing something else. 
Notably, this proposal does not either exclude the possi-
bility of the person fetching the paper but declining the 
reward, i.e., it does not imply that if he fetches the 
paper, the candy will be forced upon him whether he wants 
it or not. What the proposal really means is that if he 
wants a candy, he will get one if he goes on this errand 
for the bidder. A tentative proposal of this sort is a 
pure offer, for it obviously closes no option. Perhaps it 
does not propose to remove the right obstacle, or it pro-
poses to remove the right obstacle in the wrong way - or 
maybe to an extent not deemed sufficient by the recipient. 
But being offered half a loaf cannot be worse than being 
offered no bread at all, since a tentative proposal does 
not exclude the possibility that the recipient will get 
the whole loaf anyway. 
Someone might object, however, that such proposals 
are virtually non-existent: 'If you fetch the paper, 
you'll get a candy' always implies (in the popular, not 
the logical, sense) : 'Unless you fetch the paper, you 
won't get the candy'. Thus, the objector might say, even 
if a shopkeeper tells you that you can get a particular 
thing if you pay a specific amount for it, what he really 
means is that you will get it if and only if you pay this 
amount. Hence, the so-called tentative proposals are of no 
real importance in daily life. The objector may be right 
in that final proposals are often mistakenly or carelessly 
formulated as tentative ones, but it is not true that the 
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latter play no part in our daily lives. Tentative pro-
posals are used in bargaining situations which are very 
common, especially in trade. As a matter of fact, in some 
parts of the world most business proposals are of the 
tentative kind: even if you see a price-tag on a good you 
would like to buy, it does not mean that you will not get 
it for anything less than the price offered there. On the 
contrary, it is still up to you to bargain with the seller 
for the final price to be paid for the good. 
As noted above, tentative proposals constitute pure 
offers which cannot constrain anyone's freedom. Let us now 
turn to the second kind. Final proposals have the form 'If 
and only if you do x, will I let y happen to you l : I I I 11 
give you a candy if and only if you fetch the paper I • This 
obviously entails that the person will not get a candy 
from the bidder unless he fetches the paper. Final pro-
posals combine an offer and a threat; they are what some 
people have called 'throffers'. The 'if'-part of the pro-
posal signifies the offer, the 'only-if'-part the threat. 
The latter creates an obstacle to a possible choice, 
namely that of getting a candy without fetching the paper. 
However, the question still remains if the threat (that 
is, the obstacle created by the threat) is a constraint on 
freedom. To find that out, we must follow the advice from 
chapter 2 and ask if the bidder can be held morally 
responsible for the obstacle - here if he can be held 
responsible for not giving the person a candy without his 
fetching the paper first. 
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constraint on freedom involves a two-step 
First, we distinguish between proposals 




(offers, requests, etc.). Then, we apply a test of moral 
responsibility to the former to see if the obstacle there 
is a constraint on freedom. We already have some idea from 
chapter 2 what such a test involves, and a fuller descrip-
tion of it awaits us in chapter 4. One thing we know is 
that for a threat to fail the test of a constraint on 
freedom, it is not enough that it be weak (p. 50); it must 
be such that an agent cannot be held morally responsible 
for the threatened sanction. 
Let us now apply this procedure to the above-cases of 
the billionaire's and the employer's proposals. The first 
question to be asked is whether they were meant as tenta-
tive or final proposals. If the former was the case, both 
were offers and thus not possible candidates for con-
straints on freedom. However, let us assume that they were 
final proposals, i.e., that I had been promised the money 
if and only if I ran naked, and the woman's child would be 
saved by the employer if and only if she became his mis-
tress. In that case, 
creating obstacles qua 
parts). Then we need to 
both proposals are 'throffers', 
threats (through the 'only-if'-
ask if the billionaire could be 
held responsible for not supplying me with a million 
dollars anyway, and the employer for not helping the child 
without the sacrifice by its mother. Here, the difference 
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between the two cases becomes apparent. We hardly need to 
wait for any conclusions from chapter 4 to assert that 
whereas the billionaire cannot be morally responsible for 
my failing to earn a million dollars in this way, the 
employer can be held responsible for refusing to help the 
child unless its mother sleeps with him. So, neither Benn 
nor Feinberg succeeds in undermining the view that offers 
cannot constrain freedom. Benn's irresistable offers are 
simply too good for most people to refuse; Feinberg's 
coercive offers are not pure offers but 'throffers' which 
can constrain (and even coerce) qua threats. 
3.3. Threats and offers: problems in previous views 
A great deal has been written in 
threat-offer distinction. What 
threats and offers so far has 
recent years about the 
I have said about 
all revolved around 
questions of freedom or unfreedom. However, it may be 
of some interest to bring the conclusions of the preceding 
section to bear on the longstanding controversy about the 
threat-offer distinction itself. 
A common assumption of previous views is that a per-
son faced with an offer will not be worse off than he was 
before whether he decides to accept or decline, whereas 
in the case of a threat, whatever he decides will bring 
about consequences that leave him worse off than he would 
otherwise have been. Here 'worse off' is taken to mean 
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worse off relative to a baseline, involving the present 
situation and the expected future course of events. 
Lately, the exact nature of this baseline has become an 
embattled issue, e.g. in the writings of Nozick, Wert-
heimer and Feinberg. Philosophers tend to provide grist 
for their mills by concocting fanciful stories, and this 
case is no exception. I shall start the discussion by 
recounting some cases, contrived by Nozick and Wertheimer, 
a number of which are also discussed by Feinberg. 
Drug Case I. A is B's normal supplier of drugs. 
Today, however, when B comes to A, he says that he 
will not sell them to him, as he normally does, for 
$20, but will rather give them to B iff he beats up a 
certain person. 
Drug Case II. A is a stranger who knows that B is a 
drug adddict. Both know that B's usual supplier of 
drugs has been arrested and that A had nothing to do 
with the arrest. A approaches B and says that he will 
give him drugs iff B beats up a certain person. 
Drowning Case. A who is sailing in his boat comes 
upon B who is drowning. A proposes to rescue him iff 
B agrees to pay $10,000. Both know that there are no 
other potential rescuers around. 
Slave Case. A beats B, his slave, each morning for 
reasons unconnected with B's behaviour. A now 
proposes not to beat B the next morning iff B does x. 
Private Physician Case. B asks A, a private physi-
cian, to treat his illness. A says that he will do so 
iff B gives him $100 (a fair price). 
Public Physician Case. B asks A, a physician employed 
by the NHS (and legally required to treat patients 
without cost) to treat his illness. A says that he 
will do so iff B gives him $100. 
The crux of the current debate is whether the baseline is 
a statistical or a moral one, i.e., whether the 'expected' 
course of events is the predicted or the morally required 
course. Nozick, in his well-known paper "Coercion", opts 
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for the first alternative. Thus, in the Drug Case I, the 
normal course is one in which A continues to supply B with 
drugs for money; hence his proposal there is a threat. In 
II, however, A's proposal comes unexpectedly upon B and is 
an offer - whether B cares to accept it or not. In the 
Drowning Case, Nozick sees the expected course of events 
as one in which B drowns and A's intervention as an 
offer. It is not until Nozick comes to the Slave Case that 
he begins to doubt the appropriateness of his test. The 
predictable course there is one in which the slaveholder 
continues to beat B up, and the new suggestion would then 
be an offer. However, the morally expected (or better, 
required) thing is for A to stop beating B up altogether. 
This observation leads Nozick finally to modify his 
statistical test by stating that it applies unless B him-
self would prefer the moral test; then the latter should 
take precedence. Hence, 
25) 
involves a threat. 
for Nozick, the Slave Case 
It should be evident that in many instances these two 
test yield the same result, although for somewhat diffe-
rent reasons. The Private and Public Physician Cases are, 
for example, unproblematic in this sense. The morally 
required goes hand in hand with the statistically predict-
able outcome. Thus, those who take a line opposite to 
Nozick's tend to concentrate on cases where the results 
are seen to diverge. Wertheimer is a notable advocate of 
the so-called moral test. For him, the Drowning Case 
involves a threat since A is morally required to save B. 
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In the Slave Case, however, Wertheimer agrees with 
Nozick's final verdict, not because the moral test is the 
one preferred by B, but because beating up your slave (or 
perhaps slavery in general) is morally prohibited. An 
interesting discordance of opinion is brought to light by 
the Drug Case I. There, Wertheimer claims that A's pro-
posal is an offer since he is not morally required to 
26) 
supply drugs at all. 
Feinberg suggests, like Nozick, that we use a statis-
tical test, but his is an unmodified one which means, for 
instance, that the Slave Case would not be seen as 
involving a threat. However, Feinberg thinks that Nozick's 
analysis of the Drowning Case is mistaken. The statistical 
test there is not to be applied to what B might have 
expected had A not appeared on the scene but to what 
generally happens when a drowning swimmer encounters a 
boat whose occupants have the ability to rescue him. In 
such a case, the swimmer has an "epistemic right" to 
27) 
expect rescue, irrespective of all moral claims. 
My first doubt concerns the common assumption of 
these writers that, contrary to a threat, an offer does 
not leave its recipient worse off whether or not he 
decides to accept. If 'worse off' is taken to mean 'having 
had an option closed or made less eligible by the contents 
of the proposal', what they are saying is true, but the 
former notion tends to have a wider meaning than that in 
ordinary discourse, and as we have seen, making an offer 
can have all kinds of indirect implications which leave 
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the recipient worse off than he was before. However, this 
point is trivial compared to the second one, which is that 
all the writers seem to overlook the possibility of what I 
have called tentative proposals (pure offers). Notice that 
all the cases above are of the 'if and only if'-kind 
( I iff I ) , i. e. , they all constitute final proposals or 
'throffers'. The swimmer will be saved iff he pays 
$10,000, etc. Then the question is asked if these 
I throffers I are to be understood as threats or offers, 
when it is obvious from my analysis that they are to be 
understood as both at the same time. Wertheimer on one 
side and Nozick and Feinberg on the other disagree on 
whether the test to decide if the proposals are threats or 
offers should be a "moral" or a "statistical" one. In 
reality, what such a test might do is to decide which of 
the threats constitute constraints on freedom. In other 
words, when these writers think they are answering the 
question which of the proposals are threats and which are 
offers, they are really trying to ascertain when the 
threat-part of a 'throffer' is a constraint on freedom: 
they conflate the two tasks of distinguishing between a) 
obstacles (threats) and non-obstacles (offers), and b) 
those obstacles/threats which are, 
not, freedom-restricting. 
and those which are 
In my analysis, 
proposals, the drug 
owing to the 'only-if'-part of the 
addict is being threatened both in 
Drug Cases I and II with not getting what he wants, the 
swimmer in the Drowning Case with not being rescued unless 
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he pays the set amount, the slave in the Slave Case with 
not being treated more humanely unless he does x, etc. It 
seems strange how anyone could mistake this part of the 
proposals for an offer. However, I have claimed that in 
accordance with a responsibility view of freedom, a test 
of moral responsibility is required to decide if the 
threatened sanction constitutes an infringement of free-
dom. Can the dope peddlers be held morally responsible 
for not supplying the addict with drugs, the sailor for 
not rescuing the swimmer, the slaveholder for continuing 
to beat up his slave, etc.? 
Can Wertheimer's "moral" test or Feinberg's unmodi-
fied "statistical" 
b») although they 
test perhaps help us here (with task 
are unnecessary for task a)? Unfor-
tunately, neither will do. The "moral test" is really what 
I have called a moralized test, testing (absolute) moral 
rightness or wrongness of actions. Here, as always, it 
presents its typical weakness of being too restrictive: we 
are not able to locate a constraint except where absolute 
moral rights are at stake. However, that for which we can 
hold our fellow-men morally responsible is surely more 
extensive than that which they are, strictly speaking, 
morally required to do. For instance, it is difficult to 
imagine a theory of moral responsibility which would not 
hold the dope peddlar in Drug Case I responsible for fail-
ing to supply B with drugs although he does not have an 
absolute moral duty to do so. In general, previous argu-
ments against a moralized test apply here (2.1). 
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The "statistical" test is hardly more plausible. It 
seems plain that the slaveholder can be held responsible 
for his threat to the slave although he might be "statis-
tically expected" to continue beating him up. Also, it is 
hard to see what kind of an "epistemic right" the swimmer 
would have to expect rescue on Feinberg's test if it so 
happened that in this area, sailors were not in the habit 
of rescuing drowning strangers. It should already at this 
point in my thesis be clear that whatever the exact 
boundaries of moral responsibility are, they do not coin-
cide with that which we can statistically expect people to 
do at a given time in a given society. 
What I have been arguing for in this chapter is that 
the moral concept of a constraint, based on responsi-
bility, presupposes a non-moral concept of an obstacle, of 
which constraints are a subclass. This insight first 
helped us to see the controversy about the necessary 
'size' of an obstacle in a better perspective, and has now 
also enabled us to discern certain shortcomings in the 
literature about threats and offers. It is time to turn to 
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4. THE TEST OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
To retrace my steps once again: in chapter 2 I threw in my 
support for a responsibility view of negative freedom, 
possibly creating the impression that previous advocates 
of it had left little in this department for others to do. 
By contrast, much of chapter 3 was taken up by direct or 
indirect criticisms of their views: Benn & Weinstein's 
unreasonableness view of the 'size' of an obstacle was 
rejected, and although Miller's analysis was deemed more 
acceptable, it also was found wanting in its appreciation 
of the concept of an obstacle. Even more so than 3, the 
present chapter 
these and other 
will constitute a running criticism of 
writers, as regards their accounts of 
moral responsibility, for that notion is the cornerstone 
of any responsibility view of freedom. 
In 4.1 I examine the link drawn by Miller between 
responsibility and obligation; this, in the end, gives 
rise to a strange apostasy from his earlier insights. I 
attempt to show why and where his analysis goes awry. In 
4.2 the perils of overly narrow and overly broad defini-
tions of responsibility become apparent, and among the 
proposals which do not stand up to scrutiny is Benn & 
Weinstein's standard choice-situation model. As a result, 
a revised definition of moral responsibility, applicable 
to cases of unfreedom, is proposed in 4.3 and defended 
against charges of relativity in 4.4. My conclusions are 
then used in 4.5 to answer the question of under what 
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circumstances poverty can be seen as a constraint upon 
freedom. Finally, in 4.6 some attention is given to the 
problem of attributing moral responsibility to collec-
tivities. After reading chapters 3 and 4, a sceptic might 
ask whether the quest for a moral test of unfreedom does 
not import ten times as many difficulties as it removes. 
My answer is no. I shall continue to hold that the main 
insight of the responsibility view is correct, although 
the foundations of previous accounts of it need to be 
repaired. 
4.1. Responsibility and prima facie obligations 
In the final part of the paper where Miller argues for his 
responsibility view of freedom (2.3), he aims to apply his 
analysis to the ongoing debate between libertarians and 
1) 
socialists. That debate tends to focus on the distri-
but ion of wealth in the world, and a question that often 
crops up is whether such distribution is relevant to an 
assessment of people's freedom. Miller's basic observation 
is that nothing in the nature of financial obstacles dis-
qualifies them from featuring in a discussion of freedom. 
Like any other obstacles, they count as constraints if 
there are agents who can be held morally responsible for 
them. So, to decide whether a certain distribution of 
wealth is freedom-restricting, more than conceptual ana-
lysis is needed: the moral responsibility in question must 
be established. 
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According to Miller, this "requires in 
2 ) 
turn a theory of moral obligation". Thus, in order to 
clarify the socialist point of view, he finds it necessary 
to invoke two obligations: ensuring that the needs of 
others are met, and dealing fairly with people placed in a 
dependent position. However, for Miller these obligations 
are in principle contestable. Generally, his claim is that 
because libertarians and socialists hold conflicting 
theories of interpersonal moral obligations, ultimate dis-
agreements between them are inevitable. Often what the 
former call freedom, the latter would call unfreedom - and 
there is no rational way to decide who is right. 
I am not the only reader of Miller's paper to wonder 
if, by these apparent concessions, he is not cutting off 
the branch from which his own theory hangs. Any attentive 
reader will be somewhat taken aback by the sudden change 
of tone towards the end of his piece. Up to that point, 
the whole exposition has had a very optimistic air. What 
Miller seemed to be showing, e.g. by his stories of the 
office-worker and the janitor, was this: once we realize 
how the notion of a constraint on freedom is tied up with 
that of responsibility, we can decide when an obstacle is 
freedom-restricting, for there is in everyday situations a 
consensus on the ascription of moral responsibility (at 
least outside philosophical circles). Thus, Miller's aim 
appeared to be that of providing us with a decision pro-
cedure for locating and defining constraints on freedom: a 
procedure that somehow claimed the acceptance of every 
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perspicuous thinker. The reader may be excused for believ-
ing that here we had finally reached the conceptual common 
ground on which meaningful controversies about the value 
of particular freedoms could be staged - an agreement on 
the meaning of that about which we could disagree. Maybe 
this was never Miller's point; at least he ultimately 
backs away from this conclusion. But once this assumption 
of a firm common ground has been abandoned or relaxed, the 
whole edifice of his theory begins to crumble. Obviously, 
an interpretation of Miller's view as claiming, on the one 
hand, that there is a consensus on responsibility and, on 
the other hand, that moral obligations are a matter of 
irresolvable dispute, cannot be sustained without imputing 
to him a glaring inconsistency. It is therefore of vital 
importance to find out where exactly Miller goes wrong in 
his analysis. 
Recall that the core of Miller's view is that for an 
obstacle to count as a constraint an agent must be morally 
accountable for it. He is accountable when the onus of 
justification rests with him, and that in turn is when he 
has a prima facie obligation not to create the obstacle, 
not to let it be created, or to remove it if it is already 
there. (To avoid unnecessary repetition, I shall now coin 
the term 'to suppress an obstacle' for use in the sequel: 
saying that an agent A suppresses an obstacle 0 shall be 
taken to mean that he refrains from imposing 0, or pre-
vents its imposition by others, or removes 0 if it has 
already been imposed). The cause of Miller's apparent 
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about-face must lie somewhere in the links he supposes to 
obtain between responsibility, justification, and the 
(prima facie) obligation to suppress a given obstacle. 
Since the last of these three is, for Miller, prior in the 
order of explanation, it is the concept of obligation, 
or more precisely of prima facie obligation, that turns 
out to be the logical foundation of his analysis. His 
eventual claim is that having a prima facie obligation to 
suppress an obstacle is a necessary and a sufficient 
condition of an agent's moral responsibility for that 
obstacle and, hence, 
freedom. 
for its counting as a constraint on 
All moral theories, be they deontological or conse-
quentialist, have something to say about moral responsi-
bility, whereas the notion of obligation is more at home 
with the former. There it is used to denote the absolute 
requirements we must meet as moral or rational agents. 
However, the term 'obligation' is sometimes used in a 
looser sense by consequentialists, referring to whatever 
we are supposed to do to promote the best consequences. 
The first question we can ask about Miller's link between 





or, more specifically, by 'prima 
is pretty obvious that he is not 
using 'obligation' in a consequentialist sense. There, a 
distinction between unconditional and prima facie obli-
gations would be somewhat out of place since a consequen-
tialist does not acknowledge any obligations of the former 
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sort which are non-overridable whatever the consequences. 
Moreover, there is no mention in Miller's analysis of his 
'office-stories' of what promotes the best consequences. 
Hence, he must be using 'prima facie obligation' in a 
deontological or a quasi-deontological sense. 
It was W.O. Ross who originally coined this term, and 
according to him: 
Thus, 
(1) X has a prima-facie obligation to do A. 
does not entail 
(2) X has an obligation to do A, 
because it is consistent with 
(3) X does not really have any obligation at 
all to do A, he only seems to have that 
obligation.3) 
for Ross 'prima facie obligation' is a provisional 
label put on requirements which at first glance seem to be 
'real', but might later prove merely to have been 
'apparent'. In other words, you have a prima facie obli-
gation to do x if x is something which you seemingly have 
a real obligation to do. However, most deontologists have 
used 'prima facie obligation' in a way that differs from 
Ross' definition. What they mean are obligations which are 
'real' but not absolute. That is, they exist unless over-
ridden - usually by other obligations but perhaps some-
times by other things: I have an obligation to meet you 
for dinner tomorrow if I have promised to do so, but if I 
should have to save somone's life tomorrow, my obligation 
to dine with you is overridden. Hence, it is not an 
absolute but a prima facie obligation. 
My earlier suggestion, that there is no reason to 
believe that the so-called 'presumption of freedom' is of 
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a deontological nature (pp. 31f.) may already have thrown 
some doubt upon an attempt to forge a link between con-
straints on freedom and prima facie obligations. But a 
more fundamental problem now confronts us. It is well-
known that deontologists disagree on what obligations we 
have and, also, which of those obligations (if any) are 
absolute. However, most of them use the term 'obligation' 
rather sparingly; it would be difficult to imagine the 
usefulness of invoking it if we had, for instance, an 
obligation (even prima facie) to promote whatever another 
person happens to want. In the context of a responsibility 
view of freedom, it seems implausible to hold that the 
only time we are morally responsible for the non-
suppression of an obstacle is when we have a prima facie 
obligation to suppress it. Would it not be stretching the 
concept of obligation beyond the breaking point to claim 
that the reason why a father who removes a box of matches 
from his child is constraining its freedom, is that he 
has a prima facie obligation not to 
allow the child to play with fire? 
interfere, i.e., to 
Or, to take another 
example, would we want to say that a fireman rescuing a 
semi-conscious person from a burning house has, qua fire-
man, a prima facie obligation to leave him in there, if he 
knows that the person lit the fire himself in order to 
commit suicide? I take it that we would probably not want 
to say that, although we would grant that the fireman is 
restricting the person's freedom to commit suicide. 
Does Miller's link work if we only apply it to 
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omissions but not actions? Then, an agent is morally 
responsible for every action which places obstacles in 
another person's path, but he only constrains a person's 
freedom by his omission if he has a prima facie obligation 
to remove the obstacle. Let us grant, for the sake of 
argument, that some general distinction can be drawn 
between acts and omissions. Nevertheless, this modified 
version of Miller's claim fails. Suppose a person has been 
taken hostage by a terrorist organization and is kept in a 
room where a guard watches over him. Now, the guard acci-
dentally locks himself up in an adjacent room and asks the 
hostage for assistance. By refraining from helping him, 
the hostage restricts the guard's freedom, but it would be 
very odd to say that the reason for the latter's unfreedom 
is the hostage's obligation to help him get out. 
These three cases seem to indicate that there is an 
extensional difference between being morally responsible 
for not suppressing an obstacle, on the one hand, and vio-
lating a (deontological) prima facie obligation to 
suppress it, on the other. The father, the fireman and the 
hostage would easily fall under the former description but 
scarcely the latter. If Miller insists that they do fall 
under the latter also, he is using the term 'prima facie 
obligation' in a more permissive way than most deonto-
logists would allow. Not that I have anything against such 
deviant usage; deontological theories contain in general 
much baggage that I do not want to carry. But it creates 
problems for Miller's own view. Basically, it means that 
-87-
he can no longer use prima facie obligations to explain 
the onus of justification and thus moral responsibility: 
the former are no longer prior in the order of expla-
nation. For on this permissive reading, 'having a prima 
facie obligation to act/refrain from acting' simply turns 
out to mean the same as 'being obliged to justify an 
action/inaction', i.e., 'having the onus of justification 
placed on you' . Now, it is clear what would be meant by 
saying that the father, the fireman and the hostage are 
morally responsible for the non-suppression of the 
relevant obstacles because they are obliged to justify 
their action/inaction (in the above sense of having the 
onus of justification placed on them), although we could 
still ask why they are obliged to do so. But it would not 
add anything to say that they are so obliged because they 
have a prima facie obligation to suppress the obstacles, 
if they are ex hypothesi deemed to have such a prima facie 
obligation whenever they are obliged to justify their non-
suppression. 
So, to explain the three apparently clear-cut cases 
of unfreedom above, Miller would have to adopt a very per-
missive definition of 'prima facie obligation' that is at 
best synonymous with, at worst less clear, than the notion 
it was supposed to explain. However, when he starts to 
discuss different moral claims of 'socialism' and 'liber-
tarianism', it is not this permissive sense that he has in 
mind but the more traditional and narrow one: of different 
deontological systems with conflicting views of prima 
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facie obligations. There, it can be controversial whether 
we have even a prima facie obligation to help people in 
need: such an obligation must e.g. be "invoked" (contro-
versially) by the socialist (p. 81) . In other words, 
Miller needs the permissive definition to account for many 
common cases of unfreedom, but then uses the narrow 
definition to show that judgements about freedom are bound 
to be the object of an irresolvable disagreement. However, 
he has not produced any convincing arguments for the claim 
that there is a link between moral responsibility and 
prima facie obligations on the narrow reading. In fact, 
the cases above indicate that there is no such link: 
whether one is a socialist or a libertarian, a de onto-
logist or a non-deontologist, the hostage is restricting 
his guard's freedom to get out of the room. Perhaps 
obstructing a person by violating a prima facie obligation 
towards him as recognized within a certain deontological 
system, such as libertarianism, is a sufficient condition 
of a constraint on freedom; but there is no reason to 
believe that it is a necessary one. So, there could well 
be an uncontroversial sense in which we are morally 
responsible for the non-suppression of obstacles despite 
its being controversial when we are morally obliged to 
suppress them; it is not true that because deontological 
views of prima facie obligations differ, judgements about 
freedom will necessarily differ, too. 
In sum, Miller's claims about the link between moral 
responsibility and the onus of justification, on the one 
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hand, and prima facie obligations, on the other, are 
either trivial or wrong. They are trivial on the per-
missive definition of 'prima facie obligation' 
on the narrow one. 
and wrong 
4.2. Narrow and broad responsibility 
We have seen that Miller's preoccupation with prima facie 
obligations offers little in the way of clarification of 
the all-important concept of moral responsibility. The 
idea of connecting (un) freedom and responsibility may well 
be sound, but deep and difficult questions about the 
nature and extent of the latter still wait to be resolved. 
In order to pursue such questions, it is often best to 
start at opposite ends by looking at some very broad and 
very narrow accounts. If both of these prove to be too 
extreme, we may hope to find the correct solution some-
where in between. 
Consider first the broad proposal that we are morally 
responsible for all the foreseeable consequences of our 
action/inaction. This is more or less the answer that 
would be given to us by the so-called 
responsibility' and, curiously enough, 
his most permissive mood (p. 7) • 
'strong doctrine of 
also by Berlin in 
Here, however, we 
venture into a field mined with counter-examples. A father 
might plainly be held responsible for constraining his 
child's freedom to take part in a ball game if he 
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neglected to tie the laces of the child's shoes, without 
which it could not compete. The reason lies in his 
special role as the child's father. However, he would not 
be held responsible for failing to tie the loose laces of 
all the children in the neighbourhood, although he could 
foresee that each of them who had loose laces would be 
ineligible for the game. Here, the strong doctrine seems 
to go badly wrong since it would hold the father respon-
sible for all the loose laces which he could possibly have 
tied. Miller also enters the lists against this doctrine. 
His own counter-example is that because all those who wish 
to fly to the moon might be able to do so if human 
resources were devoted entirely to this end, we would have 
to say that those people are now unfree to fly there. 
4 ) 
This, he contends, is not a "helpful extension". It is 
simply wrong that we are morally responsible for not 
granting these people their wishes. 
Miller undoubtedly hits the point: it is wrong that 
just any humanly removable, remediable or preventable 
obstacle renders me unfree. Were that so, the subclass of 
constraints on freedom would take up most of the class of 
obstacles, since the great majority of everyday obstacles 
could possibly be overcome by concerted human effort; the 
domain of mere inability would shrink down to that of 
physical and logical impossibilities. It is odd how Berlin 
could turn a blind eye to this fact in suddenly giving up 
the liberal conception for the view that the freedom of 
social arrangements is determined by their alterability or 
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5 } 
remediability. Following Berlin, however, this overly 
broad view has been embraced by many negative theorists, 
most of whom think, incidentally, that they are upholding 
the values of positive liberty (6.1). 
If this view of moral responsibility is too broad, 
others might be too narrow. Let us look at three proposals 
which I see as falling into that latter category. First 
and nearest to hand are Miller's suggestions. (I take it 
that they are based on his own favourite conception of 
responsibility and obligation since he believes that such 
conceptions are radically controversial.) Miller is intent 
on not biting off more than he can chew: 
I assume ... that our theory of freedom will rest on a 
view of obligation that does not entail our being 
obliged to do everything in our power to promote 
human welfare ... on a view of limited obligation and 
therefore of limited responsibility.6) 
One example he takes is that the wholesale price of some 
commodity rises and, as a consequence, a shopkeeper 
raises his price accordingly. Now, says Miller, although 
the option of buying this commodity has become less 
eligible, we would not want to say that it constitutes an 
infringement of freedom. As the shopkeeper is acting 
within his rights in putting up the price, he is not 
7 } 
morally responsible for the rise. Recall that Miller 
does not hold the unreasonableness view on the size of an 
obstacle but the irrelevance-of-size view. Thus, what 
matters in his argument cannot be the fact that the 
commodity has only become less eligible (not ineligible) 
for the customer, but rather that the shopkeeper is 
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"acting within his rights". Miller would have to say the 
same about the Drug Case I (p. 72) the dope peddlar is 
supposedly acting within his rights in demanding whatever 
he wants for the drugs since he has no obligation to 
supply B with them anyway; hence, he cannot be held 
morally responsible. All this sounds rather counter-
intuitive to me, but that is not the main fault. The main 
fault is that if we take Miller at his word here, the 
foundations of his own responsibility view begin to crack 
for how can he now sustain the distinction between 
accountability and culpability necessary to distinguish a 
moral account, based on responsibility, from a moralized 
one, based on rights? Was the prison guard not acting 
within his rights in locking up the justly convicted 
criminal (pp. 20 and 37f.)? Why was that, then, to count 
as a constraint on freedom? The crucial claim of a respon-
sibility view of freedom is precisely that it does not 
matter if we are acting within our rights in imposing 
obstacles on another person; if we can be held responsible 
for imposing them, 
freedom. 
then we are restricting the person's 
The second 'narrow' view I want to consider is a view 
which one sometimes comes across when discussing moral 
responsibility, especially with non-philosophers. The idea 
is that each individual has a "quota" of responsibilities 
that he can be expected to fulfil. As long as he is doing 
that, e.g. by helping persons A and B, he cannot be held 
responsible for neglecting the needs or wants of other 
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people (C, D, etc.) that he might just as well have chosen 
to attend to - but his time and energy do not allow him to 
while he is doing his part somewhere else. 
Once again, I think this idea rests on a confusion 
between responsibility and culpability. To show that it 
does, we can make use of Kant's distinction between per-
fect and imperfect duties towards others. We have, in 
Kant's view, an unexceptional duty not to harm others, but 
we are only loosely bound to help others: since we cannot 
help everybody, we are to a large extent entitled to 
decide for ourselves which needy persons we will favour 
8 ) 
with our attention. It is important to note that on 
this view, devoting our assistance to A and B does not 
exempt us from our imperfect duty to help C and D, but we 
only violate that duty if we are not filling our 'quota' 
elsewhere. I am not a follower of Kant, but there is a 
lot to be said for his insight here. By invoking a quasi-
Kantian terminology, we could talk of perfect and imper-
fect responsibilities. For instance, we could say that the 
Icelandic government, which has decided to concentrate its 
developmental help on the Cape Verde Islands, only has an 
imperfect responsibility towards the starving masses in 
Ethiopia: one that it is not violating by its non-action 
there as long as it is spending all it can reasonably be 
expected to on Cape Verde. Such an analysis seems much 
more plausible than the verdict of the view under dis-
cussion, according to which the Icelandic government would 
have no responsibility towards the people in Ethiopia. 
-94-
This narrow view could help us to dismiss a charge of 
culpability but not responsibility: it seems apt to say 
that the government is not culpable for failing to relieve 
the plight of the Ethiopians in the example above - but 
that it is still (imperfectly) responsible for it. 
The inadequacies of this second narrow view should 
remind us of one thing: a correct view of moral responsi-
bility must be able to account for a distinction that is 
subtle, but nevertheless real, between a) cases of 
responsibility which is 'imperfect' or easily overridden, 
such as that of the Icelandic government towards Ethio-
pians, and b) cases where there is no responsibility at 
1 1 . a~~, as In the example of the father and the loose shoe-
laces of the children in the neighbourhood. 
The third narrow proposal is what I shall call Benn & 
Weinstein's 'standard choice-situation model'. They insist 
that what is to count as a restriction of freedom depends 
on the range of options that would, under standard con-
ditions, be available and eligible to the normal man. 
Thus, when attributing moral responsibility, we must be 
aware of various contextual conditions, in particular what 
9 ) 
is taken to be a standard expectation. For example, a 
shopkeeper who offers eggs at the reasonable price of 62 
cents a dozen cannot be said to interfere with our free-
dome Given the laws of property, which in this case define 
the normal conditions of action and therefore the alterna-
tives available, we cannot complain that we are being 
10) 
deprived of free eggs. 
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The problem is that the "normal conditions of action" 
can themselves often be put into question. Recall why we 
refused to accept the conclusion of Feinberg's statistical 
test: that the slaveholder's proposal could not be con-
sidered a constraint on the slave's liberty (3.3). The 
reason was that we refused to accept the presupposition 
that the slaveholder could not be held responsible for the 
(continuation of) the 'normal' relationship between him 
and his slave. Now, there is undoubtedly, as Cohen points 
out, a tendency "to take as part of the structure of human 
existence in general, and therefore as no 'social or legal 
constraint' on freedom, any structure around which, merely 
11) 
as things are, much of our activity is organised." In 
capitalist society, the institution of private property 
happens to be such a structure; and Cohen seems to assume 
that we are collectively responsible for it since we could 
change it for something better if we wanted to. That is a 
fairly radical thesis, for we may be inclined to doubt 
that some of society's most deeply ingrained institutions 
can be changed through individual or collective action. 
Could we, for example, decide one day to abolish the 
family? Social structures do change with time, but it does 
not necessarily follow that some individual or some 
uniquely definable group of persons can change them. This 
brings up questions about the nature of social entities 
and processes which will be briefly addressed in the final 
section of the chapter. 
Fortunately, however, I do not need a radical indi-
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vidualist thesis about social change to undermine the 
standard choice-situation model. Once we get down to the 
level of everyday situations and individual action, we 
ascribe responsibility to persons without worrying too 
much about the nature of social processes. Even presuppos-
ing that a person cannot change the rules of the game he 
is taking part in, it does not follow that he cannot be 
held responsible for obeying them. Once again, the 
difference between culpability and responsibility is of 
vital importance. It may well be that the shopkeeper who 
offers eggs at 62 cents a dozen cannot be blamed for not 
selling them cheaper, if his price is 'reasonable' given 
the laws of supply and demand, but this does not mean that 
he can automatically be absolved of all responsibility for 
offering them at this price. We must remember that we even 
want to hold people who act under duress responsible for 
the outcomes of their actions although, as I have pointed 
out, showing that B was coerced into doing x is usually 
sufficient to exculpate B from moral blame (pp. 60f.). 
So, absolving people of responsibility for the 
results of their action simply because that action happens 
to be the standard practice in a given society seems to be 
a bad mistake. Incidentally, Benn & Weinstein themselves 
are more willing than I to embrace the radical view of 
social change mentioned above, for they concede, in a 
rejoinder to a critique of their original paper, that "if 
we see the poor man's indigence as the consequence of 
arrangements that do deny him options that would be avail-
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able to him in some possible and better ordered society, 
we may indeed be disposed to say that his inability to buy 
12) 
eggs is a case of his being unfree to buy them." How-
ever, after that concession little remains of the standard 
choice-situation model (which was at any rate much too 
restrictive) . 
4.3. Responsibility and justification 
In sum, not all obstacles to a person's choices, although 
suppressable in a possible world, constitute constraints 
on his freedom since people cannot always be held respon-
sible for not suppressing them. On the other hand, the 
attempts discussed above to narrow the sphere of moral 
accountability seemed to undermine the distinction between 
a moral and a moralized test which is crucial to a respon-
sibility view of freedom. 
Maybe another responsibility theorist, Connolly, can 
point us in the right direction. He claims that the notion 
of a constraint "involves the idea of a normal range of 
conduct people can be expected to undertake or forgo when 
doing so restricts the options of others." This might seem 
little more than an echo of the already discarded standard 
choice-situation model; but Connolly's view turns out to 
be much broader than that. His point is that moral respon-
sibility for the non-suppression of an obstacle can be 
established "if agents are limited with respect to 
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important actions or goals by circumstances potentially 
alterable at less than prohibitive cost by agents that 
stand in a strategic position to do so". Thus, poor people 
can be counted unfree with respect to certain individuals 
(politicians, etc.) who stand in a particularly strategic 
position to enable the poor to escape poverty, providing 
there are means available which would not impoverish the 
13) 
entire society. 
We could call Connolly's suggestion the 'feasibility 
view' of moral responsibility, with feasibility being 
placed somewhere between possibility and normality: we are 
not responsible for the non-suppression of all obstacles 
that we could possibly suppress, nor only of those which 
we would normally be expected to suppress in a standard 
choice-situation, but rather of those which it is feasible 
for us to suppress, viz., those which we are in a strate-
gic position to suppress at less than prohibitive cost. 
Connolly's ideas seem initially more plausible than those 
discussed so far, but they still establish a test of moral 
responsibility that is unsatisfactory, because it is too 
broad. Recall the Drug Case II where B's usual supplier 
had been arrested and B got an unacceptable proposal from 
another dope peddlar. Now, the latter stood in a strategic 
position to supply B with drugs at a 'reasonable' price: 
it was definitely both possible and feasible (in the above 
sense) for him to do so, but there is no way in which we 
can hold him responsible for not offering B a better deal. 
If we did that, we would have to hold every person, for 
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whom it would be 'feasible' to offer us good deals at less 
than prohibitive cost for himself, responsible for not 
doing so, and that would include most people in our own 
country, if not the whole world. 
Instead of criticizing more attempts to define moral 
responsibility, I shall now suggest and argue for the 
following view: an agent A is morally responsible for the 
non-suppression of an obstacle 0 to B's choices/action 
when the question 'Why didn't you suppress 07' is an 
appropriate one to ask in the given context by a rational 
agent who is aware of A and B's situation, and where A's 
failure to provide a satisfactory answer makes him liable 
to blame. 
Recall that Miller's theory was that an agent is 
responsible for the non-suppression of an obstacle when he 
is obliged to justify its non-suppression, and that in 
turn is when he has a prima facie obligation to suppress 




explains what the onus of 
to justify the non-
suppression) really amounts to, without any recourse to 
prima facie obligations to suppress the obstacle: a 
recourse which either proved to be trivial or wrong (4.1). 
For me, it is sufficient that rational agents with ade-
quate knowledge of the circumstances should find it appro-
priate to ask A for a justification; then A can be held 
responsible for his non-suppression, and the relevant 
obstacle is a constraint on B's freedom. 
When I talk about agents with 'adequate knowledge of 
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the circumstances' demanding a justification, I am emp-
hasizing that objective, not subjective, standards of 
appropriate demands are being referred to. In general, if 
we ask whether it is appropriate of C to demand a justifi-
cation from A of his actions, the answer will depend on 
many factors having to do with C's position. For 
example, if C sees a child, B, being forced to opt out of 
a ball game because its shoelaces have become untied while 
A, whom C takes to be B's father, sits immobile on a bench 
nearby, it seems appropriate of C to demand from A a 
justification of his inaction. Meanwhile, another observer 
(D) knows that A is totally paralyzed and/or that A is in 
fact not B's father; hence, it does not seem appropriate 
of D to make the same demand. But surely, A's responsi-
bility cannot depend on what C and D happen to know about 
him. To overcome this problem, my definition implies that 
a rational agent, C, can be mistaken about A's responsi-
bility, because of his lack of knowledge, and that he may 
have to admit after becoming aware of the facts: 'I 
thought it was appropriate to ask for a justification, but 
now I know it wasn't; that's why I mistakenly believed A 
was constraining B's freedom'. Note that this 'adequate 
knowledge condition' does not mean that C must be omnis-
cient or able to read A's mind; it is only meant to rule 
out the possibility that the reason for C's demanding a 
justification from A merely lies in his ignorance of the 
basic details of the situation, such as who A is, whether 







A's responsibility for the 
us, I believe, with the 
correct moral test for which we were looking at the end of 
chapter 3, a test which can determine when threats do con-
stitute constraints on freedom. For instance, in the 
Drug Case I, it is surely appropriate to ask B's normal 
supplier for a justification of his threat not to sell B 
more dope unless B kills a certain person. However, in the 
Drug Case II, the question is inappropriate, for there is 
no sense (moral, statistical or otherwise) in which B 
could reasonably expect the stranger to offer him dope 
anyway. Furthermore, in the Slave Case, the slaveholder's 
threat 'Unless you do x, I'll continue to beat you up to-
morrow' , does constitute a constraint on B's freedom 
(contra Feinberg), for although the slaveholder could be 
statistically expected to continue the beating, it is 
surely possible to give a good reason of another kind 
(here a moral one) why he should be expected to stop the 
beating and, hence, it is not inappropriate to ask him for 
a justification. 
Another advantage of my proposed definition is that 
it honours the subtle distinction between imperfect 
responsibility and no responsibility (po 94). It is in-
cumbent on the Icelandic government to justify why it does 
not help the starving Ethiopians, but that justification 
may be easy to find since the responsibility is only im-
perfect. On the other hand, it is not appropriate to ask 
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the father why he does not tie the loose laces of all the 
children in the neighbourhood (barring the unlikely possi-
bility that he has been employed especially to perform 
that function). The responsibility in question is not even 
imperfect; it is non-existent. A person who asks such a 
question, in order to hold the father culpable if he does 
not supply a justification, does not understand the 'rules 
of the game'. His question makes sense but it is in-
appropriate in the sense of being foolish or unreasonable, 
just in the same way as if he were watching a football 
match and asked why the referee did not help the losing 
team by kicking the ball into their opponent's goal. Such 
a person would neither understand what the game of foot-
ball nor the game of asking for a justification is all 
about. 
My test of moral responsibility also enables us to 
see what exactly is true in the claim that there is a 
'principle of freedom' embodied in our language, a claim 
often made by responsibility theorists (2.2). It cannot be 
right that this principle amounts to a general presumption 
against impairing the choices of others or obstructing 
their activity, for we are doing so all the time without 
it being considered appropriate to ask us for a justifi-
cation: the father is impairing the possible choices of 
those children whose loose laces he does not tie. What is 
true, on the other hand, is that there is a presumption 
against constraining other people's freedom. Thus, freedom 
is a 'principle' in the sense that when the onus of 
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justification can be placed on us for the non-suppression 
of an obstacle, to avoid blame we must be able to explain 
satisfactorily our non-suppression. This means that the 
connection between the principle of freedom and the onus 
of justification is more intimate than previous writers 
may have realized. It is not that we first locate 
instances of un freedom and then place the onus of justifi-
cation on the constraining agents; this onus is a defining 
characteristic of what constitutes unfreedom in the first 
place. When it can be placed on a specific person, A, that 
person is responsible for the given obstacle to B's choice 




(p. 27) which implies 
definition of a 
that accepting the 
principle of freedom is to acknowledge at least a prima 
facie obligation to suppress a given obstacle in case the 
onus of justification has been placed on us. But surely, 
Connolly might say, given your objective standard of 
appropriateness, where A and B's real situation is known 
to us, A cannot have an obligation to justify not doing x 
unless he has at least a prima facie obligation to do x. 
Once again, the answer hinges on the meaning we want to 
give to the term 'prima facie obligation'. My response 
here is much the same as against Miller earlier (4.1). I 
think it is more useful in a moral inquiry to retain 
Miller's narrow definition of 'prima facie obligation', 
where different deontological systems can disagree on the 
prima facie obligations we have and I, as a conse-
-104-
quentialist, can even refuse ever to invoke the term in my 
normative arguments. 
As I have spelled it out, A's obligation to justify 
the non-suppression of an obstacle simply implies that a 
good reason can be given why A could have been expected 
(in some sense of , expected' ) to suppress the obstacle. 
For instance, we might say to a father removing a box of 
matches from his child: 'Wouldn't it have been good if you 
had used this opportunity to teach your child to be 
responsible for the consequences of its own actions?' The 
father would probably provide us with overriding reasons 
against our point, but it is still a perfectly respect-
able and understandable one. If he did not have any such 
reasons, he would be liable to blame. But does this neces-
sarily entail that he had a (prima facie) obligation to 
allow his child to play with the matches? On the contrary, 
I think one possible recourse for the father, in ful-
filling the obligation to justify his action, would be to 
insist that he had no obligation whatsoever to allow the 
child to play with fire! If we prefer to use 'prima facie 
obligation' in the wide sense in which having a good 
reason to do x entails having a prima facie obligation to 
do it, the objection imputed to Connolly above may hold 
good, but then the force of the 'because' in 'He has 
an obligation to justify not suppressing 0 because he 
had a (prima facie) obligation to suppress 0' is lost 
(p. 87). 
-105-
4.4. The threat of relativity 
It is now time to consider charges of relativity that 
could be brought against my test of moral responsibility. 
A possible objector might grant that an agent is morally 
responsible for the non-suppression of an obstacle when he 
can be appropriately asked to justify it, but still deny 
that this yields an uncontroversial definition of respon-
sibility and, hence, of constraints on freedom. The 
objector would claim that once I start to flesh out this 
suggestion and apply it to specific cases, the results are 
influenced by the fact that I am a consequentialist of a 
sort, although not a utilitarian. Unfortunately for you, 
the objector would say, rational agents do not agree on 
when it is appropriate to ask for a justification. Some 
utilitarians, for example, find it appropriate to ask such 
questions about all the foreseeable effects of our acts/ 
omissions, whereas many deontologists have a much narrower 
conception of what is appropriate, some of them so much so 
that they find it inappropriate to ask for a justification 
of anything but intended effects. Thus, the objector would 
continue, the general moral perspective determines what 
reasons you are willing to accept as appropriate, and the 
results of your test of moral responsibility will always 
be relative to such a perspective. In reply, I shall argue 
that, given their own moral standpoints, the utilitarians 
and deontologists referred to by the objector would here 
be mistaken in holding the views ascribed to them. 
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It is true that the strong doctrine of responsibility 
is often imputed to utilitarians, but I see no reason why 
any coherent utilitarians should embrace it. For instance, 
if they claimed that a father could appropriately be asked 
to justify his not tying the shoelaces of all the children 
in the neighbourhood, this would require them to give us a 
reason, satisfying a minimum criterion of plausibility, 
why he could have been expected to do so. What kind of a 
reason might these (imaginary) utilitarians produce? The 
only one I can think of is that the father could possibly 
have tied all the laces, by devoting all his time and 
energy to it, but that reason happens to be counter-
productive from the utilitarian standpoint itself by mak-
ing unrealistic demands of people. Thus, there are sound 
utilitarian reasons for not holding the strong doctrine of 
responsibility. 
To examine the objector's claim about deontologists, 
it is worth looking at what Antony Duff has to say about 
the way "absolutists" may view responsibility. Generally 
speaking, Duff holds that ascribing responsibility to an 
agent for the effect of his action is claiming that he 
should (not does) see it as relevant as providing a 
reason against the action - and that he should be answer-
able for it. Duff then thinks of a possible absolutist 
analysis of a scenario where a person (Albert) could save 
five lives by killing, with intent, one innocent. The 
absolutist believes that killing with intent is absolutely 
prohibited. He also believes that this absolute prohibi-
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tion limits his responsibility by requiring him to ignore 
as irrelevant effects which would otherwise have been 
relevant. Here, he sees the fate of the five as irrelevant 
to his decision, as something which he should not regard 
as a reason against refusing to kill the innocent. In this 
way, the absolutist can understand the doctrine of double 
effect as absolving him of responsibility for those of his 
14) 
acts which are not directly intended. 
Duff realizes that the obvious objection to this is 
that an effect such as five deaths must always be signifi-
cant for an agent's actions and that he must be able to 
justify these deaths by reference to reasons which carry 
more weight in the particular cases or in every case. 
Duff's answer to this objection is that it "fails because 
it distorts the status and the meaning of the absolute 
prohibition on killing the innocent which informs Albert's 
thought and action". It ascribes to him the belief that it 
is better or more important not intending to kill the one 
innocent than saving the other five, but fails to see that 
the absolute prohibition excludes precisely such con-
15) 
siderations of good or bad consequences. 
The problem about Duff's answer is that the objection 
does not purport to describe the considerations which do 
inform Albert's actions but those which should do so -
which is in full accordance with Duff's own view above of 
how responsibility is to be ascribed. Furthermore, as Duff 
himself explains, the principle of double effect, which 
distinguishes an agent's relationship to the intended 
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results of his actions from that to the effects he fore-
sees but does not intend, can be understood in different 
ways. I have already stated that I am generally suspicious 
of the moral fruitfulness of this principle (p. 23). How-
ever, if it is taken to mean that it may be morally right 
to do a good act in the knowledge that bad consequences 
will ensue, it is at least an intellectually respectable 
principle which can be argued for or against on substan-
tial grounds. If, on the other hand, as Duff holds, it can 
be taken to mean that when you intentionally do a good act 
in the knowledge that bad consequences ensue, you are not 
morally responsible for those consequences, it begins to 
sound too morally bizarre to be taken seriously and is 
thus inimical to the absolutist's own cause. 
There is a lively ongoing debate about intention 
which is largely outside the purview of this study. What I 
can say in brief compass is that I agree with Kenny that 
"it is not usually natural to speak of someone as intend-
ing foreseen consequences of his actions when these are 
16) 
unwanted or when he is merely indifferent to them." I 
also agree with George Graham's taxonomy, according to 
which something can be done a) with the intention of doing 
it, b) intentionally but without the intention of doing it 
(things brought about as foreseen avoidable consequences 
17) 
of intended doings), and c) non-intentionally. A prin-
ciple of double effect may perhaps be invoked to distin-
guish between a) and b) on the one hand and c) on the 
other, or between a) on the one hand, b) and c) on the 
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other, with the aim of making some point in a moral 
debate. But neither distinction has any bearing on the 
definition of moral responsibility, for we can obviously 
be held responsible for many acts which fall under c) (as 
18) 
well as a) and b) , e.g. acts of negligence. 
Interestingly enough, as far as responsibility for 
the non-suppression of obstacles is concerned, it is not 
only that intention (direct or oblique) is not a necessary 
condition; it is not even sufficient. Let us return once 
again to the case of the loose shoelaces: even though the 
father might go for a walk through the neighbourhood with 
the sole intention of refraining from tying any loose 
shoelaces he came across, and might rejoice each time that 
this happened, he would still not be morally responsible 
for the obstacles he failed to remove by not tying the 
laces, since it would still be inappropriate to ask him to 
justify these particular omissions. 
This observation sheds light on an important point. 
There is no such thing as moral responsibility 
simpliciter; we are always morally responsible for our 
actions with regard to some effect, and how this effect is 
described is determined by our purpose in ascribing 
19) 
responsibility in the given context. For example, what 
I have been saying so far concerns exclusively our respon-
sibility for obstacles to people's choices. Establishing 
such responsibility is placing the onus of justification 
on the constraining-agent; he is liable to blame unless he 
can supply us with a morally acceptable reason why he did 
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not suppress the obstacle. 
Meanwhile, we must remember that there is another 
sense in which we ought to be prepared to justify our 
actions generally, i.e., show that they are rational or 
even reasonable. So, in that sense a person (A) would be 
morally responsible for taking his car out of the garage 
in the morning and driving to work, if only because he 
supposedly has a free will and does this as a result of a 
voluntary decision (or an Aristotelian habit, which is 
also voluntary). Hence, I could appropriately ask him to 
'justify' what he is doing to see if it is a rational 
course of action - and in this sense, intention is surely 
sufficient for responsibility. However, even if I am 
delayed for a minute at an intersection because A happens 
to be driving in front of me, it would not be appropriate 
to ask him to justify his having created an obstacle to my 
choices (by altering my preferred rhythm of movement 
through the city). In other words, A could not be held 
morally responsible for that obstacle; or, to be more 
exact, if I asked a question like that in order to hold 
him responsible for constraining my freedom, I would have 
to give a good reason for asking that question, a reason 
which other people could acknowledge, e.g. my reasonable 
suspicion that A has a motive for holding me up when I am 
on my way to work. Then I could at least say that I 
thought he was constraining my freedom. 
But is this not the same as taking the standard 
choice-situation (here = the ordinary traffic conditions) 
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as given, and as beyond the scope of responsibility, like 
Benn & weinstein do? No, since that very choice-situation 
might still be questioned in many ways. I could, for 
example, appropriately ask the relevant authorities why 
they put up traffic lights at this intersection where they 
were not needed, delaying the traffic considerably instead 
of expediating it, and as I have already touched upon (pp. 
57f.), there is nothing in the nature of traffic lights or 
other standard conditions of traffic that excludes them a 
priori from counting as possible constraints on freedom. 
We simply have to find an agent who is morally responsible 
for them as obstacles to our choices. 
Recall that this observation about the different pur-
poses behind ascribing moral responsibility is an offshoot 
of my answer to the original objection that what we deem 
appropriate in asking for a justification is relative to 
our general moral perspectives. The drift of my answer 
was that the views imputed to the utilitarian and the 
absolutist would work against the plausibility of their 
own substantial moral beliefs. Arguably, these views 
also suggest that what we can appropriately be asked to 
justify is something quite different from what the non-
philosopher in the street would think. His understanding 
would, I believe, be that we can appropriately ask people 
to justify the non-suppression of those obstacles which we 
have some plausible reason for expecting them to suppress 
- and it is this simple understanding that I have been 
trying to capture by my account of our moral responsi-
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bility for the non-suppression of obstacles. 
However, once we start to appeal to the intuitions or 
beliefs of the ordinary man, 
emerges, this time not with 
cal standpoints, but rather 
a new threat of relativism 
regard to complex philosophi-
to the varying customs and 
intuitions of ordinary people in different societies. 
Since I believe that, in general, relativism is the most 
serious threat facing any conceptual or substantial moral 
thesis, this is also an objection that we need to look at 
in some detail. 
20) 
Let us start by considering a Dating Case in which 
a man has dated a woman for three months without any 
sexual intimacy and then suddenly tells her that he will 
not take her out again unless she sleeps with him. Now, 
someone might ask if he is constraining her freedom by his 
implicit threat - which in my analysis would be the same 
question as 'Is it appropriate to ask him 
cation of it in this context?'. The point 
for a justifi-
of the objec-
tion, which the story is meant to highlight, is that you 
do not really know what is the normal moral or socially 
expected course of events until you know quite a lot about 
the context (time, place, etc.) - and until you know about 
the expected course, you cannot answer the question if the 
man can appropriately be called upon to justify his ulti-
matum. Is the story set in Mormon Utah or promiscuous 
Hollywood? What are the views of the parties involved on 
pre-marital sex? So, no judgements about freedom in 
society or community S can be passed by people who do not 
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know the norms and values of S inside out. What counts as 
an instance of unfreedom in your community may not count 
as one in the community on the other side of the track, or 
not even in your own community in a couple of years' time. 
Consequently, we are left with an account of freedom which 
is at least as radically relativized as that of Miller. 
My response 
accepting some of 
fact that in my 
to this objection would be to start by 
its insights. There is no denying the 
view, ascriptions of unfreedom are to a 
certain extent relative to time and place. For instance, a 
doctor might 
why he did 
medication to 
appropriately have been asked in the 1960s 
not provide 
cure his 
his patient with the necessary 
TB, although the same question 
would have been inappropriate in the 1930s. Facts, such as 







did restrict his 
patient's freedom in the former case, but not the latter. 
However, such 'factual relativism' is of an innocuous 
kind, at least unless we add the premise that in most 
significant cases, people's judgements about whether or 
not it is appropriate to ask for a justification of the 
non-suppression of a given obstacle will differ between 
communities. That would be an anthropological, not a 
philosophical, hypothesis whose merits cannot be argued 
here, although I firmly believe it is false. 
As far as the Dating Case itself is concerned, it is 
hard to imagine a context where it would be inappropriate 
for rational agents to ask the man for a justification, 
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viz., a society in which it is literally unknown that a 
man dates a woman without demanding that she sleep with 
him. It should be remembered that my understanding of 
appropriateness is quite flexible; it only requires that 
the reason given for demanding a justification satisfies a 
minimum criterion of plausibility. Moreover, in borderline 
cases, I can always accept that we err on the side of 
responsibility, for in a responsibility view of freedom, a 
person has not scored a very big point by persuading us 
that a restriction of freedom is taking place. To be sure, 
a justification of any such restriction is called for, but 
that may be very easy to find (imperfect responsibility, 
etc.). Still, however flexible my definition is, there is 
no reason to think that it is apt to collapse into the 
strong doctrine of responsibility, for I have already 
given examples of suppressable obstacles which it is hard 
to imagine an agent's being appropriately asked to justify 
in any real society or under any plausible circumstances. 
I conclude from all of this that the charge of 
factual relativism does not seriously threaten to under-
mine my view (this will be further borne out in 9.3-9.4 
where a related charge is examined in the context of the 
'essential contestability thesis'). The kind of relativism 
that would undermine it is of a more intrinsic kind, not 
relating to varying judgements about particular cases but 
to essential controversies about the criterion of appro-
priateness itself. The problem, the thorough-going 
relativist might say, does not lie in petty arguments 
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about whether it is appropriate here or there to ask A for 
a justification of his action, or in people from different 
societies giving different reasons to explain why a 
question is appropriate, but rather in the fact that there 
is no common standard of appropriateness available between 
societies: people with different social backgrounds are 
bound to be working with irreconcilable notions of appro-
priateness. This, of course, is an objection that does not 
only challenge my view of responsibility and freedom but, 
in general, any rational philosophical doctrine. It 
assumes that we not only differ over whether a given case 
constitutes good reasons for saying such-and-such, but 
also on what it means for something to constitute good 
reasons. 
It may be little more than an articulation of faith 
to state that I find this radical relativism with respect 
to human rationality unconvincing. However, it must be 
incumbent on the holder of such a radical view to provide 
convincing arguments for its validity; as long as such 
arguments have not been produced, we are entitled to 
assume this kind of relativism to be false. At any rate, 
its potential threat should no more debar us from trying 
to establish a sound responsibility view of freedom than 
from arguing for any other rational doctrine. So, it does 
not dissuade me from holding that my definition of moral 
responsibility is one that could and should be used in all 
societies at all times. 
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4.5. Poverty as a constraint on freedom 
A question often asked in political debate is under what 
conditions poverty can be considered a constraint upon the 
liberty of the poor. This question hardly requires 
special treatment as the answer can be easily read out of 
the analysis of the preceding section: poverty is such a 
constraint when there are agents who may appropriately be 
asked to justify its existence. There is little doubt that 
we can appropriately be asked to justify not helping a 
person (B) in serious need, when the following minimal 
conditions are fulfilled: (1) B is faced by serious (life-
threatening) difficulties and requires assistance by some-
body; (2) A is able to be of assistance; (3) B is unable 
to assist himself; (4) A is reasonably sure that B desires 
21) 
assistance of the sort he proposes to give. It is 
difficult to suppose that the moral responsibility here 
could be relative to a particular world-view or political 
outlook. We cannot, I believe, envisage any morality where 
A would not be held responsible for failing to assist B. 
However, this does not mean that he should necessarily do 
so. People have many responsibilities which may at times 
conflict. Perhaps A can only remove B's unfreedom at the 
expense of somebody else's freedom which is deemed more 
important, or A believes in the value of desert, claiming 
that B's afflictions serve him right since he has only 
himself to blame for them. But it is one thing to say that 
B should not be helped here because he is not unfree 
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(which is a conceptual mistake); another to hold that 
despite B's unfreedom there are overriding reasons for 
non-assistance (which is a substantial, political thesis 
that will not be argued for or against here). 
Moreover, since lack of time and resources prevents 
us from helping everybody in need, the responsibility in 
question can often be seen as an imperfect one, i.e., as 
one we are not culpable for ignoring as long as we are 
doing as much as might be expected of us in removing con-
straints of a similar sort. However, in such cases blame 
seems to be ascribed differently to governments and public 
bodies, on the one hand, which in their domestic duties 
are supposed to follow a rule of non-discrimination among 
the citizens, and individuals and relief organizations, on 
the other hand, 
arbitrarily. 
that can choose their clientele more 
When I say that we cannot envisage any morality where 
A would not be held responsible for failing to assist B in 
the above context, it might be objected that there is a 
whole school of libertarian thinkers which holds the oppo-
site view. My response is that I am not sure they really 
do; however, if they insist that this is their view, they 
are wrong in holding it. The important libertarian point 
ought to be that people have, in general, no obligation, 
even prima facie, to help others in need: helping in such 
cases is a supererogatory good. But as I have tried to 
show, a person could appropriately be asked to justify his 
non-suppression of an obstacle without his having a {prima 
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facie) obligation in a given deontological system to 
suppress it. So, libertarians and socialists may differ on 
the obligations people have to suppress obstacles without 
necessarily disagreeing about what people can appropri-
ately be asked to justify. They may also differ on the 
extent to which people's freedom should be weighed against 
claims of other values (justice, deserts, etc.). But 
again, that is a political dispute, not a conceptual one, 
and does not warrant Miller's conclusion that the concept 
of responsibility (and hence of freedom) is bound to be 
the subject of an endless, irresolvable conflict between 
these two schools of thought. 
We should now be able to see where various writers on 
freedom have missed the mark when dealing with poverty. 
For example, Berlin claims that it is "only because I 
believe my inability to get a given thing is due to the 
fact that other human beings have made arrangements 
whereby I am ... prevented from having enough money to pay 
for it" that I think of myself as a victim of unfree-
22) 
dome The use of the term, then, depends on a particular 
social or economic theory about the causes of my poverty, 
since it is a logically prior question whether a causal 
relation can be presumed at all between human arrangements 
and my situation. Oppenheim makes more or less the same 
point when claiming that whether poverty under a given 
economic system such as capitalism constitutes unfreedom 
depends on the general theory of the causes of poverty one 
adopts: "Some tend to explain poverty and unemployment in 
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terms of anonymous causal factors inherent in that ... 
economic system; others are inclined to lengthen the 
causal chain to arrive at specific persons or groups whom 
they accuse of being the cause of what they consider to be 
23) 
instances of unfreedom." 
Even if we grant the claim that there are social and 
economic processes for the origin and workings of which no 
individuals can be held morally responsible, Berlin and 
Oppenheim's conclusion does not follow. For although the 
most important sense of responsibility for the non-
suppression of obstacles may be that of being accountable 
for the imposition of one, there is also a sense in which 
we can often be held responsible for not altering a state 
of affairs, irrespective of its original causes. A does 
not need to be responsible for the causal chain leading up 
to the creation of 0, that impedes B, for the question 
'Why don't you suppress 07' to be appropriate. Thus, if 
the results of an economic system are such that some of us 
find ourselves in pockets of affluence surrounded by seas 
of destitution, then it is certain that we, as indi-
viduals, can appropriately be asked to justify turning a 
deaf ear to our fellow-men's call for help. The responsi-
bility established may often be an imperfect one but it is 
still a responsibility; hence, those left destitute by the 
system are unfree. 
In this section, I have simply applied the con-
clusions from 4.3 to the question of poverty as a poten-
tial constraint on freedom. The upshot is the same as 
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before: appropriateness in asking for a justification 
begets responsibility and responsibility is presupposed 
when ascribing unfreedom. 
4.6. The responsibility of collectivities 
One important objection might still seem to require a more 
thorough response. Even if everything I have said so far 
about individual agents being responsible for the non-
suppression of obstacles is true, the problem remains of 
how to move from considerations of such individual 
relations to those involving collectivities: corpor-
How are ations, organizations, classes, or nations. 
'impersonal entities' to be personalized in order that we 
can hold them responsible? 
to Mr. Nobody and ask 
How can we put our grievances 
him to justify his acts or 
omissions? Answers to these questions have already been 
hinted at in the previous section and in my reply to Benn 
& Weinstein's standard choice-situation model (4.2), but 
some observations of a more general kind may be in order. 
There has been in the social sciences, especially 
since the early 1960s, an ongoing methodological debate 
between structuralists (' holists' , 'institutionalists') 
and individualists. I shall not enter that debate here 
except insofar as it has bearing on questions of moral 
responsibility. The basic idea of the structuralists is 
that in the case of collectivities, no specific entity can 
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be located as the source of the agency and, hence, that 
all attempts to attribute moral responsibility are apt to 
break down. The problem here is that we often want to say 
that B is unfree to do x with respect to A, where A is a 
collectivity, such as a big corporation. If the structur-
alists are right in their analysis of such claims, then it 
seems that, contrary to the view upheld in my thesis, un-
freedom is possible without responsibility. 
A typical individualist response to the structuralist 
view of social entities is to deny the existence of any 
such entities which cannot, in principle, be reduced to 
individuals. Thus, M · 1 1 l~~ stated that "the laws of the 
phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the 
24) 
actions and passions of human beings". In this view, 
groups are nothing more than the people who belong to them 
and practices nothing over and beyond the actions in which 
they are respected. Gray explains the individualist 
position more grandiloquently as holding that "it amounts 
to an error of reification, a mystifying and animalistic 
superstition, to regard social structures as more than 
residues of the practical and intellectual activities of 
25) 
human subjects." 
Admittedly, I tend to have some symphathy with the 
individualist position. Thus, I share Pettit's commitment 
in Judging Justice to the basic individualist claims that 
the purpose of social institutions is to serve the 
interests of individuals and 
26) 
"intrinsically perfectible". 
that institutions are 
However, while these 
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claims represent an essentially anti-holistic standpoint, 
I do not agree that they must lead to the kind of radical 
methodological individualism 
27) 
Pettit's book. According 
subsequently espoused in 
to the latter view, no 
purported explanations of social (or individual) phenomena 
are to count as (rock-bottom) explanations, unless they 
28) 
are couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals. 
Fortunately, I do not need this radical thesis, 
of whose truth we have good reasons to be sceptical, to 
defend my responsibility view of freedom. My view only 
requires that if a collectivity is held to constrain free-
dom, it should be possible, in principle, to point to one 
or more individuals who can appropriately be asked why 
they did/do not suppress the relevant obstacle. But it is 
one thing to claim that; another to say that collec-
tivities are nothing but groups of individuals, to whom 
attributions of responsibility for the collectivities' 
workings are always possible. 
However, the demand for a justification will clearly 
be appropriate in more cases in my responsibility view 
than, for example, in an intentionality view of freedom. 
To make use of two examples discussed by Lukes in a diffe-
rent context, I would claim that a pharmaceutical company 
had constrained the freedom of people harmed by the 
marketing of a dangerous drug, even if its scientists and 
managers did not intend this to happen, not knowing of the 
drug's effect, given that they could have been expected to 
take steps to find out but did not. On the other hand, 
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cigarette producers did not restrain the freedom of 
smokers, by refraining from informing them of the hazards 
of their habit, before anyone could reasonably be expected 
29) 
to think that smoking was harmful. Another reason why 
followers of an intentionality view of freedom tend to 
underestimate the number of cases in which the results of 
a collectivity's workings can be seen to constrain 
people's freedom, is that they do not allow that A's 
intentional non-removal of an already existing obstacle 
constrains B's freedom, as long as A's intention was not a 
part of the causal chain leading to its creation (p. 22). 
There is yet another reason why an attribution of 
responsibility to individuals within a collectivity might 
be appropriate in more cases than is often thought. Philo-
sophers are prone to commit what Parfit calls the fifth 
mistake in moral mathematics: the mistake of thinking that 
"an act cannot be either right or wrong, because of its 
effects on other 
30) 
people, if these effects are imper-
ceptible." But as Parfit points out, the only way to 
solve many Prisoner's Dilemmas that are relevant to 
problems of pollution, congestion, unemployment, over-
fishing, etc., in the modern world, is to ask ourselves: 
"Will my act be one of a set of acts that will together 
31) 
harm other people?" Parfit's argument underwrites what 
I take to be Miller's correct insight: that in many cases 
when "I add my straw to the camel's load in circumstances 
where it be foreseen that others will do likewise, 




In this chapter, I have attempted to lay the most 
important foundation of a responsibility view of freedom, 
by providing a plausible account of moral responsibility. 
I have taken serious exception to the views of other 
responsibility theorists, such as Miller, and Benn & Wein-
stein; and in the last two sections I have argued that my 
account explains among other things the conditions under 
which poverty can be seen as freedom-constraining, and 
under which collectivities can be said to restrict 
people's liberty. This, I hope, has shown how the respon-
sibility view can provide us with promising solutions to 
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5. INTERNAL BARS 
Chapters 2-4 provided an account of the nature of social 
freedom, an account which I have categorized as a 'respon-
sibility view'. I have claimed that though this view pre-
sents a variety of negative freedom, it avoids the tradi-
tional narrowness of negative freedom accounts and fits 
more readily with some of our basic intuitions. I have 
been concerned to demonstrate the internal coherence of 
the position staked out 
positions, which have 
and its superiority to competing 
been found wanting in different 
respects. Generally speaking, the rest of the thesis will 
deal with various potential threats to my responsibility 
view. How does it stand up to the challenge of opposing 
positive liberty accounts? What bearing could it have on 
discussions of power? Is the methodology upon which the 
whole enterprise has been based sound? 
The present chapter, which prefaces a more systematic 
investigation of positive liberty in chapter 6, rests on a 
simple observation. In my responsibility view, A con-
strains B's freedom when he can be held morally respon-
sible for an obstacle that restricts B's options. But what 
if A and B are the same person? Are there not cases where 
we can be held responsible for our own remediable ignor-
ance and self-deception, along with other avoidable 
deficiencies in our awareness of our genuine interests or 
will? The problem is that if we accept the reality of such 
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internal bars to freedom, we seem to have saddled our-
selves with a central tenet of the most radical theories 
of positive liberty, a tenet which has been used to 
justify the most repugnant forms of paternalism. For in 
such cases the traditional (prima facie) objection against 
paternalism, that it takes away people's freedom, does not 
seem to apply. On the contrary, my paternalistic inter-
vention in your life can be seen as a way of relieving you 
of your own unfreedom: of forcing you to be truly free. 
I purposely treat this problem in the present chapter 
without providing any exact initial characterization of 
positive liberty, simply assuming 
rough idea of what this notion 
that most of us share a 
comprises: an idea indi-
cated, for example, by Berlin's general remarks referred 
to in chapter 1 
of 'deliberate 
(p. 5). The rationale behind this method 
conceptual sloppiness' is to let the 
features which characterize positive accounts and distin-
guish them from their negative counterparts emerge and 
manifest themselves gradually in the course of the dis-
cussion. In 5.1, I look into arguments from Charles Taylor 
that seem to reinforce the embarrassing implication 
mentioned above, arguments which aim to show that by 
granting certain unavoidable claims about internal bars to 
freedom, we are forced, in two steps, into following the 
path of positive liberty. A common rejoinder from negative 
liberty theorists is to deny the existence of such bars, 
and in 5.2 I examine this alternative by devoting some 
space to a possible candidate for an internal bar: self-
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deception. Then, in 5.3, some truths about freedom as a 
social concept are revealed, shedding new light on the 
connection between internal bars and freedom. The thrust 
of Taylor's positive liberty argument is ultimately 
resisted, but the relation of a correct negative liberty 
account to paternalism does not turn out to be the one 
that some people might have expected. 
5.1. Beyond the Maginot Line 
In his article, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty", 
Charles Taylor directs our attention to the somewhat 
curious fact that while the most "caricatural" version 
of positive liberty is pinned on its protagonists by their 
opponents, negative liberty theorists tend to be eager 
themselves to embrace the "crudest version" of their 
theory. By that he means the extreme Hobbesian view where 
freedom is understood simply as the absence of physical 
constraints: 'freedom of movement' (2.1). The reason for 
this, according to Taylor, is their fear of the "Totali-
tarian Menace": their suspicion that any modification of 
the Hobbesian notion will lay itself open to totalitarian 
manipulation. To thwart that menace, the proponents of 
negative liberty hold the line around a simple issue of 
principle, embracing what Taylor calls the "Maginot Line 
mentality". The purpose of the Maginot Line strategy is to 
nip the opposition in the bud, by holding on stubbornly to 
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the belief that you are free as long as you are able to do 
what you want, unrestrained by external barriers: 'what 
you want' being unproblematically understood as what you 
1 ) 
can identify as your desires. 
For Taylor, the journey from the Maginot Line to the 
fortress of positive freedom is made in two steps. The 
first consists in equating 'doing what you want' with 
'doing what you really want' , truly directing your life; 
the second consists in granting that you cannot achieve 
this "outside of a society of a certain canonical form, 
2 ) 
incorporating true self-government". It seems to me that 
step number one really involves two smaller steps, 1a and 
lb. In taking la, we accept some qualitative ranking of 
our desires, conceding that some of them are much less 
significant than others, even to the point where external 
bars to them can hardly be called constraints on our free-
dom at all. Simultaneously, we admit that we do not always 
carefully weigh up the significance of our various wants 
prior to acting, and that some of our actions are, in that 
way, non-rational. These concessions may seem so small 
that even though they bring in the notion of the unequal 
significance of desires, we could still grant them without 
abandoning the Maginot Line. 
Is accepting 1a and stopping there a tenable 
position? Not according to Taylor, for our position thus 
far still rules out second-guessing; we remain the final 
arbiters of the authenticity and importance of our own 
desires and the degree of our freedom/unfreedom. However, 
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Taylor asks us to consider whether our freedom is not also 
at stake when we find ourselves carried away by a less 
significant goal at the cost of a highly significant one, 
or when we are led to act out of a motive which we con-
sider bad or despicable. To bolster his case, Taylor takes 
as examples a man whose irrational fear of public speaking 
prevents him from taking up a fulfilling career, and 
another whose spiteful reactions undermine an important 
relationship. Is it not, he asks, quite understandable if 
I consider such emotions and motives as obstacles I would 
be freer without - as something I could get rid of without 
3 ) 
any loss to my identity? 
What Taylor has in mind is apparent from his 
examples, viz., the familiar cases of false consciousness, 
repression, weakness of the will and self-deception. At 
least some of his examples imply that we can be radically 
wrong about what we really want and that seeing ourselves 
in the final-arbiter role is an illusion. If we rule out, 
in principle, that a person can ever be wrong about what 
he really wants, it must be because there is nothing to be 
right or wrong about in the matter; that desires are 
4) 
simply incorrigible brute facts. 
Taylor goes on to contend that our desires are not 
incorrigible, referring to Rylean arguments about the 
necessary logical conditions of certain feelings such as 
shame and fear. In fact, Taylor claims that our emotional 
life is largely made up of desires and feelings that we 
can experience mistakenly. He concludes that we can exper-
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ience some desires as fetters because we can experience 
them as not ours. Keeping all this in view, how can we 
possibly rule out second-guessing of our desires; how can 
we exclude, in principle, that the agent has for a long 
time or even permanently a distorted sense of his funda-
mental purposes, being for example radically self-
deceived? 
.. . the subject himself can't be the final authority on 
the question whether he is free; for he cannot be the 
final authority on the question whether his desires 
are authentic, whether they do or do not frustrate his 
purposes.S) 
Step 1b consists in accepting the reality of such perma-
nent internal bars - and if these are not to count as con-
straints on freedom, how can we possibly apply the notion 
consistently? 
Taylor never really answers the question whether we 
are also committed to take step 2, i.e., accepting that we 
need a government of a certain canonical form to correct 
our mistakes and tell us what our real desires and pur-
poses are, but at least he claims that such a conclusion 
cannot be rejected out of hand by a "philistine definition 
6) 
of freedom". 
To recapitulate, Taylor tries to move us, as pro-
ponents of negative liberty, to make the following series 
of concessions. First, we are invited to accept that some 
of our desires are more significant than others (step la), 
even if we still cling to the belief that we can in prin-
ciple judge their relative significance for ourselves. But 
we are then forced to concede, in addition, that we can be 
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systematically deceived about our real preferences (step 
Ib) . By that concession, we implicitly admit that there 
are internal bars to our freedom; and since real freedom 
cannot be achieved without surmounting these bars, there 
can be good reasons for forcing a person to surmount them, 
although he himself does not recognize the need for it at 
the time. If we admit this, we have accepted step 2 and 
laid ourselves open to the paternalistic thrust of posi-
tive theories. Some would even replace 'paternalistic' by 
'totalitarian'; for seeing ourselves as 'forcing others to 
be free' is (as Berlin has pointed out to us) the argument 
"used by every dictator, inquisitor, and bully who seeks 
some moral, or even aesthetic justification for his con-
7) 
duct." 
As Taylor is inclined to direct his animadversions to 
the proponent of a "crude" negative liberty view, it is in 
order to ask at this point if and how they pose a chal-
lenge to a more 'enlightened' account like the present 
one. As far as step 1a is concerned, my responsibility 
view seems safely protected from it - for two reasons. 
Firstly, I have defined freedom without any recourse to 
actual wants or their significance. A constraint on free-
dom is something that impairs a possible choice, whether 
we now (or ever) want to make the particular choice, and 
irrespective of how important it might seem to us. If 
James Joyce's works are blacklisted by the authorities, I 
am banned from reading them and, hence, unfree to do so 
although, as a matter of fact, I may find his books so 
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boring that I would never care to open one of them in the 
first place. Secondly, as will be argued later, the 
responsibility view can make do with a minimal rationality 
requirement (6.3). We are not unfree to tryout new ways 
of living simply because we happen to be too lazy or con-
tent with the way things are to give any attention to 
them, as long as we could make the effort if we wanted to 
and as long as nobody is responsible for manipulating us 
to conform. 
Although step 1a does not pose a threat to a respon-
sibility view of negative liberty, 1b might do so. If it 
is true that, owing to our own fault or carelessness, we 
can be radically wrong or systematically deceived about 
our real options, the positive libertarian seems to have 
scored an important point. For then there really are 
internal bars satisfying both my proposed criteria for a 
constraint on freedom: they are real obstacles to choice 
that an agent, in this case the person himself, is respon-
sible for. Suddenly, the opponent seems to have the game 
in his hands while the negative libertarian is defenceless 
against what would normally seem to him to be the most 
hideous claptrap: of people not being socially free unless 
they are in control of their own passions, have 'realized 
themselves', etc. 
We should note that it is the origin of the obstacle, 
but not its location, that need concern us. The idea of an 
internal bar arises from the recognition that I am some-
times thwarted by factors within me, but it is not the 
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location of such a bar ('under the skin') that threatens 
to undermine a negative account like mine, or to make it 
collapse into a positive one. If the bar is of a natural 
origin (mental retardation caused by mongolism, etc.), it 
restricts the person's ability but not his freedom. If it 
has its origin in another agent, it is simply on par with 
any other externally created bar, although it happens to 
be internally situated. Thus, there is no morally relevant 
difference between preventing a man from entering a room 
by locking it up or by hypnotizing him into staying away 
from it. In both cases, the victim is unfree to enter, on 
a correct negative view. The problem first arises if the 
origin of the obstacle can be attributed to the agent him-
self, if he can be held responsible for his own situation. 
It is only if we are forced to concede that internal bars 
of this sort exist and constrain the agent's own freedom 
that the positive libertarian will have a field day. 
I see three possible rejoinders to Taylor's step 1b 
and his subsequent step 2. The first is to reject 1b by 
denying the existence of the sort of internal bars it 
describes; hence ruling out what Taylor calls second-
guessing of our interests or the options open to us. The 
second rejoinder is to accept 1b but to deny the impli-
cation that these internal bars must be seen as con-
straints on our freedom. The third is to accept step 1b 
and this implication, but to modify the force of step 2 by 
some overriding arguments against paternalism. 
It seems safest to adopt the first defence strategy, 
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and in the following section I shall explore its merits in 
some detail by looking into the notion of self-deception. 
We live in an age that speaks easily of all kinds of 
internal bars, but it is no arbitrary choice that leads me 
to single out self-deception for consideration. As it 
happens, some of the other possible candidates do not 
readily fit the conditions required. For example, if we 
consider fear or . 1 Jea~ousy, it is often hard to judge if an 
agent (myself or another) can be held accountable for the 
origin of a particular fear, say fear of public speaking 
or of spiders; more often than not some accidental, 
natural conditioning might be to blame. On the other hand, 
concerning jealousy, it is a matter of suprise to me that 
whenever psychologists and philosophers discuss it, they 
tend to see it as an irrational reaction for which the 
agent himself, if anyone, is culpable. To me it seems that 
jealousy is often the result of an admirable self-respect 
and a sound sense of justice. In a typical case of 
jealousy (a father having e.g. discriminated against one 
of his daughters, a husband having committed adultery, 
betraying his wife), the victim develops jealousy because 
she rightly thinks that another person is receiving some-
thing (favours/goods) that she deserves as much or more. 
In these two cases, the men violate their duties as hus-
band or father towards the wife or daughter, thereby 
restricting her choices. Hence, jealousy is typically an 
internal bar of the conceptually innocuous kind for which 
a negative theory of freedom can easily account, namely, 
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one for which another person is responsible. Self-
deception is in that respect unlike fear and jealousy, 
since we are rightly prone to see self-deception as a 
weakness of rational thinking to which the person could 
and should have avoided falling prey, and for which he is 
himself responsible. This is the main reason why I have 
chosen it as an example: if this most plausible candidate 
for a troublesome internal bar can be explained away, the 
first defence strategy might be made to work. 
5.2. Example: self-deception 
What do we typically understand by self-deception? As 
usual it is best to begin by considering an example. 
Suppose a young philosophy student X, who lives in David 
Russell Hall, is passionately in love with Miss Y who 
lives in University Hall. He naturally enough yearns to be 
loved in return. She smiles at him on occasion, chats 
about the topics in the moral philosophy course they both 
attend and even invites him, along with others, over to 
University Hall for tea and cakes. X jumps to the con-
clusion that his love for her is requited and tells his 
friend the good news. The friend listens patiently to X's 
story but rightly suspects that X is only indulging in 
wishful thinking, believing something that is not 
warranted by the evidence, although it could nevertheless 
be true. We see then that no self-deception has as yet 
-137-
occurred. 
But now consider two possible additions to the story. 
First, the friend asks X to come and see him for tea, add-
ing that he is going to tell him something about Miss Y 
which might radically change X's opinion of her. However, 
X convinces himself that nothing he might learn about Miss 
Y, for example concerning her past or present relation-
ships with other men, could change his opinion that she is 
now passionately in love with him, and he disregards or 
even 'forgets' the invitation. In the second example, X in 
fact visits his friend, learning that the young lady keeps 
frequent and close company with Z and that they have been 
observed to be quite intimate. But in the teeth of this 
evidence, X still clings to the belief that he is the only 
man in Miss Y's life, explaining away the information 
about her relationship with Z and justifying her behaviour 
8 ) 
with considerable ingenuity. 
I take it prima facie to be a plausible assumption 
that in both these cases self-deception has taken place 
and that they represent its two main types: indirect and 
direct. Indirect self-deception involves systematic 
evasion by negligence and avoidable ignorance, i.e., by 
disregarding certain sources of information that we know, 
or ought to know, would influence our evaluation of a cer-
tain topic. Direct self-deception is a more active process 
where we ignore already-acquired evidence, in some sense 
walling off its implications and persuading ourselves to 
believe what we know deep down is false. In the first 
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example, X suffers from indirect self-deception, and in 
the second example from direct self-deception. 
However, at this juncture many philosophers would 
object, claiming that there can be no such thing as self-
deception. In ordinary deception, A, being aware that 
something is false, intentionally gets B to believe it is 
true: by lying, pretending or withholding appropriate 
information. An air of paradox arises when we try to 
understand self-deception by modelling it strictly after 
such interpersonal deception, for how can we simulta-
neously be the victims/objects and the source of the 
deception, the deceiver and the deceived? This skepticism 
is reinforced by the fact that we all know of many 
instances where self-deception is invoked ad hoc as an 
explanation of morally unacceptable behaviour. Often the 
reason lies in our disinclination to self-ascribe what we 
hold to be serious 
9 ) 
defects of character, unworthy 
feelings, etc. Thus, most of us seem to suffer from what 
I have elsewhere called 'the moral myth of the given': the 
myth of the priority of goodness in the universe and our 
10) 
own nature. We tend to identify ourselves with our most 
mature state - as opposed to our previous 'childish' ones 
- as well as with our most rational and critical moments. 
The nervous student with butterflies in his stomach before 
the viva voce is not the 'real me'; if I could control my 
nerves, I would probably want to say that not only had I 
changed into a less nervous person, but that I had found 
my 'real self'. Similarly, it seems much easier for us to 
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say 'I knew all the time deep down that what I was doing 
yesterday was wrong but I just deceived myself' than to 
admit frankly 'What I did yesterday was wrong and I regret 
it today'. For most of us, moral progress is not a 
maturation or transformation but a return to the original 
goodness of our nature which has somehow been temporarily 
defiled and obfuscated. 
Generalizing from such examples and pointing to the 
alleged inconsistency of a person deceiving himself, the 
so-called "heretical view" of self-deception has in recent 
years gained many followers in philosophical circles, 
notably Mary Haight in her book A study of Self-Deception. 
According to this view, what we ordinarily call self-
deception is at best no more than wishful thinking, gulli-
bility or misplaced good intentions; at worst simply lying 
to other people - and there is no paradox about a lie. 
Then why did we invent this term, self-deception? The 
answer is that it is part of a game we play with and for 
other people; we literally take part in a conspiracy which 
aims to confuse people and make them unsure how to judge 
us. In addition, Haight claims that the term is often 
applied metaphorically to puzzling forms of behaviour in 
which we cannot tell whether people are able to help them-
11) 
selves enough to be held morally responsible. 
This heretical view is an extreme stance which denies 
the very existence of self-deception. Notwithstanding its 
insights into the many occasions where the term is meta-
phorically or wrongly applied, this stance seems in the 
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end to be as unrealistic as the view at the other extreme, 
represented by thinkers such as Freud and Sartre, accord-
ing to whom self-deception is a permanent and perhaps 
necessary feature of man's consciousness. Between these 
two extremes still lurks the position of common sense: 
that people sometimes, but not always, deceive themselves. 
Then, how can this be accounted for without inconsistency? 
In recent philosophical literature, we can trace two 
main methods of explanation. One makes states of self-
deception primary and construes acts of self-deception in 
terms of them, whereas the other account does just the 
opposite. The locus classicus of the first account is R. 
Demos' paper "Lying to Oneself". According to Demos, self-
deception entails that a person A believes both p and not-
p at the same time, or believes p and disbelieves p. But 
as believing and disbelieving are contraries, "it is logi-
cally impossible for them to exist at the same time in the 
12) 
same person in the same respect." It is this "same 
respect" clause which really holds the key to Demos' ana-
lysis since he claims that whereas self-deceivers attend 
in explicit consciousness to the belief they are happy 
with, they manage to keep the contrary unpleasant belief, 
which they are unwilling to attend to, latent. Self-
deceivers are in this sense able to retain both beliefs 
inasmuch as, not noticing one of them, they do not compare 
the two and do not appreciate their incompatibility. 
Opposing this cognition-perception account of self-
deception, H. Fingarette in his book Self-Deception wants 
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to de-emphasize the relation of consciousness to knowledge 
and to emphasize its relation to action. Thereby he claims 
to be able to give a fundamentally new volition-action 
account of self-deception. For Fingarette, consciousness 
is not a kind of mental mirror, but rather exercising the 
skill of "spelling out" some features of the world as we 
are engaged in it. Sometimes, we can avoid becoming 
explicitly conscious of our engagements and, also, avoid 
becoming explicitly conscious that we are avoiding it. 
Thus, when the issue of an apparent engagement is raised, 
13) 
we cannot express the matter explicitly at all. 
According to Fingarette's analysis, self-deception 
arises when individuals are strongly tempted to pursue an 
engagement that conflicts with the current "guiding prin-
ciple" around which they have constructed their present 
self-identity. An alcoholic, for example, as Fingarette 
has later argued in an illuminating paper, may pursue the 
engagement of excessive drinking without avowing it as an 
engagement because he has never spelled it out as such. 
Nor has he made the appropriate adjustments in his atti-
tude, emotions and behaviour to make the drinking com-
patible with the synthesis of engagements which consti-
tutes him as a person. What has made this all that much 
easier for the alcoholic in recent years is the myth 
of alcoholism as a disease. As diseases are conceived as 
external to the person, the alcoholic is not compelled to 
spell out the real reaso~s for his drinking nor to avow 
14) 
this habit as a part of himself. 
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It seems to me that Fingarette's description might 
capture certain real types of self-deception. But even if 
we grant the analysis of his most thoroughly argued case, 
the one about the alcoholic who suffers from the 'bad 
faith' of thinking of his habit as a disease, there seem 
to be more plausible ways of explaining alcoholism in many 
cases as weakness of the will. Now, the main difference 
between self-deception and weakness of the will is that 
the latter can, whereas the former cannot, speak its name 
15) 
out without destroying itself. From my experience, most 
so-called alcoholics sincerely regret their drinking 
although they claim to feel that they are not really in 
control of it. They can even "spell out", to use Finga-
rette's phrase, very clearly all sorts of psychological 
and social plights which have led them into their sad 
state. This suggests that at least some alcoholics fulfil 
Aristotle's criteria for incontinence or weakness of the 
for "every incontinent is prone to regret", says 
Aristotle, and "notices that he is incontinent", a con-
dition which is, 
16) 
deception. 
of course, incompatible with self-
Returning to the cases of the St.Andrews students, X 
and Y, Fingarette's analysis could possibly capture the 
essence of the first version where X pursues an engage-
ment, that of acting as if Miss Y were passionately in 
love with him, without ever spelling out the reasons or 
justification for his behaviour - even turning a deaf ear 
to his friend's offer of information. Thus, Fingarette 
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seems to be describing certain types of indirect self-
deception. However, nothing in his analysis can account 
for direct self-deception, as in the second case where X 
has assembled all the evidence in his mind, and can even 
discuss it with his friend at length, but still reaches an 
apparently irrational conclusion. This entails that Finga-
rette's new 'volition-action' account of self-deception 
can only eliminate the 'cognition-perception' family of 
terms in a limited number of cases. Direct self-deception 
seems more typically to be a matter of contrary beliefs 
than of disavowed behaviour. 
We have thus returned, by way of Fingarette's pro-
posals, to the original view of Demos: that in directly 
deceiving oneself, it is essential to have obscured an 
item of knowledge and to have persuaded oneself to believe 
the opposite. Moreover, it appears evident that one can 
only be self-deceived about matters in which one has a 
personal stake, it must link up with one's wants, hopes, 
fears and emotional needs. This point has been admirably 
expressed by Patrick Gardiner: 
It is ... not clear what could be meant by ... speaking 
of somebody as deceiving himself if it were at the 
same time contended that what he was said to be 
deceiving himself about what was a matter of total 
indifference to him, in no way related to his wants, 
fears, hopes, and so forth: could we, e.g., intelli-
gibly talk about 'disinterested' or 'gratuitous' 
self-deception?17) 
The answer is, of course, no, which means that a person 
must at least have one want which explains, in part, both 
why his belief that not-p is latent and why he is disposed 
to reject a belief that not-p and to allow that p, even 
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when presented with overwhelming evidence against p. 
Has the paradox of believing p and not-p at the same 
time then been dissolved? I tend to think that Demos' 
account makes it very innocuous, to say the least. We only 
have to think of the mind as a large building with many 
storeys and rooms, stacked with experiences and beliefs. 
Why should we not be able to close off certain rooms or 
even storeys of the building from our consciousness if 
their contents are incompatible with certain other beliefs 
that we are strongly disposed to cherish? Sartre's famous 
answer, that you can in fact wish not to see a certain 
aspect of your being only if you are acquainted with the 
aspect you do not wish to see, and in order to take care 
not to think of it, you must think of it constantly, seems 
to be tantamount to saying that you cannot close a room 
from outside without first checking carefully what is 
inside. That assumption simply flies in the face of all 
experience, the experience that, as Bishop Butler once put 
it, "it is as easy to close the eyes of the mind as those 
18) 
of the body" . To take the decision of closing off a 
room, it seems quite sufficient to have a hunch that there 
is something inside you do not want to see. And after a 
while, even the hunch is not necessary. The room is just 
closed and you bypass it. 
In finishing my discussion of self-deception, a dis-
claimer is in order. I do not profess to have revealed any 
new, substantive truths about self-deception. I have only 
tried to show that the common sense view of what self-
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deception involves may be sound, and that the logical case 
against direct self-deception does not hold. That is, an 
account has been provided which is at once plausible and 
free from inconsistency. Needless to say, a pedantic 
objector might snap his fingers at my building metaphor: 
in what sense are there walls in the mind, and in what 
sense is a thought sealed off from adjacent thoughts? How 
~ 
are thoughts to ~ndividuated in the way that rooms are? 
The thrust of my answer would be that the onus is still on 
the objector to show that there is something paradoxical 
about my rendering of the common sense view. Admittedly, a 
metaphor is only a metaphor, but it is none the worse for 
that as long as it is not logically flawed. Incidentally, 
in the context of the present argumentation, I do not need 
to insist on having proved that direct self-deception is 
real. The original purpose was to find out if self-
deception could be seen as a real internal obstacle to our 
choices. For that purpose, enough has been said: no reason 
has emerged for rejecting the reality of indirect self-
deception, and the logical case against direct self-
deception has been rebutted. 
But the possible objector might try another line of 
argument: even if internal bars of this sort exist, the 
account above is radically confused as to the question 
which really matters, namely, whether I am responsible for 
my self-deception or not. Is self-deception something that 
I do or something that happens to me - am I the victim of 
self-deception or am I the promulgator of it? On the one 
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hand it seems to be saying that self-deception is a real 
obstacle, an example of true psychological compulsion, but 
on the other that it is rendered intelligible in terms of 
19) 
motives: a motivated, reasonable strategy. To reply to 
this objection, it is wrong to think that nothing which 
the agent himself is responsible for can be a real inter-
nal obstacle, a genuine spanner in the works of the 
psyche. In the case of fear, a scientist might deliber-
ately induce in himself a fear of spiders by negative con-
ditioning as part of a research project; his subsequent 
terror when coming across a spider would certainly be a 
real obstacle, although he had only himself to blame for 
it. In the case of self-deception, it may seem strange to 
think of a person as deliberately 'deciding to be self-
deceived' but it is not impossible, as J.T. Cook has shown 
20) 
for non-self-deceptive beliefs. A person might, for 
instance, contrive some elaborate mechanism to condition 
himself into believing p and -p at the same time, and then 
his subsequent self-deceptions would have to count as ones 
that he himself was reponsible for. But, actually, we do 
not need to concoct any fanciful stories to prove this 
point since my view of responsibility does not presuppose 
that people are only accountable for outcomes which they 
have deliberately brought about, but also for their negli-
gent omissions, etc. - and, surely, a person can be held 
responsible for failing to steer clear of self-deception 
or failing to do anything about it. The reason why self-
deception was chosen as an example in the first place was 
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precisely the fact that it is an internal obstacle which 
the agent himself is generally considered accountable (and 
often blameable) for. 
It is worth remembering that my discussion of self-
deception started as part of the first defence strategy to 
rebut Charles Taylor's claims against negative theories of 
liberty. This particular strategy - denying the existence 
of internal bars which the agent himself is responsible 
for - has failed. Therefore, Taylor's second-guessing can-
not be ruled out, and we seem forced to accept the impli-
cation that people can constrain their own freedom. But 
sometimes one must draw back in order to leap further. 
5.3. Social concepts, irreflexivity and paternalism 
Self-deception debars us from seeing the world aright, and 
is thus an impediment to our choices. What Charles Taylor 
held out against the doctrine of negative liberty was its 
failure to accept the reality of such impediments which, 
21) 
although "less immediately obvious" than the more palp-
able, externally created ones, are just as real. Now, 
Taylor might seem to have an easy time cashing in on the 
concessions we have made to his point, forcing us next to 
take step 2 in the direction of positive theories that, 
if taken to their furthest extreme, would have us kneel 
before the omniscient Big Brother, and ask him humbly to 
protect us against our own follies - thus making us truly 
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free. 
To resist the drift of Taylor's arguments, we might 
still invoke the second defence strategy, claiming that we 
have only acknowledged the existence of internal 
obstacles, not that these obstacles constitute constraints 
on freedom. But initially this manoeuv~1 does not sound 
very convincing, since we have also conceded that agents 
(namely ourselves) are responsible for the origin of these 
obstacles, and thus seem to have satisfied both of the 
previously-presented conditions (restricted choices and 
responsibility) for an obstacle's counting as a constraint 
on freedom. However, one rather subtle point has so far 
been overlooked in the presentation of my responsibility 
view. The point, which I shall try to drive home in this 
section, is that we cannot in any coherent sense say that 
an agent constrains his own (social) freedom. If this is 
true, we would foil Taylor's attack on a rather unexpected 
battleground. Now, it may seem odd, after granting that 
the relation to deceive can be reflexive, to claim that 
the schema 'A constrains A's freedom' yields no signifi-
cant statements. But this is what I want to contend. 
In recent discussions of moral and social theory, 
freedom and justice are often juxtaposed, so it may pre-
pare the ground for discussion to say a few things first 
about the irreflexivity of justice. There is a passage in 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics where he tackles the 
question of whether it is possible to do injustice to one-
self. Aristotle invokes various arguments to rule out this 
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possibility: a) that no one suffers injustice willingly, 
b) that you cannot lose and get the same thing at the same 
time, c) that you cannot do and suffer the same thing at 
the same time, and d) that doing injustice involves doing 
particular acts of injustice; but, in fact, you cannot 
commit adultery with your own wife, burgle your own house 
and steal your own possessions. Aristotle concludes that 
"what is just or unjust must always involve more than one 
22) 
person". As easy as it would seem to pick holes in some 
of Aristotle's arguments, his conclusion is intuitively 
appealing. Although we do not grant Hobbes' famous claim, 
that the notions 'just' and 'unjust' have no place before 
the time of covenants and coercive power, it seems fair to 
say that the idea of Robinson Crusoe being just or unjust 
to himself on a desert island does not make much sense. 
Justice seems to be a social term, a term that can only 
have application in interpersonal relationships. 
But how about freedom? Does the same apply there? 
Consider the possibility of the earth colliding with a 
comet, as a result of which only one man survives. 
Plainly, that man would be surrounded with obstacles, and 
we can suppose that he would not be able to survive very 
long on his own. But could he do anything that might 
sensibly be said to infringe upon his own freedom? I am 
inclined to doubt that. In a rage of despair, he might 
lock himself up in a cage, but would that not only make 
him unable, not unfree, to leave? At first glance, I can 
think of no suitable case where a person could be said to 
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constrain his own freedom. However, we might ask if that 
is not simply an example of the imperfections of ordinary 
language - or of a deviant intuition which has to be 
modified in light of the correct general theory of free-
dome I shall argue that this is not the case. There are 
important logical reasons for upholding the irreflexivity 
of social freedom and, hence, for adding a third condition 
to my definition of a constraint: not only must the 
potential constraint be a real obstacle for which an agent 
is responsible; this agent and the victim of the con-
straint must not be the same person. 
First, a useful distinction should be drawn. Of 
course, you can 'make yourself unfree' in the sense of 
deciding to become unfree to do something with respect to 
somebody else. You may decide, for example, to rent your 
house to me and sign a contract to that effect. But then 
you become unfree to do certain things not with respect to 
23) 
yourself but to me. So, the correct thing to be said 
there is not that you have constrained your own freedom, 
but that you have brought about the restriction of your 
freedom by somebody else. A famous example of the same 
sort is Odysseus' request to his shipmates to bind him to 
the mast so that he could listen to the beautiful singing 
of the Sirens without being literally enchanted and 
trapped by them. If we deny the irreflexivity of freedom-
constraining, we are forced to say that Odysseus had some-
how plotted against his own future self, constraining its 
freedom, when the simpler and more reasonable thing is to 
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say that the other sailors constrained his freedom, as he 
had ordered them to. (On my theory, a person's past, pre-
sent or future wants and wishes do not matter in assessing 
his freedom.) Now, it seems profitable to distinguish 
cases of this sort from ones where a person deceives him-
self, or sets an alarm clock before retiring to prevent 
himself from sleeping in, etc. In the former sort of case, 
an ordinary constraint of freedom by another agent has 
taken place (although incidentally with the constrainee's 
prior assent); in the latter sort the correct thing to say 
is, I believe, that no constraint of freedom has occurred. 
According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in the 
history of political thought, "'freedom' has a specific 
use as a moral and a social concept - to refer either to 
circumstances which arise in the relations of man to man 
24) 
or to specific conditions of social life." Flathman 
concurs with this view in his insistence on historical and 
25) 
social "situatedness" as a condition of freedom. Even 
more explicitly, Oppenheim's view chimes in with mine when 
he states that all power relations are irreflexive: that 
26) 
no actor can stand in such a relation to himself. 
Understanding freedom as a social as well as a moral con-
cept, and 'constraining freedom' as an irreflexive 
relation, is the only way to grasp a vitally important 
feature of its nature, historical as well as logical, that 
is pointed out by these three writers. Precisely as 
Aristotle claimed for justice, the relation of social 
freedom must involve more than one person. 
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If someone insists on the oddity of allowing that a 
person may deceive himself, while denying that he can 
restrict his own freedom, I can only answer that the two 
concepts arise out of radically different situations. The 
lone survivor of the comet-collision could easily deceive 
himself to varying degrees, 
cerned with the intrapersonal 
since self-deception is con-
matter of how a spurious 
belief can prevent us from seeing the world aright, but he 
could not constrain his own freedom, for freedom is 
essentially an interpersonal relation that arises in the 
context of social responsibility. If we deny this, we have 
no way of explaining the soundness of various distinc-
tions, such as that between the Odysseus- and alarm clock 
cases explained above, which seem to lie at the heart of 
all freedom-talk. Needless to say, I am not arguing merely 
that restricting one's own freedom is not wrongful, 
because done with consent. My definition of a constraint 
is a moral, not a moralized one, and clearly I could often 
be appropriately asked to justify the obstacles I create 
to my own choices. The point I am making is a much 
stronger one, namely, that the logic 
social freedom is such that it does 
of the concept of 
not allow for the 
possibility of A's constraining his own freedom, without 
the intervention of somebody else. 
Now, by granting this point, we see that the second 
defence strategy does indeed cut against Taylor's argu-
ments. Since an agent cannot be said to constrain his own 
freedom, although his options are restricted by self-
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deception or other internal bars for which he himself is 
responsible, we cannot see paternalistic measures as 
simply relieving people of their own (reflexive) unfree-
dome An important assumption leading to Taylor's step no. 
2 has thus been undermined. 
Meanwhile, my responsibility view has two other 
implications which are pertinent to the issue of internal 
bars and freedom. First, because we can often be held 
responsible for failing to remove obstacles that restrict 
other people's choices, my self-deception can be con-
sidered a constraint on the freedom of others, insofar as 
it has consequences which restrict their options, and 
insofar as I can be held responsible for not ridding my-
self of it. Second, a self-deceived man, although not un-
free with respect to himself, might be counted unfree with 
respect to others, viz., those who could be held respon-
sible for not relieving him of his self-deception - just 
as the occupant of the room, locked in by the wind, was 
unfree to leave with respect to the janitor who did not 
arrive. The difference between the trapped office worker 
and a self-deceived person is, however, that the first 
cannot, whereas the second generally can, be held morally 
accountable for the restrictions that his unfreedom 
creates to other people's choices. 
What is apt to seem odd about the second of these 
implications is that while we have alleviated the force of 
Taylor's step 1b, we appear to have argued ourselves into 
taking his step 2, thus committing ourselves to some kind 
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of paternalism. There is no reason why we could not often 
be potentially culpable for failing to remove the scales 
from other people's eyes, just as we are potentially culp-
able for failing to relieve them of some of their other 
plights, even if we were not responsible for creating them 
in the first place. 
It may surprise some to see that a sound negative 
theory of freedom can entail a prima facie reason for 
paternalism. However, there is a world of difference 
between this reason and the one which follows from 
Taylor's arguments. 
liberty theorists) , 
For Taylor (and many other positive 
we are not necessarily restricting a 
person's liberty by 'forcing him to be free', that is, not 
if we are merely removing self-imposed constraints on his 
own freedom. Thus, as I noted earlier (p. 127), the main 
substantive objection against paternalistic intervention, 
that it constrains the person's freedom, melts away - for 
allegedly a constraint is only being removed, not imposed. 
In my responsibility view of negative liberty, however, we 
are constraining a person's freedom in certain respects if 
we try to set him right by paternalistic measures, since 
he cannot be said to be restricting his own freedom in the 
first place. But if we consistently refrain from limiting 
a person's freedom in this way, we may possibJly wind up 
restricting his freedom in other (and perhaps more signi-
ficant) ways. So, on balance, a limited paternalism may 
serve, rather than hinder, the interests of freedom; a 
conclusion that is still far from the potential extremism 
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of Taylor's step 2. 
At the end of this chapter some important things 
stand out. The responsibility view of freedom has been 
shown to entail a prima facie case for paternalism in 
situations where we can, for example, be appropriately 
asked to justify not removing the scales from other 
people's eyes, and where these people are, hence, unfree 
with respect to us. However, positive liberty theorists 
tend to make out a much stronger case for paternalism. The 
reason for this difference is the latter's insistence on 
the claim that people may be unfree with respect to them-
selves; a claim which can now serve as the first of our 
insignia of a positive liberty account. But as this claim 
has been shown to be incompatible with the nature of free-
dom as a social concept, doubt has already been cast on 
the justification of positive liberty in general: a doubt 
that will be reinforced in the following chapter. 
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6. POSITIVE LIBERTY 
In the last chapter, grappling with some of the problems 
posed by Charles Taylor's arguments against negative 
accounts of freedom led us to the first of what I hold to 
be the two main characteristic elements of positive 
liberty theories: the supposition that agents can (and 
frequently do) constrain their own freedom. In this 
chapter, the second of the two elements will emerge. The 
crucial point there is that while negative libertarians 
see freedom as an opportunity concept, which only requires 
that our capacity to choose whatever we might care to 
choose is not restricted by others, positive libertarians 
demand that we actually utilize this capacity. So, for 
them, freedom is an exercise concept; being free means 
"doing something with it, 
1 ) 
not just sitting pretty on 
it." In the ensuing discussion we shall see how these 
two elements are reflected, to varying degrees, in 
theories of positive liberty and examine what bearing this 
has on the potential viability of these theories as 
accounts of social freedom. 
It should be recognized at the start that 'positive 
liberty' seems to be a pretty general term, covering a 
wide range of accounts and ideals that divide positive 
libertarians in many ways from one another as well as from 
negative libertarians. For example, Berlin claims that 
the notion of positive liberty has historically assumed 
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two distinct forms, the point of the first being self-
abnegation (or what he calls the "return to the inner 
2 ) 
citadel") , and of the second self-realization. However, 
it must be said that, notwithstanding Berlin's renowned 
lucidity of style, he uses a rather disconcerting variety 
of expressions and metaphors in his exegesis of the 
essence of positive theories. As I understand him, Berlin 
takes both these forms to involve a bifurcation of the 
self: the 'higher' self being, in the self-abnegation 
model, that which is immune from physical determination 
and, in the self-realization model, the rational self that 
I am supposed to identify with and actualize. Thus, Berlin 
overlooks the more common variety of self-realization 
accounts which simply equate freedom with autonomy and 
make do without a split self. He also fails to recognize, 
as logically independent of the other two, a historically 
important form of positive liberty that I shall call 
'communal freedom'. 
Below, I shall first pay attention, in 6.1, to 
certain accounts of freedom which, although often termed 
'positive' by their proponents, are actually negative 
liberty theories in disguise. After that, in 6.2-6.4, I 
deal with what I take to be the three main forms of proper 
positive liberty theories: Promethean freedom, freedom as 
autonomy and communal freedom. These will be seen as 
relating to distinct and even divergent ideals, though the 
borderline between them is fuzzy and sometimes straddled 
by particular writers. writ large, the conclusion of this 
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chapter, presented in 6.5, is that as important as some of 
these ideals are, nothing short of a rejection of any 
Ipositive l definition of liberty is required since these 
ideals are logically distinguishable from, and even incom-
patible with, the concept of social freedom. 
6.1. Negative freedom in disguise 
I have already mentioned some accounts of negative 
liberty such as Berlin1s most permissive one which, 
although being faithful to the form of a negative account, 
yield definitions of a constraint that are too broad to be 
acceptable. Meanwhile, some of the reasons that tend to 
lead negative liberty thinkers away from the crude Hobbes-
ian model or the narrow liberal one were shown to be per-
fectly respectable. Now, many of these same reasons have 
been invoked by writers who do not claim to be advancing 
an improved account of negative liberty but one that 
transcends the distinction between negative and positive 
liberty - or even a purely positive account. Shedding some 
light on the conceptual confusions that lie at the heart 
of these claims will help us to focus on the real dividing 
line between negative and positive freedom. 
It is fair to say that a common characteristic of 
these laberrantl writers is their disillusionment with the 
traditional narrow accounts of negative liberty - which 
leads them to conclude, mistakenly, that what is wrong 
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with these accounts is not that they are too narrow, but 
that they are negative. This error may be partly vitiated 
by the fact that the received wisdom about what a negative 
theory can and cannot involve is often highly distorted. 
Thus, we may be told that a hemophiliac living in rural 
Alaska, who cannot afford to see a Park Avenue hemato-
logist, is only socially unfree to do so in a positive 
model of liberty - or that a negative theory gives a baby, 
abandoned in a public thoroughfare, only the right to be 
3 ) 
left alone. Providing help in cases like these, edu-
cation to the uneducated or means of life to the poor is, 
we are given to believe, something that a negative account 
cannot possibly explain as ways to remove constraints on 
freedom. I have already exposed the falsity of these 
and shown how they apply only if one accepts an 
overly narrow definition of a constraint as an obstacle 
which has been deliberately imposed by another agent. 
Freedom, on a plausible and coherent negative account, is 
much more than bare immunity from such deliberately 
created constraints. However, the writers referred to 
above, giving credence to the received wisdom, have con-
cluded that half a loaf is not the bread they expected 
from a definition of freedom and have, consequently, 
renounced their allegiance to the negative camp. Let us 
look at three noteworthy examples. 
In a paper called "Does Equality Destroy Liberty?" R. 
Norman argues for the claim that, so far from being anti-
thetical, freedom and equality are in fact interdependent 
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values. As Norman believes that the negative picture of 
liberty cannot do justice to this truth, he proposes a 
definition, "stressing the positive fact of choice rather 
than the mere negative fact of non-interference"; accord-
ing to this freedom means the "availability of, and capa-
4) 
city to exercise, meaningful and effective choice." Now, 
Norman is surely right in taking the axe to certain overly 
narrow accounts of liberty and pointing out that "the 
dividing line between natural and human impediments leaves 
a great deal more on the human side of the line than might 
5) 
at first appear." But why assume that a broader and more 
sophisticated negative liberty theory cannot account for 
this? I have argued, for example, that poverty can be a 
constraint upon freedom to the extent that identifiable 
people can be held accountable for it through their negli-
gence, violation of positive duties, etc. There is no need 
to cry out for a rapprochement of negative and positive 
theories to explain that. It should also be noticed that 
Norman's own definition fails to meet either of the two 
criteria which I claimed were characteristic of positive 
liberty theories: what it demands is only the "capacity" 
for effective choice, not its exercise, and there is no 
mention of internal bars that could constrain the agent's 
own freedom. There is, however, some confusion in Norman's 
paper as to the distinction between ability and freedom. 
He takes a man who unexpectedly inherits a fortune and 
suddenly becomes aware of new ways of living to be on a 
par with a man who experiences liberation upon release 
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6 ) 
from prison. Thus, although nothing in what Norman says 
exceeds the natural boundaries of a negative account, he 
may in the end be guilty of the same mistake as Berlin in 
his most permissive mood, making men responsible for all 
the alterable consequences of their actions, and thus 
shrinking unduly the domain of mere inability. 
C. MacPherson's efforts in his Democratic Essays to 
play down the importance of the negative-positive dis-
tinction are misguided in much the same way. For him, a 
positive conception would highlight man's ability to live 
in accordance with his own conscious purposes, to act and 
decide for himself - and he asks if these are not the 
noblest strivings possible for any individualist theory. 
Furthermore, MacPherson claims that when the exact impedi-
ments to negative liberty are spelled out, they turn out 
to be much the same as the potential impediments to posi-
7) 
tive liberty. In this he is partly right and partly 
wrong. He is right because his minimal account of positive 
liberty contains nothing that is not also to be included 
in the negative model; he is wrong insofar as his defini-
tion is still a far cry from positive liberty proper. It 
is, naturally enough, not difficult to erase the dis-
tinction between two concepts if you just leave out what 
is specific to one of them and concentrate on what is 
common to both. 
Finally, let us look briefly at some of the views 
aired by L. Crocker in his book positive Liberty. Somewhat 
. . 1 1 lronlca~~y, Crocker, the only writer to have devoted a 
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whole book to the advocacy of 'positive liberty', turns 
out to be nothing more than yet another negative liber-
tar ian in disguise. He claims that the largest difference 
between traditional (negative) libertarian views and posi-
tive or "left" libertarianism is the latter's support for 
affirmative programmes aimed at removing incapacities and 
developing human capacities: providing free time, equip-
ment, facilities and other means to the enlargement of 
8 ) 
life's possibilities. By contrast, the right liber-
tarian wants only to minimize restraint and coercion. For 
example, Crocker's blind man, curable with a moderate 
expenditure, is not, according to the right libertarian, 
interfered with by those who could afford to pay for a 
9) 
sight-restoring operation but fail to do so. Thus con-
strued, Crocker has of course not much difficulty in 
distinguishing between positive and negative liberty and 
renouncing the latter. But we have seen that this is 
simply representing negative liberty in its most implaus-
ible, if not caricatural, form. Crocker's own words, how-
ever, show that he has no sympathy with positive liberty 
proper. He says he is "cautious" in counting internal 
obstacles as limitations of freedom, 
10) 
since they are not 
restrictions of "social liberty". Moreover, the "posi-
tive liberty" he wants to defend is "a matter of the pre-
sence of options and opportunities, not a matter of self-
mastery or rationality", and the concept of autonomy is 
11) 
really "quite distinct" from it. I could not agree 
more, but then I am supposed to be the negative liber-
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tarian! Crocker's book is deficient as an account of posi-
tive liberty precisely in that it rejects all the defining 
characteristics that distinguish positive from negative 
liberty. In the end, Crocker upholds nothing more than the 
now familiar permissive version of negative liberty, as 
that which we would be free to do on some other possible 
12) 
social arrangement, openly declaring his support for 
13) 
Berlin's rendering of it. But there is no reason what-
soever to saddle that view with the name 'positive 
liberty' . 
Crocker's ultimate aim is to find some conceptual 
apparatus which can underpin the ideological perspective 
which he calls "left libertarianism" but would probably be 
termed 'social democratism' or 'socialism' outside of the 
U.S.A. David Miller is fishing in the same (murky) waters 
when he takes himself to be offering "a persuasive defense 
of the socialist view" with his responsibility view of 
14) 
negative liberty. Both he and Crocker are wrong in 
thinking that a conceptual analysis of freedom will under-
pin a given ideology. There is, for example, no necessary 
connection between maintaining a negative account of 
liberty and upholding so-called libertarian values 
witness Hobbes. Moreover, a right wing libertarian could 
plausibly hold that my responsibility view of freedom is 
correct, and that private property often constitutes a 
constraint on the freedom of the propertyless. But he 
would simply add that, on the same account, depriving the 
owners of their property is also a constraint on freedom, 
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and that for political (rather than conceptual) reasons 
the latter restriction is always, or almost always, more 
severe and lamentable than the former. 
6.2. Promethean freedom 
I'll put up with everything police, soldiers, 
muzzling of the press, limits on parliament ... Freedom 
of the spirit is the only thing for men to be proud 
of and which raises them above animals. 15) 
These words, expressed by Richard Wagner, represent the 
natural self-assertion of an oppressed party who tries to 
bolster his own courage and resilience in the face of 
adversity: you can lock me up, harass me and beat me, but 
at least my spirit remains free - and that is the most 
important freedom of all. Wagner's words as such give no 
indication to which definition of freedom the oppressed 
party adheres, they only show what aspect of freedom he 
happens to value most and what varieties of constraints 
(he tries to convince himself) he is ready to tolerate. 
But the view expressed by Wagner may sometimes fuse subtly 
with another, and philosophically more important, one: 
that, to quote Oscar Wilde, Ita man can be totally free 
even in that granite embodiment of governmental con-
16) 
straint, prison." Here, the point is not only that a 
person can put up with so-and-so much unfreedom, but a 
stronger one, namely, that certain familiar kinds of con-
straints do not make us unfree at all. In this section, I 
shall be concerned with a genuine positive liberty theory, 
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17) 
a theory of what has been called "Promethean freedom" 
"return to the inner citadel", or simply "inner freedom", 
and that is supposed to account for the truth embodied in 
wilde's statement. 
Theories of Promethean freedom assume that man's self 
is divided into two parts, a 'higher' and a 'lower' self, 
and that 'real freedom' consists in the sUbjugation of the 
latter by the former. 'Subjugation' must, however, be 
given a highly unusual interpretation, as we shall see. In 
a typical statement of this view, D. Cooper emphasizes 
that the right perspective upon freedom is not the common 
"civil" one, but a "private" perspective which sees free-
dom as a state of mind, rather than as the state of being 
18) 
free from external constraints. 
The classic position of Promethean freedom is repre-
sented by Stoicism. A pantheistic system, whose linchpin 
was full-blown natural determinism, the precarious marri-
age between causation and moral responsibility was accom-
plished in early Stoicism by means akin to those employed 
by modern-day soft determinism: although human behaviour 
is determined, like other events in nature, an action can 
be considered free (or one for which the agent is morally 
responsible) if one of its causes is an act of the agent's 
will - a volition. So far, there is no mention of a bifur-
cated self. But as the centuries passed, this soft deter-
minism gradually developed in Stoic thought into the idea 
of Promethean freedom, represented e.g. in the writings of 
Epictetus. There, the events of the external world are 
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believed to be as inexorably determined as before (human 
actions included) but now man is seen as having the possi-
bility of escaping from this sphere of necessity into an 
inward space: a protected area to which the laws of cause 
and effect have no access. In this haven, man's higher 
self, his reason, can find shelter - freedom - from the 
fleeting world of necessity to which his lower, appeti-
tive, self is doomed. Man's destiny is compared to that of 
a dog tied to a cart. He cannot help being dragged along 
by the cart, but it is up to him what attitude he takes to 
this external unfreedom within the confines of his mind: 
he may be dragged along grudgingly, or he may trot 
willingly and happily beside the cart. It goes without 
saying which attitude is then considered the rational one 
to take. In more recent times, Kant is often taken to be 
the chief representative of Promethean freedom, but in him 
this picture is complicated by a more subtle, if a less 
clear-cut, view of causality. 
In addition to these views, traces of Promethean 
freedom can be found in different philosophies ranging 
from Taoism and Hinduism to Hegelianism and Marxism. Wher-
ever this idea manifests itself, I see it as resting on 
three main assumptions: (i) Man is subject to some kind 
of external necessity that restricts his freedom of action 
completely, or almost completely. (ii) Despite this, his 
real/higher self can seek refuge in an internal domain 
where it is free from external determination; however, 
this inner freedom is of little or no consequence to his 
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lower/physical self. (iii) The true and only freedom of 
man is the recognition of external necessity and the 
mental attitude that is bound to follow: equanimity, 
tranquility, or (sometimes) apathy. We thus see what 'sub-
jugation of the lower self by the higher self' really 
amounts to, viz., paying no attention to it, flouting it. 
We subjugate our lower nature by detaching our real selves 
from it. 
Historians of ideas tend to explain the concept of 
Promethean freedom as a reaction to difficult social con-
ditions which hold little prospect of improvement: times 
of turmoil or economic exigencies. In such situations, 
the most available recourse may be an 'inner emigration' 
to the wonderland where nothing can touch you and nobody 
can hurt you; where you can abandon yourself to a mental 
life of passive detachment from the outside world. 
However, straitened circumstances are not always the 
spring of this notion. In times of relative economic 
abundance, Promethean freedom has sometimes laid the 
foundation not for abject passiveness, but for unsurpassed 
heroism. The clearest examples of this are found in what 
MacIntyre calls "heroic societies": Homeric Greece and the 
19) 
realm of the Icelandic sagas. Being more at home with 
the latter, I grant that some of MacIntyre's insights into 
the world of the sagas are very much to the point. He 
recognizes, for example, that in them fate is a social 
reality and the descrying of it an important social role -
and that understanding the workings of fate is in itself 
-169-
20) 
considered to be a virtue. But not all the conclusions 
which MacIntyre draws from this about the "key features" 
of heroic society are correct. He claims that a "man in 
heroic society is what he does ... he has no hidden depths", 
and that to "judge a man therefore is to judge his 
21) 
actions." 
That man's actions are the touchstone of his real 
virtues in a fatalistic society seems very implausible; in 
the case of the Icelandic sagas, at any rate, it is simply 
untrue. There, man is not "what he does" but what he 
thinks: what attitude he takes to the drama of his life, 
whose script has been written in advance. Gisli Sursson 
is, as MacIntyre himself notes, a winner, not a loser at 
the moment of his heroic death. However, it is not because 
of the number of men he kills or wounds before he is him-
self overborne, it is because he is a hero at heart: he 
has the attitudes and ideas that befit a hero. Bjorn in 
Njals saga also fights against the odds when battling with 
the hero Kari, but even while doing so he is a coward at 
heart and therefore remains an object of unrelenting 
derision. 
The real magic in the literary style of the Icelandic 
sagas, which seems to have misled MacIntyre, lies in the 
fact that the things which really matter, man's "hidden 
depths", are never described from the inside, as it were, 
but must always be deduced from descriptions of the per-
son's outward appearance: his countenance, his clothes, 
his kinship, the odd remarks he makes, etc. MacIntyre mis-
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takes the charming but cryptic style of these epic works 
for an important philosophical truth about the ideas of 
the society they describe, and thus comes to see things 
upside down. 
In reality, the Icelandic sagas are a classical 
embodiment of the main features of Promethean freedom. The 
hallmark of the hero is that before the inevitable battle 
he sees himself faced by a kind of a positive dilemma: 
his fate is either to die or to survive. If the former, 
why not die proudly and courageously? If the latter, what 
reason is there for holding back, either? As the outcome 
is already determined, a man's real freedom resides in his 
soul; and while everything else fades away into death and 
oblivion, the hero's reputation, as judged by the approach 
he takes to his destiny, lives on. 
How much of what I have said about the Icelandic 
sagas applies to the society depicted by Homer and the 
Greek tragedies is an open question. However, if (as I am 
inclined to believe) the world-view of the ancient Greek 
epics is similar to that of the sagas, Martha Nussbaum 
need not be as puzzled as she is about Agamemnon's atti-
22) 
tude to his predicament in the Aeschylus. Faced with 
the heavy doom of having his expedition fail unless he 
offers up his daughter Iphigenia as a sacrifice, Agamemnon 
at first despairs. But he then begins to arrange his feel-
ings to accord with his fortune, and ends up as a willing 
victim, slipping his own neck into the "yoke-strap of 
23) 
necessity". Nussbaum wonders what moral significance it 
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can have simply to blow with the winds that strike against 
you, and cooperate inwardly with necessity. She concludes 
that Agamemnon's moral crisis is defused "by means that 
24) 
seem arbitrary and strange". Arbitrary and strange they 
may seem to us, but given the background of a Promethean 
theory of freedom, they are the most natural thing in the 
world. Was not Agamemnon simply entering the sphere of his 
real freedom, and leaving behind the realm of necessity, 
by taking this attitude to his predicament? 
Although the idea of Promethean freedom has exercised 
a strange fascination for men at various times in history, 
the arguments against it are both numerous and strong. 
Firstly, the idea of locating 'real' freedom in a special 
realm, beyond the empirical world of causality, in a 
system that is otherwise deterministic, seems seriously 
suspect. A modern determinist might reply to it in the 
following way: 
People's deliberations take place within the same 
spatio-temporal order as other natural events in the 
world. The thoughts that people have at any time, 
and the reasoning in which they will engage, is 
determined by the state of their central nervous 
system and their environment at that time. There is 
no reason to suppose that the deliberations of pure 
practical reason are any less caused by brain events 
than are those of inclination-tainted deliberation. 
Moreover, if it were the case that there is a natural 
causal order, which includes the actions of 
bodies ... as well as the coming and going of incli-
nations, it is difficult to see how the 'actions' of 
the rational self could ... fail to violate the laws of 
the natural causal order.25) 
Secondly, Promethean freedom has the counter-intuitive 
implication that by removing desires, we automatically 
become freer: if a slave does not desire freedom any more, 
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qua slave he is no longer unfree. Thirdly, as Berlin has 
pointed out, Promethean freedom rests on the presuppo-
sition that knowledge always liberates, that once some-
thing is understood or known, it is conceptually im-
26) 
possible to see oneself as being at the mercy of it. 
But how does the mere knowledge that I have been locked 
up in my room make me freer? We might want to insist 
that knowledge is always better than ignorance, but this 
does not entail that it always makes us freer. On the 
contrary, real constraints remain constraints even if they 
are understood and accepted as such. Fourthly, we can ask 
why apathy at worst, heroism at best, is the natural con-
comitant of the recognition of necessity. Why not irony, 
or simply despair? Fifthly, and most importantly for the 
argumentation in this thesis, Promethean theories grossly 
violate the condition of social freedom that a man cannot 
make himself unfree. In fact, they violate it to such an 
extreme degree as to make the subjugation by one part of 
myself of another a necessary condition of my own real 
freedom. 
Logically consistent or not, Promethean theories have 
no relevance for a correct analysis of social freedom. 
They can most favourably be understood as upholding 
certain virtues, such as self-control, self-abnegation and 
equanimity in times of hardship, but as carrying them to 
the extreme by incorporating them within a framework of 
ill-founded metaphysics. 
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6.3. Freedom as autonomy 
'Autonomy' means literally, as indicated by etymology 
('autos' = self; 'nomos' = rules/laws), the having or mak-
ing of one's own laws. Before examining the variety of 
positive liberty which tries to link autonomy with social 
freedom, some conceptual clarifications are needed. 
Furthermore, something must be said about the connection 
between social freedom and freedom of the will, an issue 
that has been explicitly avoided in this thesis so far. 
Let us start by expanding on Benn's useful distinc-
27) 
tion between "autonomy" and "autarchy". An autarchic 
person has the psychological constitution necessary for 
autonomy, i.e., he is a competent chooser, whether or not 
he happens to make a choice in a given situation. This 
means that the autarchic person has the capacity for what 
Aristotle would call practical reason: he can look for 
reasons, deliberate on them and make rational decisions 
when confronted by a range of options. Remaining faithful 
to etymology, a heterarchic agent would only be (1) one 
who had been deprived of this capacity by another person. 
However, for the sake of simplification, I shall use 
'heterarchy' as a contradictory rather than as a contrary 
of 'autarchy', so that everybody who is not autarchic is 
to be considered heterarchic. Thus, in addition to (1) 
above, a person could be heterarchic for two reasons: 
because (2) of a natural impediment (mental deficiency, 
brain damage, psychotic state, etc.) that disqualifies him 
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as a chooser, or because (3) he has sold himself into some 
kind of mental slavery (drug addiction, yielding himself 
mindlessly to manipulation, etc. ) . Plainly, what these 
different causes of heterarchy have in common is that they 
paralyze or impair the agent's capacity for choice, block-
ing the possibility of rational decision-making. 
The autonomous person is the one who utilizes his 
autarchy, being, as Rousseau or Kant would put it, obedi-
ent to a law that he has prescribed to himself. As in the 
case of heterarchy, 'heteronomy' and 'autonomy' will be 
considered contradictories. Hence, a person can fail to be 
autonomous (and thus be heteronomous) in a given situation 
for three reasons: because (1) he is constrained by some-
one else from reaching an autonomous decision, (2) he 
fails to do so owing to some natural impediment, or (3) he 
does not bother to make the effort. However, in spite of 
this, he may remain overall a competent chooser. These 
conceptual points clearly entail that every heterarchic 
person is necessarily heteronomous, but not vice versa, 
because, as Benn says, "a competent chooser may still be a 
slave to convention, choosing by standards he has accepted 
28) 
quite uncritically from his milieu." A "slave to con-
vention" may be a rather strong way of putting it, for the 
autonomous man must keep his capacity to make independent 
judgements intact; any possible conformism must simply be 
caused by the fact that he is too busy, lazy or complacent 
to look critically at the issues himself, while he can do 
so if he wants to. Otherwise, he is not only heteronomous 
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but also heterarchic, toeing the line of custom like a man 
under hypnosis. 
In sum, the autonomous person actualizes that which 
the autarchic person only has potentially. He is not only 
capable of reasoning, he reasons; not only capable of 
choosing, he chooses. But being fully autonomous is, of 
course, impossible for a finite being. Trying to reach a 
rational decision before every action would not only make 
our lives miserable but impossible to live. While autarchy 
is a principle, something that we generally expect people 
to have, Benn thus rightly describes autonomy as an ideal 
that transcends it, a goal thought to be worthy of 
29) 
aspiring to although it cannot generally be attained. 
It might now be worthwhile to bring some of this to 
bear on the question about the connection between free 
will and social freedom briefly touched upon in chapter 1. 
Strawson argued convincingly in a famous paper that there 
are a number of attitudes and institutions (praise and 
blame, punishment and reward) which are appropriate only 
to agents who are in some (non-social) sense free, and 
that a person is considered morally responsible only if he 
30) 
is a possible candidate for such attitudes. Since on my 
view of social freedom, the attribution of moral responsi-
bility plays a major role, we must ask what precisely this 
other sense of freedom amounts to that is required for 
judgements about social freedom to be appropriate. 
Day has an unequivocal answer, namely, that liberty 
presupposes ability: the truth of 'A is able to D' being a 
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necessary condition both of the truth and also of the 
31) 
falsity of 'A is unfree to D'. That this cannot be the 
correct answer is, however, shown by the fact that a man 
with a broken leg, confined to a wheelchair, must surely 
be counted as free to run, although he cannot; similarly, 
if there were a law against running, he would be unfree to 
run in addition to being unable to do so. But the situ-
at ion changes drastically if we imagine the man being con-
fined to the chair not because of a broken leg but because 
of a state of severe mental retardation, or if the 
'person' sitting there turns out to be an automaton. Here, 
I think, we come to the core of the matter: questions 
about social freedom can be raised only about beings who 
are autarchic, who have the minimal capacity to choose. 
Otherwise, they are not freedom-evaluable in the first 
place. A person in a coma, let alone by others, is not, as 
32) 
one writer claims, a paradigm case of negative freedom: 
such a person is neither socially free nor unfree. This is 
also why we hesitate to call a kleptomaniac socially free 
or unfree to steal since we are not sure if he is really 
freedom-evaluable in that respect or not. 
Already in chapter 1, I passed a tentative judgement 
about free will being in some sense a prerequisite of 
social freedom. strawson must be understood as making a 
similar point, and now we have pinpointed what this sense 
is. In fact, I want to claim that all fruitful discussions 
about free will are discussions about the precise nature 
and extent of autarchy, the capacity to choose. Still, 
-177-
someone might want to leave a space in between 'autarchy' 
and 'determinism ' for Epicurean, or should we say Heisen-
bergian, freedom of the will, covering decisions that are 
not causally determined but happen at random. I have no 
real objection to this use; but note simply that this kind 
of 'freedom of the willi would have no relevance to social 
freedom. If, however, this is the only kind of free will 
possible, or if determinism is true, all talk of 'social 
freedom ' is meaningless. 
To exemplify my conclusion about the connection 
between autarchy and social freedom, let us imagine a 
'typical ' situation of a robber, with a gun in his hand, 
ordering a bank clerk to hand over some money. If the 
robber is autarchic (but not e.g. working under hypnosis, 
or insane), he is morally responsible for his threat and 
can thus constrain another man's freedom. If he is heter-
archic, he cannot make the bank clerk socially unfree to 
retain the money, but simply make him unable to do so (as 
is true of any kind of natural compulsion). Let us assume, 
however, that the robber is autarchic. The bank clerk is 
then either autarchic or heterarchic. If he is autarchic 
(which bank clerks usually are, one would hope) , then he 
is socially unfree to retain the money, since he is con-
strained, and in this case coerced, to hand it over. If he 
is heterarchic (e.g. under hypnosis), he is not freedom-
evaluable and thus neither socially free nor unfree to 
retain the money. He could, however, be socially unfree 
qu~ hypnotized person with respect to the agent who hypno-
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tized him and possibly to those who could have prevented 
it but did not. All these qualifications may seem to have 
made the process of judging social (un) freedom a most 
complicated one; but in reality it is not the case since 
we can usually presuppose, when going about our daily 
business, that most of the people we are dealing with are 
autarchic. The reason for this are the modest demands made 
upon the rationality of the agents: to be autarchic a 
person only needs to be a minimally good reasoner. 
Autarchy is what Feinberg would call a "threshold con-
ception of natural competence", the line being drawn some-
where between the capacity levels of the normal adult and 
the mildly retarded, excluding infants, insane persons, 
the severely retarded, the comatose and the seriously 
33) 
manipulated, but including virtually everybody else. 
Before leaving the topic of free will and social 
freedom, a disclaimer is needed. It may seem that I have 
been upholding a theory according to which free will is a 
purely procedural concept of rationality, much as H. 
34) 
Frankfurt and G. Dworkin have recently done, thus 
defusing the determinism-free will dichotomy and under-
mining my own claim that if determinism is true, 'social 
freedom' is devoid of meaning. This has not been my 
intention. Briefly, in the Dworkin/Frankfurt model an 
agent with a free will has not only first-order desires 
for particular actions, but also second-order (or even 
higher-order) desires for having a lower-order desire, or 
for that desire to be his will. In the latter case (which 
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Frankfurt calls a "second-order volition"), the agent 
identifies himself with a lower-order desire, and as long 
as that process is unhindered, his will is free. But as it 
is conceivable that the process itself is causally deter-
mined (the person being determined to want what he really 
wants), Frankfurt concludes that his account of free will 
35) 
is neutral with regard to the problem of determinism. 
Relating this to what has been said here about 
autarchy as a precondition of social freedom, it may 
appear that I, like Frankfurt, have abandoned the tradi-
tional requirement of free will theories that we are 'free 
to do otherwise'. As long as the procedure of rational 
decision-making is up to standard, it does not matter if 
our higher-order desires have been implanted in us through 
manipulative conditioning, hypnosis or whatever. But on 
closer inspection, this cannot be correct, since in my 
model, such a person would not be autarchic but heter-
archic. My 'autarchy' requires, as Frankfurt's 'free will' 
36 ) 
does not, what Dworkin calls "procedural independence", 
namely, not only that the person has the capacity to 
choose on the basis of his higher-order desires, but also 
that these desires are his own, and that the possibility 
to choose otherwise is a genuine option for him. Thus, I 
conclude that Frankfurt has failed to explicate the con-
cept of free will or autarchy correctly. Incidentally, I 
think that the same applies to all those who seek to 
rescue free will by flirting with some kind of soft deter-
minism. I do not need to establish as part of my present 
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argument what precisely is meant by 'having the option to 
choose otherwise' or that 'my desires are my own', 
although I can say that I am more or less in agreement 
with modern day indeterminists like P. van Inwagen on 
37) 
those issues. I should, however, finish this detour 
into the free will issue by emphasizing the claim that, 
for social freedom, the capacity for choice is pre-
supposed, and that this capacity requires both (minimal) 
practical reason and procedural independence. 
Now, there is an old tradition in philosophy which 
wants to equate social liberty - to return to that - with 
autonomy_ More often than not, John Stuart Mill is taken 
to be one of the strongest proponents of this view, with 
his emphasis on individuality and the choice between 
different ways of life. Thus, John Gray states that this 
particular version of positive liberty informs Mill's most 
38) 
liberal work, On Liberty. As a first step in challeng-
ing the theory of freedom as autonomy, I shall argue that 
this was not Mill's view at all. What Mill praises in such 
glittering terms in On Liberty is the readiness and capa-
city to make deliberate choices between alternative 
beliefs and patterns of life, but not necessarily the 
exercise of this capacity. Hence, his notion of indivi-
duality can best be understood as relating to the concept 
of autarchy, as I have explained it, not autonomy. 
Mill is concerned that we do not undermine our own 
autarchy by what I called earlier 'selling ourselves into 
some kind of mental slavery'. When he claims that he "who 
does anything because 
39) 
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it is the custom makes no 
choice", or that our "faculties are called into no 
exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it ... ", 
the emphasis must be seen as lying on the "merely 
because". What he is warning against is not the "intelli-
gent following" of custom, but what he calls the "mechani-
40) 
cal adhesion to it". Here, Mill furnishes a distinction 
41) 
between two types of conformism: to follow custom 
merely because it is a custom is not to make a choice at 
a ll. ~ ~ , and even worse, in doing so you gradually undermine 
your own autarchy and hence freedom. But to accept and 
follow custom, however uncritically, e.g. because you are 
too lazy to look for an alternative, or too content with 
the way things are, cannot be condemned as a lack of free-
dom on Mill's view, as long as you can make the effort if 
you want to. Therefore, it is autarchy but not autonomy 
that Mill sees as a necessary condition of freedom. 
What has confused many authors is the fact that Mill 
simultaneously argues for something else, namely, the 
special value in modern society of making choices that are 
not only autonomous but also eccentric or idiosyncratic: 
"Precisely because the tyranny of the majority is such as 
to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order 
to break through that tyranny, 
42) 
that people should be 
eccentric." But this does not entail that the non-
eccentric, but autarchic, conformist is in any sense less 
free; it only means that if you stubbornly refuse to bend 
your knees to custom, you are paying an extra service to 
-182-
society. 
Admittedly, there are places in On Liberty and 
especially in System of Logic where Mill seems to demand 
that we not only have the opportunity for choice, but that 
43) 
we actually exercise it. Some of these may be accounted 
for by the fact that Mill is not always very systematic in 
the presentation of his views; but where this excuse does 
not suffice, the following observation can be made. Claim-
ing that being a competent chooser sometimes requires 
activity, does not entail that what this competence 
amounts to must be autonomy (exercise), not only autarchy 
(capacity) . To take a parallel example, overcoming 
external obstacles may sometimes be necessary to be (nega-
tively) free to do x, but that does not mean that the 
freedom you end up with is more than the opportunity to do 
x. Similarly here, to remain a competent chooser, differ-
ent types of activity may be needed to overcome internal 
or external obstacles which threaten to undermine this 
capacity, but that does not mean that the competence 
needed as a precondition of social freedom is more than a 
capacity to choose (autarchy). There is thus no good 
reason to think that Mill presupposed actual autonomy as a 
condition of freedom, or that he equated the two. 
Showing that John Stuart Mill did not adhere to the 
view of freedom as autonomy does not, of course, show that 
this view is wrong. First we should note that, although 
'autonomy' is most often used in the way I have suggested 
to describe the state of exercising our autarchy, there 
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are some other uses abroad. For example, 'autonomy' is 
sometimes invoked to refer not to a state, but to a right 
of non-interference, often in conjunction with topical 
discussions about the permissible extent of paternalism. 
There is no time here to partake of these debates about 
the value of autonomy, but I may be allowed to comment, as 
an aside, that talk about an inviolable right to autonomy 
may merely serve to obscure the issue at hand, since Mill 
seemed in any case well equipped to thwart the menace of 
paternalism without presupposing any such right. I shall, 
however, leave this and other more deviant uses of the 
term out of consideration. The pressing question is still 
about the possible connection between social freedom and 
autonomy: if freedom is a necessary condition of autonomy 
and/or autonomy a necessary condition of freedom. 
Richard Lindley in his book Autonomy expounds the 
former view by making freedom from external constraints 
the second of the "two dimensions" of autonomy. Now, it is 
obvious from the discussion above that freedom from 
certain constraints is a necessary condition of autonomy, 
namely, from those that would make the person heteronomous 
in sense (1) (p. 174): another agent being responsible for 
preventing his exercise of practical reason. But Lindley 
goes much further, claiming that a prisoner languishing in 
his cell, although having a strong, well-ordered will and 
being a clear, rational thinker, cannot be considered 
autonomous since he is "able to do hardly anything". 
Realizing, however, that his own example is counter-
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intuitive, Lindley tries to rescue it by assuming that 
while the man may be autonomous, he is at least prevented 
44) 
from exercising his autonomy. The problem is that such 
a distinction cannot be made in the case of autonomy, as 
it is in itself an exercise concept. EVen if we take 
Lindley to mean 'autarchic' when he says "being auto-
nomous", the counter-intuitiveness is not obviated since 
his claim would still entail that a person such as Nelson 
Mandela could not have taken autonomous decisions in his 
. 1 1 prlson ce~~. On the contrary, the reasonable thing to say 
seems to be that although Mandela may have been taking 
autonomous decisions all the time, he was in fact pre-
vented from acting on them. Taking rational decisions and 
being able to carry them out are surely two distinct 
things. Hence, in general, social freedom is not a neces-
sary condition of autonomy. 
But is autonomy a necessary condition of social free-
dom? While remaining for the most part faithful to a 
responsibility view of negative liberty, Connolly some-
times seems to answer this question in the affirmative, 
e.g. by giving a definition of 'acting freely' according 
to which X acts freely in doing z when "he acts without 
constraint upon his unconstrained and reflective choice 
45) 
with respect to z." Why "reflective" (which seems here 
to mean 'autonomous')? We have already seen that autarchy 
is a necessary condition of freedom in the sense that a 
heterarchic person is not freedom-evaluable. But autarchy 
makes a much less extended and intense requirement on 
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rationality than does autonomy, or more precisely, 
autarchy requires only in potentiality that which autonomy 
requires in actuality. A heteronomous person is not neces-
sarily unfree. He is not unfree if he does not exercise 
choice because of a natural impediment (in that case he is 
merely unable to do so) 
(in that case he just 
or because of voluntary conformism 
does not bother). In neither of 
these cases are there obstacles to his choice for which 
another person is accountable and which prevent him from 
taking an autonomous decision. Hence, as we see, autonomy 
is not a necessary condition of freedom, at least not when 
we consider particular free actions. However, it could be 
argued that autonomy is in a more general and indirect 
sense a precondition of freedom. For if people were never 
able to exercise practical reason, there would be no sense 
in asking them to give justifications for their actions; 
without that there would be no concept of moral responsi-
bility and, hence, no social freedom. But this does not 
entail that individual agents cannot perform particular 
free actions unless they act upon a "reflective choice". 
By comparison, soccer would not exist if no goals could be 
scored, but this does not mean that a particular goalless 
match counts any less as a game of soccer than a match in 
which goals are scored. 
The theory of freedom as autonomy implies both that 
agents can constrain their own freedom (by not bothering 
to take autonomous decisions) and, more generally, that a 
man is unfree if he does not exercise his capacity for 
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choice. Both these claims conflict with the nature of 
social liberty. Autonomy designates a set of properties 
which constitute a human virtue, and a very important one 
at that. But, unlike social freedom, autonomy is not an 
interpersonal relation. Hence, I conclude that another 
variety of positive liberty fails to meet the criteria for 
social freedom. 
Furthermore, theories of positive liberty which try 
to combine autonomy with some other positive ideal cannot 
be expected to fare much better. For example, the attempts 
of Keith Graham and other neo-Marxists to rescue the con-
cept of autonomy from its individualist context and 
restate it within a theory of 'communal freedom' should 
already look prima facie implausible. Yet, they cannot be 
discarded until the following section has shown why this 
third and last variety of positive liberty theories will 
not wash either. 
6.4. Communal freedom 
There is an Icelandic proverb which says that relatives 
make the worst enemies. It is particularly noticeable that 
the differences between the view I shall call 'communal 
freedom' and other positive liberty accounts run at least 
as deep as those between communal freedom and negative 
liberty. with the exception of K. Graham, who tries to 
46) 
square autonomy and communalism, the point of departure 
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for most of the communal freedom thinkers is their 
rejection of freedom as autonomy (and often of Promethean 
freedom as well). Hannah Arendt provides a case in point. 
For her there has been an ominous trend toward transposing 
the idea of freedom from its "original field, the realm of 
politics and human affairs in general, to an inward 
47 } 
domain ... " B. Dauenhauer makes an even more pungent 
remark when he claims that if radical human autonomy were 
indeed realized and sustained, this would be a defeat for 
48) 
freedom and not a triumph. 
The basic idea of these thinkers is this: just as 
for the negative libertarian the isolated, self-reliant 
person becomes a valued objective, so for the proponents 
of autonomy man is seen fundamentally as an atomic indi-
vidual, and only derivatively as a social being. On both 
of these accounts it is thus thought to be possible and 
desirable for the agent to achieve radical independence 
from others to enhance his freedom. It is this vision of 
the free, self-subsistent individual that the communal 
freedom thinkers aim at vitiating. Against it, they pit 
the views of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and other modern 
philosophers of a similar stripe who claim that persons 
can only be human, and consequently free, to the extent 
that they are citizens of a society: participants in 
intersubjectivity. This latter view is then seen as hark-
ing back to crucial elements in ancient Greek thought, 
where freedom necessarily involved interplay with other 
49} 
persons. Nobody can be considered free as a mere indi-
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vidual; on the contrary, man is only free when he acts 
within a framework of communal ties, rules and bonds. 
Freedom is the raison d'etre of politics, not of splendid 
isolation. Some of these writers even go as far as stating 
that, since communal interplay always involves different 
kinds of relationships (of equality, hegemony, subsump-
tion, etc.), man is no less free when he is on the receiv-
ing end of authority and power than when he is himself the 
leader, exercising power - so long, that is, as there is 
50) 
mutual respect at work in the relationship. In simple 
terms, this means that when you obey a command or yield to 
a constraint imposed by another agent, this constraint 
does not limit your social freedom if a) you see the need 
for it, and b) you respect the person imposing it. In 
capsule form, we can thus define communal freedom as stat-
ing that freedom is the active participation in different 
relationships within a community characterized by frater-
nity and mutual respect. 
As a first response, it may be asked if the communal 
freedom thinkers are not really imagining a wonderland in 
which the ducklings of this world have become swans. Are 
solidarity and respect actually the main characteristics 
of modern communities? In Benn's Theory of Freedom, there 
is a trenchant and insightful critique of different 
communitarian models which seems to indicate that the 
mutuality sought for there can be realized only in face-
to-face relations, not on a larger societal basis, and 
that other proposed forms of community are likely either 
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to break down or turn into a totalitarian nightmare: the 
51) 
immersion of the individual in the whole. In reply to 
this, the communal freedom thinker could claim that, 
although no present society comes near to satisfying his 
criteria, such a society of fraternity and respect is 
nevertheless a worthy ideal to aim at. The problem about 
this move is that it entails that in the present state of 
affairs no social freedom is attainable at a ll. ~ ~ , we would 
have to embark on a MacIntyrean project of constructing 
radically new forms of community to have any hope of 
creating a background against which the notion of freedom 
could (again?) become intelligible. 
Although simple observations about the societies we 
live in, or the nature of human societies in general, may 
seem to cut against the theory of communal freedom, there 
remains something attractive about it. Understanding its 
attractions may be the first step to realizing its short-
comings. Firstly, communal freedom emphasizes as no other 
theory the social nature of freedom, its interpersonal 
form, its situatedness. Secondly, it reminds us of the 
fact that man is a political animal and that most of the 
activities which are conducive to our flourishing or 
eudaimonia must necessarily take place within a social 
context. Moreover, active participation in the society we 
belong to can be seen as a precondition of being able to 
enjoy many of the benefits that such an institution has to 
offer. There is every merit in underlining these truths 
about the nature of social freedom and the nature of man. 
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It has to be remarked, however, that in theories of 
communal freedom all these laudable ideas are overworked 
and inflated. Because freedom is a social concept, it is 
assumed that no obstacle imposed in the name of society or 
with the needs of society in mind can restrict our 
liberty. But this is not true. We are unfree to do x when 
we are constrained from choosing and/or doing x, however 
necessary and desirable such a restriction may be. 
Hannah Arendt finds something drastically wrong about 
the notion that perfect liberty is incompatible with the 
52) 
existence of society. But she is conflating different 
points. It is true of man that his nature cannot be 
realized in isolation; it is also true that freedom only 
acquires meaning in interpersonal relationships, but it 
does not therefore follow that the commitments you must 
accept to be a member of society do not limit your free-
dom. They do, however just and democratic the society may 
be; but then getting married also necessarily restricts 
your freedom in many respects, however much you love your 
spouse and want to be united with her or with him in holy 
matrimony. The truth is that a person often undertakes 
commitments which, through someone else's agency, will 
restrict his freedom, not because he is forced to do so, 
but because he wants to; because he prefers some other 
value to certain liberties. Denying this is calling for a 
moralized definition of freedom according to which you 
cannot constrain another person's freedom by anything 




indeed, come down to little more than that. How-
ever, the legitimacy of such a moralized definition has 
already been argued against in this thesis (2.1). 
The fact that nobody can enjoy perfect freedom in a 
society, and that there is nevertheless a prima facie pre-
sumption against every restriction of it, may seem to be a 
paradoxical product of my negative model. But if you are 
an enthusiastic soccer player, do you not consider every 
attack of the other team as a threat? Yet, would it not 
be a still greater threat if they stopped attacking 
altogether, i.e., stopped playing the game? In general, 
there is nothing incoherent about combining a negative 
theory of freedom with a desire for an integrated 
community of common dependence and common sacrifice; then 
the presumption in favour of freedom is simply overridden 
in many cases by other considerations, deemed to be more 
important. 
The reason why the communal freedom thinkers fail to 
acknowledge this possibility may, as Berlin suggests, lie 
in their belief that all good things must in the end be 
compatible and even entail each other; a belief that he 
54) 
rightly describes as being attractive but false. Now, 
it is possible that Berlin's own views on the irreducible 
plurality of values yield too easily to what MacIntyre 
would call a decisionist interpretation. However, an 
alternative explanation might be possible on Aristotelian 
lines that would reconcile an essential trade-off between 
55) 
certain values with an objective human teleology. Any-
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way, as far as the idea of communal freedom in general is 
concerned, I have already exposed some of its principal 
weaknesses. A theory which claims that we are only free if 
we are participating actively in a communal project, that 
we make ourselves unfree by not doing so, and that certain 
constraints imposed by society are not real constraints at 
all, is not a viable candidate for an account of social 
freedom. 
6.5. positive liberty reassessed 
At the end of the last chapter and at the beginning of the 
present one, two main characteristic elements of positive 
liberty theories were described, and doubts were enter-
tained as to whether such theories could have anything to 
do with social freedom. Now, after having examined a whole 
gamut of positive accounts, the reassessment presented in 
this section will turn out to do little more than confirm 
my original doubts. 
Let us first say something about the connection 
between positive liberty and paternalism. At the end of 
chapter 5, it was argued that positive liberty lent itself 
more easily to development into rampant paternalism, and 
even totalitarianism, than did negative liberty. This 
claim can now be supported by reference to the three main 
forms of positive liberty. Thus, there is plainly not much 
in Promethean theories which can be used to counter 
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paternalism. At worst, paternalism can be seen as simply 
one more inconvenience with which the higher self has to 
put up; at best, if enacted by the higher self itself on 
the lower self, it is an admirable state of affairs. The 
proponents of freedom as autonomy, with their heavy 
emphasis on individual rational choice, are somewhat 
better equipped to resist paternalism (see e.g. K. 
56) 
Graham's arguments against Lenin's vanguardism ). But as 
soon as the autonomous self of the individual begins to be 
equated with the rational self as such (shared by all 
rational agents), a slide into paternalism begins here, 
too. Communal freedom, on the other hand, seems to be the 
variety of positive liberty most open to paternalism. To 
be free, man must be an active member of a community; if 
he fails to participate or refuses to abide by its rules, 
the right course of action may be to 'force him to be 
free', i. e. , coerce him into enjoying his liberties and, 
hence, realizing his genuine human nature. 
If we reflect back upon the two characteristic 
elements of positive liberty, we see that they violate 
what I have shown to be central features of social 
freedom: that a) a person cannot be said to constrain his 
own freedom, and b) to be free, only opportunity, not its 
exercise, is required. What, then, is positive liberty? 
It turns out to be a very general term, covering a variety 
of accounts, all supposedly having to do with social free-
dom, but in reality upholding other distinct, if no less 
respectable, values. Self-abnegation and self-control can 
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be important virtues; the frequent exercise of autonomy is 
also a significant accomplishment, and some degree of 
social participation is a necessary feature of man's 
eudaimonia. But why in the world should we interpret these 
values as aspects of social freedom which is the simple 
relation of being unconstrained by another agent? Marxism, 
incidentally, is perhaps the paradigm case of a positive 
liberty theory since it combines all the three main 
varieties into one: freedom as the recognition of neces-
sity (until the world revolution), freedom as the autonomy 
of agents released from false consciousness, and freedom 
as the participation in productive activity. This may be 
due to Marxism's mixed conceptual roots: Aristotelian, 
Kantian and Hegelian. But again, all these values can and 
should be explained and celebrated without any reference 
to social freedom. 
Somebody might question this conclusion by pointing 
out that the positive liberty theories I have surveyed 
all fit into MacCallum's generic schema for freedom (p. 
10), although they disagree among themselves, and with 
negative liberty theories, on the ranges of the given 
variables. The obvious answer to this is to say that Mac-
Callum's schema must be too broad, since it fails to 
exclude accounts that we have found good reasons for not 
counting as those of social freedom. If somebody wants to 
rescue his proposals, the schema will have to be made much 
more precise, incorporating e.g. the two central features 
of social freedom set out above, and thus excluding the 
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positive theories. 
Should we then just make a clean sweep of all posi-
tive liberty theories? Should the term itself even be 
abolished? I am not sure. Perhaps we need a term to refer 
to a set of theories which are thought to have some bear-
ing on social freedom but do not. Nevertheless, the con-
stant conflation of 'positive liberty' with real (nega-
tive) freedom is a rather lamentable state of affairs. The 
most sympathetic interpretation of positive liberty 
would be to try to argue that it designates another kind 
of freedom than the social one (as freedom of the will is 
another kind of freedom). However, most of its proponents 
would not agree: they see 'positive liberty' as competing 
with 'negative liberty' for the correct notion of social 
freedom. Also, I have shown that the positive liberty 
theories examined above uphold specific values which have 
nothing to do with 'freedom' in any ordinary sense of the 
word. So, although positive freedom may be 'positive', 
'freedom' seems, indeed, to be a misnomer. 
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7. FREEDOM AND POWER 
After having put paid to attempts to construct a 'posi-
tive' account of social freedom, it is now time to return 
to the insights of the responsibility view. Earlier in the 
thesis it became evident that social freedom had to be 
accorded a place within a hierarchy of interrelated con-
cepts. At that point, emphasis was placed on tracing its 
logical links vertically: to moral responsibility and 
from there, in turn, to that which people can appropri-
ately be called upon to justify. It remains to examine 
whether the responsibility view can shed light on the kin-
ship of freedom to other concepts to which it may stand in 
more horizontal relationships, so to speak: concepts such 
as power, control, influence, authority, etc. These (along 
with freedom) tend to be referred to collectively as power 
concepts and be said to share certain basic character-
istics such as irreflexivity. Also, their meanings are 
1 ) 
often seen as partially overlapping. In an exhaustive 
inquiry into the nature of social freedom, all these 
claims would merit investigation. However, in order to 
keep the scope of the present thesis within reasonable 
limits, I confine my attention in this chapter to the con-
cept of power. 
What interests me is, naturally enough, power as a 
social concept and, more specifically, the idea of some-
one's power over another person. I distinguish this from 
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the more general possession of power to do things, which 
need not designate a social concept, and also point out 
a contrast between the social relations of 'exercising 
power over' and 'having power over' someone. Rather than 
producing at the outset any hypothesis on the exact links 
between social power and freedom, I set out, in 7.1, on a 
short polemical journey into the thicket of scholarly 
opinion on power. It gradually becomes apparent that many 
of the insights that were brought to bear on questions of 
freedom, can also aid us here in cutting away some of the 
dead wood. Subsequently, in 7.2, I formulate and defend a 
responsibility view of exercising power over which, if 
correct, attests to an even more intimate relationship 
between freedom and power than has been suggested by pre-
vious writers. Finally, in 7.3, I use the conclusions of 
this and earlier chapters to examine what is meant by say-
ing that individuals or groups of people have more or less 
freedom/power than somebody else, i.e., I address the 
question how we can sensibly talk about different degrees 
of freedom/power. 
7.1. Conflicting views 
There are voluminous studies on power, just as there are 
on freedom. However, it is difficult to ascertain with 
some of them what kind of power is being discussed. For 
example, Steven Lukes quotes in his monologue on (social) 
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power Arendt's view that power is the property of a group 
of people acting in concert; the antithesis of power being 
2 ) 
, 1 vlo~ence. At first sight this definition seems so far 
removed from ordinary usage as to verge on the absurd: so 
far is it from being the case that an exercise of power is 
necessarily the sign of the union of minds that most 
people tend to think exactly the opposite. One is tempted 
to conclude that Arendt's problem is here, as was the case 
in her treatment of freedom, that she is so preoccupied 
with certain ideals about how people should lead their 
lives or how society should be ordered that she takes 
important social terms like 'freedom' or 'power' and re-
defines them to accord with these ideals. This would be as 
fruitful an endeavour as trying to conquer inflation by 
expunging the word 'inflation' from the dictionary. How-
ever, Arendt's definition could, more sympathetically, be 
understood to refer, not like Lukes' account to A's exer-
cise of power over B, but to the locus of social power (in 
'the people'), or something of that sort, in which case 
these two accounts would simply not be about the same 
thing and, hence, not competing. 
Another difficulty is that many of the numerous 
studies on power are more sociological than philosophical 
and, thus, tend to presuppose some definition which is 
never clearly stated. still, there are distinguished 
philosophers who have contributed to the discussion, 
notably Bertrand Russell with his claim that power is the 
production of intended effects. In this definition, the 
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question who can produce these effects on what is passed 
over. More importantly, a question from chapter 2 crops up 
again: why place so much emphasis upon intention? What is 
e.g. the significance of the distinction between doing 
something deliberately and negligently in this context? 
Connolly produces a convincing counter-example to an 
intentionality view of power: the story of a white 
employer in control of scarce job opportunities who, 
through inattention and habit, fails to consider other 
candidates than lower-class white males. He could do 
otherwise if he were to attend carefully to the conse-
quences of his actions, but he does not. So, he contri-
butes to the high unemployment of minorities and thereby 
3 ) 
exerts power over them. The upshot of the story seems to 
be that intention cannot be the decisive factor here. 
Nor are we much aided by Weber's suggestion that the 
fact of resistance is crucial to attributions of power, 
since it can be convincingly argued both that power may 
preempt resistance, as happens in some of the worst cases 
of totalitarian control, and that B can be under A's power 
although he may on particular occasions (and at great 
costs) be able to resist A successfully. As far as Dahl's 
definition, that A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something which B would not otherwise have 
4 ) 
done, is concerned, it seems to be much too permissive 
by including all forms of rational persuasion and frater-
nal advice. If I tell you that the bridge you are planning 
to cross is unsafe and you change your mind about crossing 
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it, have I exercised power over you? Or are the students X 
and Y, the former of whom is required by his teacher to 
read a book in order to pass an exam while the latter is 
told that if he is interested in a certain field, he might 
be well advised to read it, both subject to their 
teacher's power when picking up the book from the library? 
The answer seems to be no to both these questions: acting 
on good advice does not show that a person is on the 
receiving end of a power relation. In light of the dis-
cussion in chapter 3, the reason immediately suggests it-
self that advice or rational persuasion do not erect 
obstacles to persons' choices in the first place and, 
thus, cannot constitute exercises of power over them. If 
that is so, we may already have spotted one similarity 
between the exercise of power over somebody and the 
restriction of his freedom. 
The observations up to this point should already have 
indicated why I question the fruitfulness and general via-
bility of Benn's definition of 'power' in The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy: 
A, by his power over B, successfully achieved an 
intended result r; he did so by making B do b, which 
B would not have done but for A's wishing him to do 
so; moreover, although B was reluctant, A had a way 
of overcoming this.S) 
Why must A be successful - and why did he have to intend 
the result? (see the points made above against Weber and 
Russell). Why did B have to do something (but not refrain 
from doing it)? Why is it necessary that B would not have 
done it otherwise? In case my parents threaten to disin-
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her it me unless I marry a white girl, is that not to be 
considered an exercise of power if it so happens that I 
would have married a white girl anyway? Why does B have to 
act reluctantly? Is it not the supreme example of power 
when the subjects start obeying the powerholder willingly 
and uncritically, grovelling at his feet? In other words, 
it seems possible to question all the basic ingredients of 
Benn's definition. 
Perhaps Benn's mistake lies in trying to define power 
in isolation from other and intimately related concepts. 
One of Oppenheim's chief aims has always been to layout a 
clear-cut taxonomy of all of these. To do so, he relies on 
one of the fundamental tenents of operationalism: the need 
to "reconstruct" the meanings of terms (8.4). For Oppen-
heim, power incorporates the extensions of both control 
and unfreedom. We have already seen how he defines unfree-
dom (p. 55); furthermore, on his definition, A controls 
B's not doing x to the extent that A influences B not to 
do x or renders it impossible for him to do x. Thus, 
although unfreedom and control often coincide, freedom is 
compatible with control in cases of influence, and unfree-
dom is possible without control when A constrains B by 
making it punishable for him to do x. Power then covers 
both what is common and what is specific to these two con-
6) 
cepts. 
The problem here is the same as with all of Oppen-
heim's other definitions; they are not based on any argued 
analysis of how the terms are actually used, or how they 
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should be used in light of the purpose they serve in our 
language, but simply on a definitional fiat. Let us decide 
to define them in this way and then we can use them syste-
matically henceforth: such is Oppenheim's philosophy_ It 
seems more or less a coincidence that he chooses to see 
control as a form of power but not vice versa, as would 
7 ) 
e.g. be implied by Rescher's account of control, or that 
influence is not chosen as the most general term, as Wrong 
8 ) 
does in his book on power. Now, I tend to doubt the 
value of such arbitrary, stipulative definitions, and one 
of my objectives in writing this thesis has been to show 
that we do not have to make do with a definition of that 
sort in the case of freedom. However, it may well be true 
that there is no neat division between many of the inter-
related power concepts in our language; in that case 
Oppenheim should simply be mindful of Aristotle's advice 
not to look for more precision in subject matters than 
they admit of. 
One of the most impressive attempts in recent years 
to give a rational (non-arbitrary) account of social power 
is that of Lukes in his Power. A Radical View. He claims 
that there are clearly standard cases of the possession 
and exercise of power about which we can all agree and 
which give rise to the following core concept: A exercises 
power over B iff A affects B in a (significant/ non-
trivial) manner contrary to B's interests. However, 
people's views about the nature of interests differ; 
therefore, according to Lukes, power is an essentially 
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contested concept (9.2) with three main contrasting con-
9 ) 
ceptions. 
In brief, what he calls the one-dimensional ("plural-
ist", "liberalist") view is based on a want-regarding 
principle of interests as publicly revealed and observable 
policy preferences; he has most power whose preferences 
are actually shown to prevail. On the two-dimensional 
("reformist") conception, interests are understood as pre-
ferences within or outside the political agenda, which 
means that power can also be enacted by preventing certain 
issues from appearing on that agenda ("non-decisions") . 
The three-dimensional ("radical" ) conception is of an 
essentially different sort, implying that power may be 
exercised over men even when their wants have been fully 
satisfied, as a person's real interests are not what he 
happens to want, but whatever he would want if he were to 
become a fully autonomous agent. In the present state of 
affairs, people's beliefs and desires are constantly being 
shaped in such a way as to preclude options which they 
would have preferred and chosen under ideal conditions. 
Hence, power may be exerted in preventing a conflict of 
interests from ever occurring, there can be a conflict of 
interests without a respective conflict of preferences, 
and neither A nor B need be aware of the power relation. 
Unfortunately, the many virtues of Lukes' account are 
overbalanced by its defects. Thus, the reference in the 
original definition to A's necessarily acting contrary to 
B's interests must be unfounded, and in fact Lukes himself 
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10) 
has now abandoned it. A dictator who imprisons a dissi-
dent has no less exercised power over him although the 
imprisonment may turn out to be beneficial to the dissi-
dent's but detrimental to the dictator's interests. More-
over, ordinary notions of political power seem to admit 
that a government might exert power in the interests of 
all. The most serious weakness in Lukes' position lies, 
however, in his holding simultaneously the incompatible 
views that power is an essentially contestable concept and 
that the three-dimensional view is superior to the other 
11) 
two as shown by rational arguments. In 9.2 we see why 
this will not do and also why the essential contestability 
thesis itself, which guides Lukes in his analysis, is 
wrong. 
7.2. A responsibility view of power 
Meanwhile, there are elements in Lukes' account that point 
in a more promising direction. In the first place, he is 
surely right in emphasizing that people's wants may be the 
product of a system that works against their real 
interests and that often, in attributing power, we are 
working with counterfactuals as to how people would have 
acted if not restricted by internal bars implanted in them 
by somebody else. Incidentally, in chapter 5 we saw that 
the existence of such bars poses no problem for a correct 
theory of negative freedom. Secondly, after sketching the 
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conflicting conceptions of power, Lukes remarks that the 
identification of the process of exercising power lies in 
the relation between power and responsibility - that to 
locate power is to fix responsibility for consequences 
held to flow from the action, or inaction, of certain 
12) 
specifiable agents. However, Lukes fails to pursue this 
insight in a book that is often needlessly brief and in-
exact. For example, he does not explain the connection 
between this thesis about responsibility and the defini-
tion of power which states that power is always enacted 
contrary to B's real interests. If the latter is true, A 
is likely to be culpable (not only accountable) for exer-
cising power over B. So, in the end it is anybody's guess 
if Lukes' monologue was meant to uphold a moral or a 
moralized definition of power. His considered opinion on 
this question is complicated by the fact that he subse-
quently retracted both the contrary-to-interests clause 
(see above) and the suggestion that a direct attribution 




Other writers, notably Connolly, have tried to 
develop a more straightforward responsibility view of 
social power, but usually without paying much attention to 
the connection between such a view and the correct defini-
tion of social freedom. Their assumption seems to be that 
the meanings of these two concepts are not too intimately 
related for each of them to be worked out in isolation 
from the other. Let me now express and test a more radical 
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suggestion, namely, that A exercises power over B iff A is 
responsible for the non-suppression of obstacles that 
narrow B's options and hence that the extensions of 
'constraining B' and 'exercising power over B' virtually 
coincide. If this is true, the concepts of power and (un)-
freedom turn out to be necessarily and intimately related. 
The first doubt about the viability of a responsi-
bility view of power may be expressed by the claim that 
the primary use of the term 'power' is not to denote a 
relation but rather a capacity or a property. Thus, P. 
Morriss goes so far as stating that a power-vocabulary 
should not be used if our basic concern is something other 
than the capacity for producing events. While granting 
that the locution 'power over' has a specific use of its 
own, he claims that it is not the general, and certainly 
not the main, way in which we talk about power. On the 
contrary, what lies at the root of all power-talk is 
15) 
having or exercising the 'power to' do things. 
It is obvious that the general possession of power to 
do things does not necessarily designate a social concept: 
we can have power to move stones or other inanimate things 
as well as having power to affect agents. However, even if 
I had the power to move a big rock, I would never say that 
I had or exercised power over the rock. Now, it seems 
natural to assume that the social relation of exercising 
power over someone requires the capacity or the property 
which the general term designates: A would not be able 
to exercise power over B unless he had in some sense the 
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power or ability to do so. But exactly the same applies to 
freedom: A cannot constrain B's freedom if he does not 
have the ability required in the specific case to do so. 
For example, if A wants B's hands tied up, he must be able 
to tie them up himself or have the authority and the means 
of communication to order someone else to do it. The 
important point here is that we have made considerable 
progress in analysing 'constraining freedom' as a social 
relation without the need ever arising of stating care-
fully what A's ability must amount to (except his satis-
fying the logical condition of being an autarchic agent). 
So, if there is no reason to say that the language of con-
straints should not be used when our basic concern is 
something other than the capacity for producing events, it 
is odd why it should not be possible to work out a 
plausible view of 'power over' as a social relation with-
out saying something important first about the general 
'power to' . 
It is worth pointing out that the adjective 'power-
ful' is sometimes used in the capacity-sense and sometimes 
in the relational sense. We can easily talk about a power-
ful man as one who has the ability to do various things, 
some of which may affect other persons (e.g. make business 
offers that are too good to refuse). But as long as his 
acts do not erect obstacles to their choices, it is odd to 
say that he exercises power over them. On the other hand, 
'powerful' is also commonly used to refer to men who do 
precisely the latter. 
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Another potential objection to a responsibility view 
of power runs as follows. Consider a small boy who runs 
away from home and hides in his neighbour's garage for a 
few hours because he feels his parents have been neglect-
ing him. 'If they think I am lost or dead, at least 
they'll miss me', the boy thinks. (Who has not harboured 
similar thoughts as a child!). Now, on my definition, the 
boy may succeed in constraining his parents' freedom, by 
being responsible for placing obstacles in their path, 
since they will probably have to cancel their plans for 
the day and look for him. But - and here is the point of 
the objection - so far is it from being the case that the 
boy has power over his parents that the only way he can so 
much as arouse their attention is by constraining their 
16) 
freedom. Hence, power and (un)freedom are not inter-
twined in the way I have claimed. 
Combatting this objection requires me to draw another 
distinction, this time between two locutions about social 
power: 'having power over' and 'exercising power over'. In 
a somewhat trivial sense, we may say that A has power over 
B whenever he exercises power over him. However, this is 
not the way the locution 'having power over' is commonly 
used. Rather, it tends to denote relations of more complex 
sorts of which I shall mention four, starting with that of 
authority: I have authority over B because of a difference 
of standing between us which makes my exercising power 
over B legitimate and/or voluntarily complied with by him. 
Secondly, 'having power over' can simply refer to the fact 
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that A is generally known to exercise power over B in a 
certain (important) respect: 'I have power over my wife in 
financial matters but she has complete power over me in 
the kitchen! '. Thirdly, it may suffice that A is generally 
capable of erecting obstacles to B's choices (although he 
does not exercise that capacity for extended periods) for 
us to say that he has power over B. Fourthly, we may even 
say that A has power over B, period, meaning that A's 
possibilities to exercise power over B are unusually com-
prehensive and intensive (7.3), although complete power in 
this sense is probably impossible (contingently). So, it 
seems that while 'having power over' can mean a number of 
different things, it always depends logically on the more 
basic and easily definable 'exercising power over'. To 
return to the story of the lost son, it may be true that 
he did not have power over his parents in any of the four 
above senses and that he, nonetheless, managed to exercise 
power over them in this particular case. 
It is noteworthy that we have no term corresponding 
to 'having power over' in the case of unfreedom, meaning 
e.g. that A has in general the capacity to constrain B's 
freedom (in a particular field) or that he frequently does 
so. To describe such a state, we would simply say that A 
has power over B. This is, I believe, one more indication 
of the logical affinity between exercising power over and 
constraining freedom. 
The case of the neglected boy failed as an objection 
since for A to be able to exercise power over B in respect 
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x, it is not necessary that he generally has power over 
him in that respect nor, of course, in other and perhaps 
more important respects. But does not all this have the 
counter-intuitive implication that everybody can exercise 
power over everybody else, at least in some respect? It 
does have that implication but I am not sure this is a 
defect. Tony Benn, the politician, has advocated what he 
calls the "stiletto heel principle": that if you put all 
your weight on one place, you can go through almost any-
17) 
thing. If one individual A, however 'insignificant' a 
person he may be, sets all his energy at hampering or 
annoying person B, he will most likely succeed, however 
powerful B is. He can, for example, send B threatening 
letters which may force him to employ bodyguards, etc. 
Also, in a certain (trivial) sense, by being able to exer-
cise power over B, A has power over him, but as pointed 
out above, the latter locution is usually restricted to 
relations of a more general nature. 
In spite of these clarifications, there may still be 
flies in the ointment. Gray thinks he has spotted some. 
On a responsibility view such as Lukes' or Connolly's, a 
power relation exists whenever one agent is significantly 
affected by another, but the problem is, Gray says, that 
"significantly affecting" is a feature of many other sorts 
of social interactions such as love or trade and, hence, 
18) 
not a distinctive characteristic of power relations. 
This may hit at the two mentioned accounts; however, on my 
responsibility view, an effect on B which A is responsible 
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for does not constitute a constraint on B's freedom unless 
it satisfies the logically prior condition of erecting an 
obstacle to his choices (this was the thrust of chapter 
3). Expressing your love to, or offering to trade with, a 
person does not generally constitute such an obstacle and 
is thus not to be counted as an exercise of power. But 
Gray has more to say. If it is true that power relations 
may be most pervasive and efficacious when B is himself 
not aware of them, why can the powerholder A not also be 
19) 
the victim of such an invisible force? The simple 
answer is that he can. Obviously, A's own freedom to do x 
can be constrained by another person (C) although A is 
simultaneously exercising power over B by constraining him 
from x-ing. More importantly, the relation of exercising 
power over can be symmetrical. A can exercise power over B 
while B is simultaneously exercising power over A in the 
same respect. The whole idea behind nuclear deterrence is 
e.g. based on such a symmetrical exercise of power, the 
superpowers constraining each other from using nuclear 
force. 
A. Reeve concurs with Gray in rejecting a responsi-
bility view of power. Let us look at the three main argu-
20) 
ments he produces against it. Firstly, he asks, if A 
has power over B to the extent that A fails to remove a 
restriction, why does A not also have power over B to the 
extent that A might introduce a constraint but does not in 
fact do so? Here, it is possible to reply that A may well 
have such power over B, at least in the trivial sense of 
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the "stiletto heel principle" according to which everybody 
could have power over everybody else. However, what I have 
been aiming at is not an account of 'having power over' 
but of 'exercising power over', and a person who could 
introduce a constraint but does not do so is obviously not 
responsible for an erected obstacle (since there is no 
obstacle). Hence, there is no exercise of power taking 
place. Secondly, Reeve asks us to consider the example of 
a person A who is taking an exam in which only the top 10% 
pass. By doing as well as he can, and knowing of this 
regulation, is he not imposing a disbenefit on the weaker 
candidates and thus (counter-intuitively) exercising power 
over them? In reply, two strategies are open to me. Recall 
first that there are different contexts in which we may 
invoke moral responsibility (pp. 109f.). While it is true 
that A is responsible for his decision to sit the exam, it 
is probably not true that he can appropriately be asked to 
justify his disbenefitting the other candidates; hence, he 
is not responsible for the potential obstacle to their 
choices. Alternatively, if some plausible reason could be 
given for this to be an appropriate question to ask in the 
context, my response would be that, counter-intuitively or 
not, he has constrained the freedom of his fellow 
students. But then the prima facie illegitimacy of this 
constraint would be easily overridden by other consider-
ations: the need for competitive examinations, the justice 
of the best getting their rewards, etc. Anyway, the need 
for this second recourse is doubtful since it is difficult 
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to imagine situations in which it would be appropriate to 
ask a student why he made life more difficult for others 
by doing better than them on an open exam. Thirdly, Reeve 
claims that certain sorts of fanatics might rightly be 
regarded as lacking responsibility, while still exercising 
considerable power. If Reeve means that heterarchic 
persons can be considered as agents, exercising power over 
other persons, I have already produced arguments against 
such claims in 6.3 to which I need not add here. 
I do not intend to devote as much energy to the 
defence of a responsibility view of power as I have 
devoted to my view of social freedom, for this thesis is 
about freedom rather than power. However, the most serious 
objections to a responsibility view of power have, I feel, 
been answered. Moreover, my insights about power and free-
dom have proved to be mutually supportive in the sense 
that most of the points I have needed to make in this 
chapter have been little more than echoes of others which 
were raised previously in the discussion of freedom. 
Since responsibility views of power are no novelty, 
my account of 'exercising power over' is not likely to be 
looked at with scepticism merely because it is a responsi-
bility view, but rather because of the intimate connection 
it upholds between power and unfreedom. If, as I claim, 
the extensions of 'exercising power over' and 'constrain-
ing freedom' virtually coincide, the question may be asked 
why we should go against conceptual economy in having two 
locutions express the same relation. Would the former not 
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more usefully be taken to refer to something else? One 
answer might be that by using the expression 'to exercise 
power over' we are picking out precisely those cases of 
power which involve someone's freedom being constrained. 
Furthermore, these two locutions could be seen as bringing 
our attention to different aspects of the relation between 
A and B: 'exercise of power' shifting the focus to the 
powerholder, A, while 'constraint on freedom' relates more 
to B and the obstacles that restrict his options. 
What plausible alternative could there be to the sort 
of responsibility view I have been advocating? The only 
one that suggests itself to me is an intentionality view 
of power. In such a view, A exercises power over B when he 
intentionally constrains B's freedom. This would be, more 
or less, in accordance with Russell's and Benn's views 
discussed earlier (pp. 200ff.). There, one counter-example 
about a thoughtlessly discriminating employer was taken to 
show that A can exercise power over B negligently. But 
this might have been altogether too quick. Would it not 
have been more illuminating to say that while the employer 
constrained the freedom of individuals from minority 
groups to find jobs by being morally responsible for the 
obstacles that stood in their way, he did not exercise 
power over them since the relevant intention was missing? 
The problem here is much the same as we came across 
earlier in dealing with the liberal conception of freedom 
(2.1): the difference between those consequences which an 
agent brings about intentionally and those which he brings 
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about non-intentionally seems to be arbitrary from pre-
cisely that moral point of view which talk about social 
power requires. Such a distinction would rob some of the 
most topical debates about power of their point. For 
example, an issue of much concern nowadays is the massive 
environmental pollution created by big corporations. Few 
environmentalists would go so far as to claim that these 
consequences are a) (directly) intended by individuals 
within the corporations. Rather, they would claim that 
these are b) more or less unwanted but intentionally 
created (forseen/avoidable) by-products of other measures, 
or c) non-intentional effects, unforeseen by any specific 
individual since none of them took the trouble to weigh 
the foreseeable consequences of the corporate decisions. 
However, in both b) and c), as well as a), individuals 
within the corporation could possibly be held responsible 
for the pollution (4.6), and it seems most implausible to 
hold that only in a) and b), the corporation could be 
exercising power over people affected by the pollution. To 
take another example, whether or not we are feminists, 
most of us will accept that there have been numerous cases 
in history of men exercising power over women. Surely, we 
will have to agree that the most insidious but at the same 
time the most thorough-going instances of such relations 
have taken place when men have not been aware of them, 
i.e., when they have exercised power over women through 
their own mindlessness or inattention. 
Someone might want to deny that the difference 
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between intentional and non-intentional actions in this 
context is arbitrary by pointing out that 'exercising 
power over' is an exercise concept. The difference between 
exercise and opportunity concepts has already been invoked 
in this thesis to make certain points about freedom and 
autonomy, the objector might say, but now it seems to have 
been forgotten. still, it is pretty obvious that for an 
exercise of A's power over B to take place, A must be 
actively engaged in restricting B's options, and for that, 
A's actions must be intended or at least intentional. 
I agree that 
concept, but I do 
conclusion. For a 
'exercising power over' is an exercise 
not accept the objector's subsequent 
relational concept to be an exercise 
concept, it it not necessary that A or B are 'active' in 
some elementary sense (their minds, bodies, etc.), but 
that the relation between them is actual as opposed to 
potential. Thus, although freedom is an opportunity con-
cept, constraining freedom is an exercise concept, since 
the relation between A and B must be actual, viz., there 
must in fact be a real obstacle impeding B, for the non-
suppression of which A can be held responsible. The same 
applies to 'exercising power over': A does not exercise 
power over B when B merely responds, perhaps mistakenly, 
in anticipation of an expected obstacle, although we might 
want to say in such a case of anticipatory surrender that 
A has power over B in one of the senses explained earlier 
(p. 211). 'Having power over' in that sense would then 
designate an opportunity concept. This tallies with my 
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answer to Reeve's first objection (pp. 213f.): for an 
exercise of power over someone to take place, an obstacle 
must be present and the possibility to hold A responsible 
for it - but it does not follow that there is any need for 
intentionality on A's part. 
The final objection I shall consider is that the link 
I wish to uphold between power and unfreedom is of a 
completely trivial nature: that what I have done is simply 
to pick out one locution of power among many and tailor it 
to meet my needs so that in the end it could not fail to 
have the same extension as 'constraining freedom'. Here, I 
deny both the claim that the locution 'exercising power 
over' was picked out arbitrarily and that it was given a 
trivial, stipulative definition. On the contrary, this 
expression proved to be the most common, basic and simple 
one when dealing with power as a social relation (but not 
as ability to do things in general). Then I tried to sort 
out how it could most usefully be defined to convey our 
purpose in ascribing to someone an exercise of power over 
another agent. After examining numerous proposals and 
objections, the conclusion proved to be in accordance with 
my original suggestion: that we exercise power over some-
body when we constrain his freedom, and vice versa. 
7.3. Degrees of power and freedom 
The course of discussing the relationship between freedom 
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and power may direct our attention to one more potentially 
thorny issue. Recall the thread of my argument in chapter 
3, according to which B's freedom to do x with respect to 
agent A is an all or nothing affair. Either A makes x less 
eligible for B or not. If he does, the mere 'size' of 
the actual obstacle is irrelevant to attributions of un-
freedom: an obstacle, of whatever size, which A is 
responsible for, makes B unfree to do x with respect to A. 
However, even if B is unfree to do x, he can be free to do 
numerous other things which may be more important than x. 
Then, in section 7.2, I argued that the locution 'having 
power over', although not having a single technical 
meaning, is commonly used to denote the general tendency 
or capacity of an agent A to constrain B's freedom in a 
certain respect. Hence, A can have power over B in one 
respect (financial matters) while the reverse holds in 
another (the kitchen), and it was even shown that the 
power relation could be symmetrical (nuclear deterrence) . 
If all this is true, the question arises whether we can 
impart any sense to the common claims that A is in general 
freer than B, that A has more power than B or that society 
S is freer than society S . In other words, is there any 
1 2 
aggregate net freedom and power? 
Most of us have an intuitive feeling that there must 
be some way of calculating and comparing different free-
doms on a single scale, for how else could we e.g. say 
that Icelanders enjoy more freedom than Albanians? Berlin 
is trying to capture this intuitive idea when he says that 
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what we are referring to in speaking about the degree of 
freedom enjoyed by men or society is the width or extent 
of the paths before them, the number of open doors, as it 
were, and the extent to which they are open: "The more 
avenues men can enter, the broader those avenues, the more 
21 ) 
avenues that each opens into, the freer they are." This 
sounds convincing, but to continue with the same metaphor, 
it cannot be denied that we may consider ourselves much 
less free after a dozen new, broad "avenues" have been 
opened to a destination we do not care about if, simulta-
neously, the one possible avenue to our personal 'promised 
land' has been narrowed down slightly. So, the question is 
if all we can say about the degrees or totality of freedom 
and power is bound to be a matter of mere personal prefer-
ence. 
While relatively little has been written on this 
totality problem, there are notable exceptions. For 
instance, Oppenheim spends considerable time unravelling 
the different "dimensions of freedom". While holding on to 
the thesis that there is 
22 ) 
"no such thing as 'liberty in 
general''', he concedes that people often try to compare 
the different types of actions that an agent is free or 
unfree to perform. The four dimensions he discerns are a) 
probability, b) degree of deprivation, c) scope, and d) 
domain. B is with respect to A more unfree to do x, a) the 
greater the probability that he will be prevented or 
punished, b) the higher the negative utility for him of 
being constrained, and c) the smaller the number of ways A 
-222-
leaves him free to go. Furthermore, d) the greater the 
number of actors A can make unfree, the more powerful is 
he. Oppenheim then concludes that one actor has more total 
power or freedom than another if he has more power or 
freedom as judged by each dimension; or alternatively, if 
he scores higher than another on one dimension while they 
are equally powerful or free as judged by the others. 
Also, one actor has more total power or freedom than 
another if he is more powerful or free as judged by the 
most significant dimension. But what is the most signifi-
cant of these dimensions? Here, Oppenheim's uncompromising 
operationalism comes to a halt; there are no general 
operational criteria to be found, and the concept of a 
free society is thus "essentially a valuational one ... 
23) 
unsuited for the purposes of scientific inquiry". 
Wrong gives a similar account of the dimensions of 
power, although for him there are only three. Power is a) 
extensive if the power subjects are many, b) comprehensive 
if the powerholder can move them by a variety of means, 
and c) intensive if he can push them far without a loss of 
compliance. Wrong then makes certain plausible suggestions 
about the contingent interrelationships of these 
dimensions, for example, that the more extensive the power 
is, the less comprehensive and intensive it is likely to 
be. However, as far as the totality problem is concerned, 
the most he can do is to make the general remark that 
total or absolute power usually means power that is high 
24) 
both in comprehensiveness and intensity. 
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A possible recourse is simply to abandon oneself to 
subjectivism, as implied by Flathman's claim that a free 
society is (roughly) one in which it is true of the pre-
ponderance of persons that they are not unfree to act in 
25) 
respects that matter most to them, or to the sort of 
relativism implied by Connolly's account, according to 
which power is greater, the more important interests it 
touches, while judgements about the importance 
26) 
of 
interests are inherently controversial. Apparently, 
this could warrant Taylor's "diabolic defence of Albania": 
that the Albanian society is freer than the American one 
since there are fewer traffic lights (although less con-
27 ) 
cern for human rights) in the former than the latter. 
However, for those of us who are neither moral subjectiv-
ists nor relativists, such claims do not constitute a 
satisfying end-result. 
It might be helpful to distinguish here between two 
questions: a) , IsS a free society?' - and b) 'Are you 
1 
freer in society S than S ?' When we talk about a free 
1 2 
society, we are usually referring to one in which social 
freedom is a fundamental ideal, secured in the constitu-
tion and laws. In such a society, the major principle is 
that one freedom shall only be constrained to protect 
another (and more important) freedom. In this sense, we 
can have many different free societies, though Albania is 
hardly going to count among them. Meanwhile, question b) 
can easily be asked about two 
forms a part of the question 
'free societies'. Then, it 
'Is S a better society than 
1 
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S ?'. Both could be 'free' in the above sense, but in all 
2 
societies some freedoms have to be restricted, and it is 
a natural question to ask if the freedoms 
or S by restricting others are the 
2 
protected in S 
1 
right (the most 
important) kinds of freedom. A proper answer to such a 
question should, I believe, not depend on contingent 
individual preferences or the relative judgement of the 
majority of people about the nature of interests, but 
rather on certain objective truths about human eudaimonia: 
about that which makes human life worth living. However, 
these 'objective' truths would be substantive truths, 
based on facts about the nature of human beings, not con-
ceptual ones. 
Thus, my response to the totality problem discussed 
in this section is that while an analysis of freedom and 
power may help us to locate 'free societies', questions 
about net aggregate freedom and power require judgements 
about the most important freedoms and the best states of 
affairs. As I have repeatedly pointed out, such questions 
cannot be answered within the limits of a conceptual ana-
lysis of freedom and power. 
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8. OBSERVATIONS ON METHOD 
It is my aim to devote the last two chapters of the main 
body of the thesis to questions of method. That is, after 
having, so to speak, delivered the goods, I plan to scru-
tinize the methodology which has, to a large degree 
implicitly, been employed in the course of the discussion. 
Arguments have so far been launched, and conclusions 
reached, with a certain complacency toward the methodo-
logical hazards which are often taken to bedevil studies 
of this kind. It must be admitted that the development of 
my argument would have been somewhat more cautious if I 
had felt genuinely intimidated by these hazards. I have 
not. However, I can envisage someone objecting that I have 
been so absorbed in creating a piece of workmanship that I 
have failed to give 
whether the tools being 
purpose of the ensuing 
serious thought to the question 
employed were appropriate. The 
discussion is both to forestall 
such an objection and, if possible, to secure further the 
foundations of the responsibility view for which I have 
been arguing, by placing them within a sound methodologi-
cal framework. 
In 8.1, I raise the question whether there is any 
need for a separate study of method. From there, in 8.2-
8.4, I move to a critical survey of three well-known 
methodologies that could possibly have been employed in a 
conceptual inquiry into the subject of freedom, and dis-
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cuss the extent to which the methods of my thesis fit the 
mould of anyone of them. Questions about the special 
nature of moral concepts then emerge and are pursued in 
8.5. Generally speaking, the discussion in this chapter is 
somewhat abstract and historical. It is not until chapter 
9 that the treatment of these methodological issues is 
brought to a conclusion and their relevance to my account 
of freedom is fully borne out. 
8.1. The need for method 
Before commencing a study of method, a note of warning 
should be sounded. Ruminating over questions of method, 
whether as a prelude to or, as here, a sequel to prose-
cuting them, is liable to be redundant. Preoccupation with 
such questions can even distract us from more substantial 
issues. Is not a method best known by its fruits? The idea 
behind these misgivings is simple enough. Either you have 
convinced the reader that the position you have staked out 
is a tenable one, in which case any further justification 
is superfluous, or he views your attempts as much cry and 
little wool, in which case a lengthy discussion of your 
methods will strike him as that of a bad shearer blaming 
his sickle. 
These considerations suggest that all theses in moral 
philosophy could be pruned of methodological discussions. 
But such a conclusion may be altogether too quick. To be 
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sure, we say that a tree is known by its fruit. However, 
just as a delicious looking fruit lying on the ground 
may turn out to be poisonous, depending on the nature of 
the tree it has fallen from, the initial appeal of a moral 
thesis might be specious. Sometimes, one way to show that 
it is not is to back it up by considerations at another 
level of inquiry, metaphysical or methodological. To take 
another example, we do, as a rule, run worse, not better, 
1) 
if we think too much about our feet. But advances in 
running techniques, so amply apparent at any Olympic 
Games, have in fact been partly brought about by experts 
who have devoted a great deal of attention to the workings 
of the human foot. 
So, however convincing the argumentation of the pre-
ceding chapters has been, it does not seem superfluous to 
ask whether it has been based upon arguments appropriate 
to a conceptual moral inquiry, and whether I have perhaps 
been taking assumptions for granted which require justifi-
cation. I would go so far as saying that despite all the 
'running' I have done so far, my results will be unsatis-
factory until I have shown that they were arrived at in an 
appropriate way. 
The spur to the writing of this thesis was my 
dissatisfaction with the fact that debates about freedom 
seldom get off the conceptual ground: the opposing parties 
do not agree to start with on the meaning of that about 
which they could disagree, and the opportunity for a 
fruitful discussion is lost. It may be called naive, but 
-229-
my belief was (and still is) that a definition of social 
freedom could be found which would commend itself to any 
rational thinker and serve as a natural point of departure 
for substantive debates. My aim was to search for a 
definition that a) respected common usage as much as 
possible, b) was coherent, both internally and with 
respect to other related concepts by honouring morally 
important distinctions, and c) was serviceable and non-
relative in the sense indicated above, i.e., could be used 
by any thinker irrespective of his substantive beliefs 
about how much freedom there should be in this or that 
area of social life. 
It is always of value in philosophy to follow sound 
precedents. My objectives seemed to point in different 
directions, and they immediately brought to mind three 
historically famous methodologies. If my emphasis was on 
common usage, should I not follow the tenets of ordinary 
language analysis? If coherence is what I was after, would 
not a method such as Rawls' reflective equilibrium come in 
handy? If I wanted a serviceable definition, why not side 
with operationalism? Here, towards the end of the thesis, 
it might be interesting to ask to what extent the insights 
of these three methodologies have actually been reflected 
in my treatment of social freedom, and to what extent I 
have departed from them. Moreover, what has led me to 
adopt or renounce their insights? To answer these 
questions, we need to review critically some of the 
advantages and some of the limitations of the three 
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methodologies. 
8.2. Ordinary language analysis 
Most textbooks in sociology and related subjects start 
with an onslaught on the 'positivistic heresy', only to be 
followed by a meticulous application of exacly that same 
approach to specific problems as if nothing in the world 
were more natural. Now, someone might ask whether I have 
not fallen into a similar trap, by tacitly invoking and 
employing a method that was knocked off its philosophical 
pedestral some time ago and is now supposed to be, to all 
intents and purposes, dead. I am of course referring to a 
way of approaching philosophical questions commonly known 
as ordinary language analysis and described by one of its 
critics as "piecemeal philosophical more favourable 
2 ) 
engineering" . For some reason, this was a kind of philo-
sophy to whose temptations many people found it easy to 
succumb, and if some aspects of my thesis bear witness to 
that fact, it may confirm Keith Graham's observation that 
philosophical views "can lead a subterranean life ... after 
3 ) 
they have been explicitly and consciously disowned". To 
answer the question whether the charms of ordinary 
language analysis (OLA) have had too strong a grip on me, 
and whether such a grip is always necessarily to be 
deplored, some of the basic characteristics of that method 
must be rehearsed. 
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By OLA I am referring to a method practised by Oxford 
philosophers such as Austin and Ryle from the forties on-
wards. It is vital to distinguish it from the methods and 
attitudes of the later Wittgenstein and his followers in 
Cambridge who are also sometimes called 'ordinary language 
philosophers'. To appreciate this difference, a few words 
must first be said about the latter. 
The Cambridge-type of ordinary language philosophy 
has its origin in Wittgenstein's repudiation of his 
earlier views in his later works, and especially in the 
so-called 'game theory' of language which superseded the 
'picture theory' of the Tractatus. In contrast to Wittgen-
stein's earlier commitment to the search for a logically 
perfect language, the main contention of his later works 
is that ordinary language is all right as it is. Philo-
sophical problems arise not because our language is faulty 
or imperfect, but because we (philosophers more often than 
laymen) subtly misuse language. For example, we extend or 
restrict the ordinary uses of words, gradually straining 
or contorting their meanings, until we begin to doubt the 
unhesitant application of these same words in ordinary 
discourse. Thus, all sorts of perplexities and diffi-
culties are generated. The aim of philosophy is first and 
foremost a therapeutic one; by pursuing it we determine 
how our language is actually employed, examining the rules 
that govern the use of various expressions, and as we 
gradually realize where and how we went wrong, we rid 
philosophy of conceptual confusion. Its problems turn out 
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to be pseudo-problems which are to be dissolved rather 
than solved. On this view, philosophy "may in no way 
interfere with the actual use of language", it simply 
4 ) 
"leaves everything as it is". 
The Oxford philosophers did not share Wittgenstein's 
therapeutic view of their subject; they did not believe 
that all philosophical problems were bogus or that every 
sentance in the language was necessarily "in order as it 
is". However, what they did believe in was the possibility 
of clearing up or even solving a number of philosophical 
problems through the analysis of ordinary language. In 
answering questions by dint of OLA, particular linguistic 
expressions are compared with particular situations, or as 
Austin described it, we proceed "by examining what we 
should say when, and so why and what we should mean by 
5 ) 
it." That is, we set up scenarios, described in the 
language which we and the readers share, and then ask what 
anybody (including ourselves) would say about these situ-
ations with a given question or purpose in mind. In this 
way we utilize the richness of ordinary language with all 
its subtle distinctions, developed through the experience 
of generations of language speakers, to clarify the 
problems at hand and, at best, to bring a conceptual dis-
pute to a conclusion. 
It has been fashionable for a while to speak dispar-
agingly of OLA, and thus a critic might complain that the 
methods used in this thesis in introducing the responsi-
bility view of freedom were alarmingly close to those of 
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OLA. As the reader will recall, a series of thought 
experiments was conducted involving a janitor and a 
trapped office worker (persons of that anonymous and 
anaemic nature that lend monumental tedium to most con-
ceptual inquiries) and was not the point of these 
thought experiments to ascertain what would be the correct 
thing to say about freedom or unfreedom in various situ-
ations? In other words, the question must be answered to 
what extent my attempts to establish the responsibility 
view were pursued within the confines of OLA. I shall 
approach this question in a roundabout way by looking at 
some of the most common objections against OLA and examing 
how vulnerable the methods of the present thesis might be 
to them. Such objections are, needless to say, a legion. 
Ordinary language philosophers have been accused of doing 
etymology instead of philosophy, of committing the 
"assertion fallacy", of an insidious but inherent con-
servatism, and, lastly, of pursuing a method of the utmost 
triviality. Let us look at each of these in turn. 
a) It is simply wrong to say that OLA replaces philo-
sophy by etymology or philology. Its aim is to look into 
the workings of our language as it is employed here and 
now. Austin and Ryle would surely have deplored the 
linguistic excavations performed, for example, in Heid-
egger's early works where truths about the origin and 
development of certain Greek terms were taken as crucial 
for their meaning. By contrast, the meaning of expressions 
is for the ordinary language philsopher determined by the 
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rules that govern their use in present language games. The 
examples given in this thesis (p. 7) about the probable 
origin of the word 'free' in English and Icelandic may, 
for instance, have pointed our attention in the right 
direction, but they were in no way crucial for my 
subsequent analysis. 
b) In his book Speech Acts, John Searle claims to 
delineate certain fallacies commonly committed by ordinary 
language philosophers, resulting from an insubstantial 
general theory of language which, Searle says, amounts to 
little more than slogans such as "meaning is use". The one 
that need concern us here is what he calls "the assertion 
fallacy". It is the fallacy of confusing the conditions of 
assertability of concepts in particular contexts with 
their general presuppositions, or more precisely, the 
fallacy of equating the question what a word W means with 
the question what are the conditions for the performance 
of non-defective assertions of certain present-tense indi-
cative sentences containing W. Thus, ordinary language 
philosophers wrongly conclude that, because it would be 
bizarre to say certain things in certain situations (like 
'I know that I am in pain'), the particular concepts or 
expressions are inapplicable to such situations; when the 
reason, as in the above example, might simply be that the 
6 ) 
things are too obvious to be worth saying. 
Now, it is not my aim to take up the cudgel for ordi-
nary language philosophy in general, but only for the 
methods of my own thesis, insofar as they could be seen to 
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take their cue from OLA. Here, I want to claim that the 
distinctions drawn, for example, between freedom and 
ability and freedom and autonomy are at least impervious 
to this objection, since what I did was not merely to 
point out the strangeness of using these terms inter-
changeably, but to give arguments showing why such 
equations would be misconceived. The reason why a man 
hemmed in by a landslide is said to be unable, not unfree, 
to go, is not that the latter is too obvious to be stated: 
it is simply wrong. If he is not constrained by another 
agent, he is free to go although he cannot do it. Perhaps, 
the "assertion fallacy" is sometimes committed by ordinary 
language philosophers, but in backing up my claims about 
the correct use of the term freedom by appeal to the ordi-
nary use of language, I was not committing this fallacy. 
c) It is often said that the Achilles' heel of OLA is 
its conceptual and linguistic conservatism. The idea is 
that OLA biases political theory in a conservative 
direction by forestalling radical departures from existing 
forms of thought. Williams thus argues against Austin that 
he is committed to the view that all worthwhile dis-
tinctions have already been drawn - and by demanding that 
we should always look at how things work before we make 
7 ) 
changes, he effectively prevents any changes being made. 
I do not think this is a fair objection, for Austin's 
point was not that language could not be made to work in 
new ways; he simply pointed out that a lot of distinctions 
had already been drawn in the course of many generations 
-236-
and that these were "likely to be more numerous, more 
sound ... and more sUbtle ... than any that you or I are 
8 ) 
likely to think up in our armchairs of an afternoon". 
So, although Austin believed that it should generally be 
left to necessity, not to a particular philosopher, to be 
the mother of invention, he did not hold any neo-
Darwinistic view about the nature of the distinctions in 
9 ) 
our language. 
The fact that people are advised to be cautious in 
drawing new distinctions is not enough to sustain a charge 
of conservatism. However, this charge still crops up at a 
deeper leve 1. Thus, Marcuse claims that since OLA takes 
exclusively as its subject matter the "totalitarian scope 
of the established universe of discourse", it can merely 
reinforce the values of the society from which the 
10) 
language evolves. Again, I think the opponents of OLA 
are tilting at windmills. Just as a student may use the 
very terms and expressions he picked up from the lips of 
his teacher to criticize him later on, the concepts of 
ordinary language, although first learnt within pre-
established language games, may later be used to criticize 
those very practices or institutions. For example, Lukes 
and Connolly do not seem to have any difficulties in argu-
ing for a 'radical' conception of interests, as superior 
to a more 'conservative' 
11) 
one, by employing tools of 
ordinary language. Generally, in times of political or 
social instability, people tend to be rebellious and their 
use of language radical, but it is radical because it is 
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used to argue for radical views, not because the rebels 
have managed to transcend any limits of OLA in defining 
terms. Claiming that ordinary language is inherently con-
servative, in the sense of reinforcing prevailing values, 
is like claiming that water is in its nature a 'peaceful' 
substance since it is more often used to quench our thirst 
than to drown people in. As far as freedom and power are 
concerned, I see no reason to believe that my analysis of 
these concepts has functioned in any regulative or con-
servative manner, nor that it would necessarily assume a 
different form in a radical society than a quiescent one 
(propagandism and abuse apart) . 
d) So far then, OLA has stood the test against 
various criticisms, or at least as much of OLA as is 
employed in the preceding chapters of my thesis. However, 
the charge of triviality still remains. There are differ-
ent ways of understanding that charge. Firstly, it may 
mean that what is wrong with OLA is its dealing with the 
language of plain men who do not think; 
fails to capture the 'evaluative' , 
secondly, that it 
as opposed to the 
'descriptive', aspect of our discourse, thus trivializing 
it; or thirdly, that the findings of OLA are bound to be 
trivial because it has no means of arbitrating between 
divergent usages. 
Ryle has admirably answered the first point. When 
ordinary language philosophers claim to be investigating 
the "stock use" of an expression, they are, of course, not 
restricting themselves to ordinary or colloquial express-
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ions on the lips of Everyman. The expression can be an 
unordinary or technical one, like 'infinitesimals'; the 
question is simply what its stock use is in the relevant 
language game, be it played by people in general or a 
12) 
limited number of experts. 
The alleged inability of OLA to take account of the 
evaluative dimension of linguistic expressions is taken by 
some to be the bane of the method. Such an objection 
hinges, however, on the validity of the description-
evaluation distinction in its traditional form, a distinc-
tion that will be rejected in section 8.S by drawing on 
Kovesi's account of moral notions. If 'evaluation' is not 
the mere icing on the cake of 'description', but simply a 
way of describing from another point of view, then there 
is nothing preventing OLA from doing justice to the so-
called normative element of language. My arguments for 
this contention will have to be shelved until the relevant 
section, but let it suffice to say here that if certain 
moral terms like 'unfreedom' or 'power' embody a pre-
sumption of prima facie illegitimacy, then such a pre-
sumption should be captured by OLA. 
Turning finally to the third point, the claim is that 
despite all its meticulous clarifications, OLA has in the 
end no means of resolving problems of divergent usage. We 
obviously do not all say the same things in the same situ-
ations, usages do differ. Austin's reply in his famous 
paper "A Plea for Excuses" is to point out that they do 
not differ nearly as much as one would think: "The more we 
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imagine the situation in detail, with a background of 
story ... the less we find we disagree about what we should 
13) 
say" . The point here is that often when we think we 
want to say different things of the same situation, we 
have actually imagined the situation slightly differently. 
However, Austin concedes that nevertheless, "sometimes we 
14) 
do ultimately disagree". Ryle has no compunction about 
admitting this either: "Sometimes the stock use in one 
place is different from its stock use in another ... Some-
times, its stock use at one period differs from its stock 
15) 
use at another", etc. 
It would be convenient if all differences in the 
usages of 'freedom' and 'autonomy', for example, could 
simply be eliminated by concocting a story or two, and 
then everybody would agree about the distinction between 
these concepts. However, it is important to note that it 
was never the claim of the Oxford philosophers that this 
could necessarily be done. Nor did they believe that pre-
vailing stock uses are always the best ways of arranging 
things. Austin freely admits that other considerations are 
likely to be of relevance "if our interests are more 
16) 
extensive or intellectual than the ordinary". Thus, 
having to accept that an objective definition of a term 
such as social freedom, which is used by philosophers and 
laymen alike, cannot be constructed solely by means of 
ordinary language analysis, in no way undercuts the fruit-
fulness of that method. Those who think it does are 
barking up the wrong tree. They may have a point against 
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people who share Wittgenstein's belief that philosophy 
cannot go beyond simply "arranging what we have always 
17) 
known" , but not against OLA. That the latter cannot do 
more than to unpack an existing linguistic practice at a 
particular time and place is not an objection against its 
method: this was all it ever pretended to do. 
Most critics of OLA have, I believe, been fighting 
against strawmen. The have not realized how modest people 
like Austin and Ryle were (at least in theory, if not 
always in practice) about the usefulness of their own 
approach. However, to accept that the use of OLA is 
limited is not to say that it has no use whatsoever. On 
the contrary, OLA serves as a natural starting point for 
all conceptual inquiries. Invoking Miller's far-fetched 
stories about the janitor and the office worker in chapter 
2 was fine, as long as the aim was nothing more than to 
get the discussion off the ground. Arguably, a point was 
even scored in doing so, since ordinary language must at 
least be a language that I share with a number of other 
people, be that number great or small. Hence, I agree with 
Alan Ryan that "everyone who appeals to the propriety of 
departing from ordinary language is under the necessity of 
18) 
making out a case for this departure". But similarly, 
and in this case more importantly, a definition which con-
forms with someone's use of language is not worth a lot if 
it is not possible, independently, to adduce good reasons 
for its being as it is. Conformity with ordinary language 
can be one such reason, but only one among many - and, as 
-241-
we have seen, Austin never claimed that OLA was the only 
source of fruitful discussion. He explicitly says that 
"ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it 
can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and 
19 ) 
superseded. Only remember, it is the first word." 
To conclude this section, we have seen that any 
references in earlier chapters to the verdicts of ordinary 
language were warranted, as long as they were only used as 
starting points of the discussion, but not made as appeals 
to a final arbiter. OLA often brings to our attention 
subtle distinctions that already exist and should be 
respected, or it convinces us that no competent speaker 
could use a word in such-and-such a way. But in the case 
of a term like freedom, where usages do differ consider-
ably, something more is needed; OLA must by necessity be 
"supplemented and improved upon". Since my aim is to 
indicate a cogent line of defence for the medhods used in 
the preceding analysis of freedom, the vital question is: 
how was it then supplemented and improved upon? 
8.3. Reflective equilibrium 
Although appeals to 'ordinary language' are now, surpris-
ingly, considered passe by most philsophers, the same can-
not be said for appeals to our moral intuitions. They are 
widely used to elicit verdicts. about the correct descrip-
tions of various scenarios. But if the objective there is 
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also to find out what is the proper thing to say in/of a 
given situation, how does this differ in practice from 
OLA? The differences might run less deep than many philo-
sophers are inclined to think. However, there are some. 
For instance, the considered moral intuition of a rational 
agent is not the same as any spontaneous verdict of 
ordinary language. Also, the appeal to intuitions tends to 
presuppose a certain methodology, namely, Rawls' reflec-
tive equilibrium. It is within that framework that the 
words 'considered' and 'rational' acquire a clear sense. 
Rawls does not claim any originality for his method. 
The basic ideas behind it seem to have been bequeathed to 
him by Nelson Goodman's justification of inductive and 
deductive principles of inference. An inference is, on 
Goodman's (admittedly highly contentious) account, justi-
fied by conformity to general rules/principles and those 
are in turn justified by conformity to accepted infer-
ences. At first sight this looks circular, but Goodman 
claims that the circle is a virtuous one: "rules and par-
ticular inferences alike are justified by being brought 
into agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it 
yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an infer-
ence is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to 
20) 
amend." What we have here is a kind of an interplay: a 
two-way traffic pattern. The method of reflective equi-
librium is that of mutual adjustments between the abstract 
and the concrete: between theory or definition on the one 
hand, use and intuition on the other. The latter only 
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serve as provisional starting points that are to be 
measured for consistency, tested by criticism and 
reflected on in the light of the former. It is this 
general model that Rawls seizes on to underpin his theory 
of justice. 
Relating mutatis mutandis what he says about justice 
to my treatment of freedom, and replacing moral principles 
by definitions of moral terms, the following application 
of the method of reflective equilibrium to a theory of 
freedom is suggested. People have certain intuitions 
about freedom, frequently brought to light in judgements 
about particular situations, artificial (like the office 
stories) or real. It appears that people share at least 
certain criteria for freedom, i.e., they understand free-
dom-talk, although they lack a developed, articulated 
definition. The main task of a conceptual inquiry is to 
formulate such a definition, one that seems best to 
support our intuitions. Then, by going back and forth, 
sometimes altering the details of the definition, some-
times withdrawing the judgements based on our intuitions 
and bringing them into conformity with the proposal, 
eventually we arrive at a definition that is both formally 
coherent and yields results which "match our considered 
21) 
judgements duly pruned and adjusted". This process 
gradually leads to the state of reflective equilibrium, 
the state reached "after a person has weighed various pro-
posed conceptions and has either revised his judgment to 




The basic justification for this method in Rawls' 
work is simple enough: there is no other way to proceed. 
If we reject this method, we are forced to rely either on 
Cartesian self-evident truths or try to win acceptance for 
some stipulative definition. But both of these have been 
done many times without much success. By contrast, the 
fundamental insight here lies in accepting the fact that 
to solve any disagreement, we must proceed from certain 
shared assumptions. We look for possible bases of agree-
ment and try to expand and develop them by mutual adjust-
ment. Naturally, we have to make some compromises along 
the way, but we are bound to be satisfied with the end 
result, knowing it to be the best we can hope for. 
Rawls' reflective equilibrium is clearly superior to 
OLA as a general methodology for moral inquiries. It 
explains the prima facie plausibility of common beliefs, 
and also why/how radical departures from these beliefs are 
sometimes called for. In any event, it is closer than OLA 
to the method employed in this thesis. It does not seem 
far off the mark to say that in chapter 2 I proposed a 
general definition of social freedom, tailored to fit as 
many of our intuitions as possible, and then went "back 
and forth" in a Rawlsian way until the intuitions and the 
definition were in harmony. 
But is the method of reflective equilibrium one that 
I would have been well advised to use? Hare has launched a 
thorough-going attack on that method. He claims that 
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although Rawls skirts round the issue, he is in the end 
nothing more than an old-fashioned intuitionist. It is to 
intuition that he appeals at all the crucial points in his 
23) 
arguments. Now, if it so happens that he can find a 
large enough number of readers who share his intuitions, 
he thinks that he has represented the views of people in 
general, and together they can "congratulate themselves on 
having attained the truth". But such a contingent con-
sensus does not change the fact that intuitionism in 
general, by making the truth of a theory depend on an 
agreement with people's intuitions, sets in motion a 
vertiginous slide into subjectivism; and this is the real 
upshot of Rawls' method, according to Hare, namely a kind 
24) 
of subjectivism in the narrowest sense. Thus, if A, an 
advocate of reflective equilibrium, comes across a person, 
B, who says that torturing people is all right, making an 
appeal to A's moral intuitions cuts no ice with B. 
Repulsive as B's view may be, he need not be committing 
25) 
any logical or linguistic error in holding it. 
I would like to make two critical comments on Hare's 
arguments. Firstly, he fails to notice that Rawls' new 
'intuitionism' - if we choose to call it by that name -
distinguishes itself sharply from intuitionism in the 
traditional sense which is a type of non-naturalism. On 
Rawls' view, a person presented with an appealing account 
of justice (or for that matter freedom) may well have to 
revise or abandon an intuition, however strong, which does 
not conform to it, in order to achieve the best reflective 
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equilibrium, but if Rawls' intuitionism were a form of 
non-naturalism, this would be out of the question; the 
26) 
intuition would be incorrigible. Secondly, Hare holds 
that although moral intuitions have in themselves no pro-
bative force, what does have such force is the ordinary 
27) 
use of moral words. But how can moral words be defined 
without a recourse to moral intuitions; how can the brick-
laying be independent of the bricks? Here, we must remem-
ber that Hare assumes that words such as 'freedom', which 
are commonly used in a moral discourse, can be understood 
in a descriptive (non-moral) sense; the dimension of 
normativity does not enter in until we make some substan-
tive moral statements about freedom. However, this 
assumption goes against my claims about the nature of 
freedom as a moral (evaluative) concept, claims that are 
vindicated by more general arguments from Kovesi in 8.5. 
Despite these flaws in Hare's argumentation, his 
basic point about the limitations of Rawls' method has 
some foundation. Plato poses a crucial question in the 
Republic when he asks: "If a man starts from something he 
knows not, and the end and the middle of his argument are 
tangled together out of what he knows not, how can such a 
28) 
mere consensus ever turn into knowledge?" The problem 
about a coherence method like Rawls', where a general 
account is made to match intuitions by mutual adjustments, 
is that it seems ultimately liable to a charge of relativ-
ism. Rawls' reflective equilibrium is "tangled together" 
out of things that are not in themselves certain or 
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objective. The output depends on the input; hence, it it 
possible that different groups of rational agents using 
this method end up with different conclusions, all depend-
ing on the intuitions and proposals with which they 
started. For example, the definition of freedom, however 
"duly pruned and adjusted", might in the end vary between 
communities. 
Actually, Rawls himself is fully aware of this fact. 
As has become clearer in some of his more recent writings, 
his aim was never more than to reveal and refine the 
general principles which we (and this explicitly means we 
29) 
in Western liberal democracies) are inclined to use. 
The same would apply to definitions of moral terms; they 
would also, on Rawls' view, be relative to our culture. 
since I refuse to be content with the result that my 
definition of freedom only appeals to the community of 
moral agents who share my basic intuitions, I differ from 
Rawls over at least one very basic and important meta-
methodological commitment. It may be that my procedure in 
this thesis is essentially that of Rawls (and of countless 
other philosophers, early and late, who have used the same 
method without giving it a catchy name) , but I disagree 
with him about the underpinnings and the limits of the 
method. What I have been aiming at is a definition of 
freedom which is non-relative in a sense that Rawls' 
reflective equilibrium does not account for. 
Now, the third methodology which suggested itself at 
the start of my project, operationalism, emphasizes 
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objectivity. Could its insights be brought to bear on my 
commitment to a non-relative definition of freedom? 
8.4. Operationalism 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines operationalism as 
"a program which aims at linking all scientific concepts 
to experimental procedures and at cleansing science of 
operationally undefinable terms, which it regards as being 
30) 
devoid of empirical meaning". Confronted with the 
morass of everyday, non-technical expressions, the oper-
ationalists see no alternative but to construct a new 
vocabulary: a precise sense has to be imparted to these 
vague expressions in order to make them serviceable for 
scientific purposes. Always most at home in the field of 
natural sciences, operationalism is, for instance, famous 
(or infamous) for claiming that just as temperature is the 
reading on a thermometer, intelligence is the score in an 
IQ-test. Whether 'intelligence' means something over and 
above this in ordinary discourse is of no more interest to 
science than our different sensitivity to heat is of 
relevance to measurements of temperature. 
If OLA has been at death's door for some decades, 
then one would think that operationalism - one of the most 
extreme concomitants of an outdated positivism - had been 
buried long ago. Still, the spectre of operationalism 
keeps haunting us, and it has recently been raised with 
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some force in Oppenheim's copious writings on political 
concepts. Oppenheim's demand is that each concept be 
associated with a precise and definite testing operation, 
an operation that can be repeated and employed by differ-
ent people, regardless of their preferences, and can be 
used for making predictions about future events (in this 
case the bahaviour of agents). 
Generally, operationalists are contemptuous of so-
called political philosophy which they consider hopelessly 
speculative and inexact. However, they believe it can and 
should be replaced by political science which, by repli-
cating the methods of natural science, constitutes a dis-
passionate study of the facts as they are, without meta-
physical overtones. Most important for our purposes is the 
claim that political concepts should be purged of all 
value connotations: science can only describe, not evalu-
ate. When we start disagreeing about values, we have 
exceeded the bounds of science, but political concepts 
have a descriptive content which can be isolated and oper-
ationalized, apart from all value commitments. 
To see, more specifically, how these assumptions 
would apply to the concept of freedom, let us quote Hillel 
Steiner: 
To ask whether an individual is free to do A, is not 
to ask a moral question. It is, rather, to ask a 
factual question the answer to which is logically 
prior to any moral question about his doing A. 
Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend how one could 
perform an action which one ought not to perform - a 
wrong action - unless one is free to do it ... "31) 
Naturally enough, as we have already seen in the case 
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of Oppenheim (2.3), operationalists view freedom as a 
descriptive concept to which evaluative connotations have 
only contingently become attached, and as a concept whose 
proper use can be determined without any prior agreement 
on broader issues, such as responsibility. As in other 
cases, meaningful disagreement about this particular con-
cept presupposes an agreed definition in non-valuational 
terms; the question whether freedom can become a subject 
of empirical science is simply the question if there are 
experimental data to which the term 'freedom' can be 
32) 
linked. We have already seen that Oppenheim takes a 
positive answer to that question for granted. 
Now, to be fair to Oppenheim, while he acknowledges 
that his approach "moves against the tide of current 
33) 
theory" , he also wants to distance himself from some of 
the dogmas associated with positivism. He is not a 
behaviourist, nor does he believe that value judgements 
are 'meaningless' . Most importantly, he accepts that 
political science cannot in a strict sense be value-free, 
insomuch as ideological commitments tend to influence the 
34) 
choice of topics and hypotheses to be tested. This last 
concession is frequently made by modern-day operational-
ists, acknowledging the Popper ian insight that 'hard 
facts' do not lie unproblematically before our gaze: our 
interests and values steer the process of discovery. But 
this does not change the fact that once a topic has been 
chosen, a field has been demarcated, the investigation can 
proceed within its confines in a value-free manner. 
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Charles Taylor has called this position the "mitigated 
35) 
positivist view". 
Having been told that political concepts like freedom 
can be operationalized, it still remains to ask which 
rules are to govern this procedure, and how much account 
must be taken of ordinary usage. In the end, the general 
rule of procedure for an operationalist is simply that of 
fulfilling the requirement of fruitfulness for scientific 
inquiry (practicality, predictability) as explained above. 
Furthermore, since neither everyday language nor previous 
scientific usage has fixed the meaning of terms like 
'freedom' or 'power', they may be defined in a way that 
best serves this purpose. It is here that Oppenheim's 
reconstructionism comes into the picture. Although we 
should, as a rule, not depart further than necessary from 
current English, the tools of ordinary language are often 
too blunt to be of use for scientific investigation. What 
we need to do is to construct a language "as free as 
possible of the imperfections of ordinary usage, or rather 
36) 
to reconstruct its basic concepts". The similarity to 
Wittgenstein's approach in the Tractatus is plain, and 
indeed acknowledged by Oppenheim: language is not "in 
order as it is", we need to construe a logically perfect 
language. All this shows how far from philosophical main-
stream ideas the method of operationalism really is. 
Connolly has presented Oppenheim with a dilemma. If 
his reconstructions are far removed from ordinary 
language, then he is bound to lose contact with the 
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community to which he speaks; if, on the other hand, they 
are close to it, the appearance of normative neutrality 
37) 
dissolves. This should remind us of the fact that the 
linchpin of operationalism is nothing but the distinction 
between description and evaluation: the separability of 
facts and values. Strangely enough, we have seen how those 
who challenge OLA for being unable to capture the norma-
tive element of political discourse (p. 238), Hare (p. 
246), and now the operationalists, who think they need to 
"reconstruct" this discourse to keep it value-free, share 
the presupposition that description and evaluation can, in 
principle, be separated. It should be clear from my dis-
cussion of freedom that this is a presupposition which I 
reject. My methods, therefore, are anything but operation-
alist. The only thing I share with the operationalists is 
their desire for authoritative and serviceable defini-
tions, but I do not believe this should - or could - be 
accomplished by dint of their artificial and antiseptic 
language. 
Indeed, it would be salutary for our present purposes 
to get to the root of the dogma of the separability of 
description and evaluation. If it can be uprooted, the 
wind will be taken from the sails of operationalism. To do 
this, we need to look more closely into the nature of 
moral concepts in general, a task awaiting us in the next 
section, which draws on Kovesi's excellent account. 
Finally, it should be noted that if the responsi-
bility view of freedom and power espoused in the present 
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thesis holds good, the analysis of these concepts has 
little if any bearing on predictions of human behaviour -
which means that one more operationalist ideal goes by the 
board. A constrained agent may yield to the restriction, 
but he may also strengthen his will and act in the face of 
adversity. The mere knowledge that he is unfree to do x 
does not provide us with any rigorous means of predicting 
his resulting behaviour. It is, by the way, not clear to 
me how such a prediction would be possible even on Oppen-
heim's operationalist definition of freedom, at least not 
in so far as his punishability condition is concerned (p. 
55). Even if we know that an act is punishable, and an 
agent therefore in Oppenheim's model 'unfree' to perform 
it, how can we say in advance if he will refrain from it 
or not? But then, as Connolly points out, power and un-
freedom are bound to be disappointing concepts to pre-
dictivists because predictivism itself provides a defec-
38) 
tive model of social inquiry. 
8.5. Moral notions 
Kovesi's Moral Notions is a gem of a book, too often 
overlooked by students of moral and political philosophy. 
In it he provides, if not knockdown arguments against the 
description-evaluation distinction, then at least a 
thoroughly convincing general account of the nature and 
formation of concepts which circumvents this distinction. 
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Kovesi starts by noting that the word 'yellow', so 
frequently adduced in the literature as an example of a 
descriptive word, is not a very good representative of 
that type, but rather of colour words which have special 
features of their own. Being yellow is a quality that must 
be present for us to judge something to be yellow; it is, 
needless to say, the essential characteristic of yellow-
ness. However, the same does not apply in the case of more 
typical descriptive words like 'table' or 'kettle'; there 
are no perceivable qualities of being-a-table or 'kettle-
ness' which make objects into things of that sort. Of 
course, certain qualities or properties must be present in 
an object for us to call it a 'table' (size, texture, 
material, etc.) but none of them seems to be definitive 
in the sense that if the object were not of this size or 
made out of this material, it would cease to be a table. 
In other words, none of these properties is that of 
'tableness' . What turns an object into a table is not 
that it has some specific perceivable properties but that 
it fulfills a certain function or satisfies a sociological 
need. The features we look for in deciding if an object is 
a table or not are those which constitute the object's 
being the sort of thing which serves the purpose tables 
39) 
were invented to serve. 
All this sounds agreeably Aristotelian, and in fact 
Kovesi seems here to be drawing on Aristotle's distinction 
between form/essence and matter. The form or the "formal 
element", as Kovesi sometimes calls it, is the rationale 
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of the concept, that to which we point in answering the 
question why we call a number of objects 'tables' and 
refuse the name to other things; the matter, by contrast, 
refers to contingent characteristics in which the object 
may vary without ceasing to be a table. 
Kovesi's analysis does not strike one as very 
original or exciting until he brings it to bear on moral 
terms as well as those which are wrongly called descrip-
tive. For instance, what makes different bits of human 
action into murder must be a common formal element which 
enables us to classify materially different actions as 
actions of the same kind. It is exactly this formal 
element, although not a perceivable quality, which affords 
us the possibility of following a rule in the classifi-
cation: the possibility of seeing a certain kind of order 
and distinction through the endless multiplicity of human 
circumstances. We must recognize what it is for an act to 
be an act of murder before we can call it so, we must 
recognize the point of the expression. Human inventiveness 
is at its best when it comes to devising new methods of 
disposing of our fellow-beings. Hence, there is no way of 
describing or predicting the possible material elements of 
killing in the future. But if we understand the point of 
murder-talk, we will be able to answer the question 
whether these possible future acts would count as 
instances of murder or not, irrespective of their empiri-
cal similarities or dissimilarities to past acts of 
murder. 
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It is a well-known Aristotelian point that the same 
thing can serve, respectively, as matter and form in 
different contexts; a tile is a form with respect to the 
sand of which it is made, matter with respect to the house 
of which it forms a part. Similarly, Kovesi points out 
that just as various movements can be the material ele-
ments of different kinds of murder, so murder, along with 
40) 
cruelty, robbery, etc., is a material element of vice. 
The point of talk about tables is to designate 
objects that fulfil a specific function, important to 
human life, enabling us to sit, eat, read, write, etc., in 
a convenient way, given the form of the human body. The 
point of murder-talk is to classify a type of action: the 
wrongful taking of human life. Terms like 'murder', which 
group together the morally relevant facts of certain situ-
ations, Kovesi calls "moral terms" and their meanings 
"moral concepts". 
The exposition so far can be summed up by saying that 
to understand the nature of concepts, we must consider the 
point or rationale for inventing them and then for employ-
ing them in one way rather than another. It is this 
rationale which enables us to follow a rule in using the 
term, since to say that things are similar is to say that 
there is some point of view from which the similarity can 
be detected. Most noteworthy is that the difference 
between moral and other notions does not appear to coin-
cide with a difference between evaluation and description. 
The real difference can be seen as lying in the formal 
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elements, the divergent reasons for collocating certain 
features, aspects and qualities, and for grouping them 
together. Non-moral notions are relevant to the inanimate 
world, or to human beings only insofar as they are a part 
of that world; moral notions are more deeply embedded in 
man's interests, wants and needs, in that these factors 
not only guide us in the formation of the concepts but 
enter into the concepts themselves. Moral concepts are 
thus not only formed by ourselves, they are about our-
41) 
selves. 
It will readily be seen from the above discussion 
that whereas we always describe from some point of view, 
we can never be said to do so from a perspective we could 
call the descriptive point of view. In the case of moral 
concepts, like murder, we describe from the moral point of 
view, but that point of view is in no way less descriptive 
than the perspective employed in classifying an object as 
a table or a kettle. It is simply another perspective, we 
are drawing attention to features of another sort. 
These considerations suffice to bring out the nature 
of the misunderstandings that have flourished so long on 
the basis of the description-evaluation distinction. 
Evaluation is not the icing on the cake of hard facts; in 
the case of moral notions we cannot, so to speak, peel 
away the layers of evaluation until we touch bottom: the 
neutral descriptive content. We do not first have hard 
facts and then load them with normativity. There is a 
rationale behind a concept like murder which determines 
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the acts brought together under that heading. If we remove 
the rationale, we are not left with the descriptive 
criteria for murder minus evaluation, we are left with 
nothing at all. To take another example, by removing the 
evaluative element from the notion of tidiness, we strip 
ourselves of the possibility of grouping together various 
instances of untidiness. Why would inkspots and coffee 
stains on this page both be considered untidy? Surely ink 
and coffee are chemically different! An attempt to specify 
'tidiness' in chemical ('tidiness-neutral' ) terms would 
fail for the same reason as an attempt to specify 'murder' 
in morally neutral terms: there is nothing left to specify 
42) 
as the same. As Kovesi puts it most forcibly: "Moral 
notions do not evaluate the world of description but 
43) 
describe the world of evaluation". All notions are 
formed for some reason, they 'describe' from some point of 
view, and the moral point of view is no exception. The 
insistence on an unbridgeable gap between description and 
evaluation, that has bedevilled so much of moral philo-
sophy, is simply groundless. 
It is no surprise that an account such as Kovesi's 
should be pitted against a non-naturalistic view of 
morality which sees moral activity as pre-eminently non-
cognitive or non-rational; J.M. Brennan does so, for 
example, in his book The Open-Texture of Moral Concepts. 
But, more surprisingly, Brennan also wants to contrast 
Kovesi's account with naturalistic ethics on the grounds 
that Kovesi implies that there is no logical transition 
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between concepts formed from different points of view, 
44) 
e.g. the moral and non-moral one. I am afraid Brennan 
may be letting the descriptive-evaluative distinction in 
again by the back door, especially when he claims that the 
"employment of ethical concepts requires special cognitive 
activity over and above the understanding of the relevant 
45 ) 
factual and logical considerations." I wonder what the 
"relevant" facts are, upon which the ethical concepts are 
to supervene. On Kovesi's account, there are no indepen-
dent, non-moral facts that are relevant for the formation 
of a moral concept; it rests on facts described from the 
moral point of view, and they are as 'basic' as any other 
facts. It may be merely a question of definition whether 
or not this account squares with naturalism. If Brennan 
means by naturalism the theory that value words are defin-
able in terms of brute facts, such as colours, feelings, 
etc. (many would, of course, deny that even these are 
'brute') , he is surely right that Kovesi's account is 
antagonistic to it. However, there are more plausible 
forms of naturalism, such as Aristotle's view that what is 
good for man is what conduces to his eudaimonia; and there 
is absolutely nothing in Kovesi's view to make it incom-
patible with such naturalisms. On the contrary, we may 
discern in his view arguments which reinforce naturalism, 
inasmuch as Kovesi maintains that values are facts of a 
certain kind. 
Whether Kovesi's account of the 'morally descriptive' 
sits easily or uneasily with naturalism may in the end be 
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of little importance to the thrust of my thesis. However, 
it carries other highly-relevant implications. Kovesi's 
arguments help to vindicate my treatment of freedom as a 
moral, or value-loaded concept. I would, indeed, go as far 
as Crocker who claims that to "attempt a 'value-neutral' 
account of liberty is at best only superficially more 
sensible than to give a 
46) 
'biology neutral' account of 
fish. " It seems to me, in line with Kovesi, that the 
point of employing the term 'freedom' is to group together 
actions that are similar to one another in a morally 
relevant way. So, my quest for an authoritative definition 
of freedom could not have been aided by the operationalist 
desideratum of isjolating the 'purely descriptive' element 
of the concept, for no such element exists. 
What I have done in this chapter is to defend the use 
of references to ordinary discourse as a helpful starting 
point in philosophy. OLA is more valuable as a method than 
is commonly acknowledged nowadays, inasmuch as it often 
captures concepts, distinctions and insights which can be 
apt in thinking about (and even solving) philosophical 
problems. However, when we start to arbitrate between 
radically divergent usages, something more is needed. 
There, Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium can help us 
(and my procedure in this thesis is close to his) - but 
only up to a point; for in the end Rawls' method seems 
liable to a relativistic interpretation. Finally, I 
rejected all the basic claims of operationalism, apart 
from its insistence on the need for objectivity. 
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9. NORMATIVITY AND CONTESTABILITY 
Chapter 9 comprises the second part of my methodological 
investigation. The preceding chapter showed that of the 
three original objectives of my conceptual inquiry into 
social freedom (8.1), two (respect for ordinary usage and 
coherence) could be realized within the frameworks of the 
methodologies discussed. However, since these were not 
able to satisfy the third and most important demand, that 
of providing an objective/authoritative definition of 
freedom, an objector could still call into question the 
viability of the whole project. My aim was to find precise 
philosophical criteria for the concepts of constraining 
freedom and exercising power over which all political 
philosophers could agree upon and employ. But have I 
really come up with anything more than a set of relative, 
if mutually consistent, intuitions? 
In 9.1, I try to formulate an account of the methodo-
logy that has actually been followed in this thesis, and 
which implies that it is possible to arrive at a defini-
tion of moral terms which is critical and normative, but 
non-relative. In 9.2, I discuss the objection that 
although moral concepts are not relative, they are (in the 
recently fashionable jargon) essentially contestable. The 
thesis of essential contestability is rejected in its 
general form as well as in its application to a particular 
concept, that of moral responsibility (9.3). Finally, 9.4 
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explains how the open texture of concepts leads to (inno-
cuous) disagreements about their use. 
9.1. Normativity without relativity 
In 8.5, we saw how Kovesi's analysis undermined the 
description-evaluation distinction. If we find Kovesi con-
vincing, there does not seem to be any reason to believe 
that moral concepts have a special logic of their own as a 
result of which ordinary language and intuitions about 
them are bound to differ. Is this not a point in favour of 
a method which looks for non-relative definitions of moral 
terms? It may be a point in its favour but it is not con-
clusive. The reason is that although the threat of the 
specifically relative nature of moral concepts has been 
averted, the threat of general conceptual relativism still 
hangs over our heads: it could be that our intuitions 
about all, or most, concepts differ and that an inquiry 
which aims at a single definition for any given concept is 
thus doomed to failure. Even if all 
for a purpose and have a point, why 
concepts are formed 
does this point have 
to be the same for everyone? Might not, for instance, the 
point of 'freedom' happen to coincide with that of 'auto-
nomy' among some language speakers in some societies? 
Now, it is true that on a map there often seem to be 
numerous ways up each mountain; however, a mountain may 
actually be of the sort that for a rational mountaineer 
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there is but one best path to its top. Let us say that the 
'mountain' we are supposed to climb is to define the term 
'table'. What we do is to search for a function or a 
social need that the term is meant to fulfil. If someone 
insists on reserving the term 'table' for 4-legged objects 
fulfilling this need, we point out to him the arbitrari-
ness of the distinction (why not also 3-legged ones?). If 
his definition is so broad as to include tables and beds, 
we say: 'If you use "table" in this way, you will have no 
uses left to refer specifically to objects you put your 
plates on at dinner, as distinct from those you sleep on 





out what I take to be a very 
satisfactory inquiries into the 
nature of concepts (at any rate those relating to the 
empirical world) will be critical inquiries. It must be 
shown why the point of the given concept is or should be 
of interest to people and how the term designating the 
concept must be defined, so as to correspond to this point 
and to distinguish its meaning from different concepts 
with other (but perhaps related) points. Much the same 
applies here to 'freedom' as to 'table' in the example 
above. I claim to have found a rationale behind a concept 
which should be of interest to us as humans: the concept 
of not being constrained by another agent. It is a nega-
tive concept in the sense that we are free to do x, as 
long as there is no agent responsible for the non-
suppression of an obstacle to do our doing x; and it is an 
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open moral concept (p. 27) in that it places the onus of 
justification on the constraining-agent. I have shown that 
the term '(social) freedom' is frequently used to convey 
the meaning of this concept in English (so does 'Freiheit' 
in German, 'frihed' in Danish, 'frelsi' in Icelandic, 
etc.); many, if not most, of our common sayings and intui-
tions are in harmony with it. 
The crux of my critical method has been to argue that 
the term must be defined in such-and-such a way for its 
use to be internally coherent, and to distinguish it from 
the meanings of other terms which may be just as important 
but do not have exactly the same extension as freedom. For 
instance, if we define 'freedom' more broadly than I have 
proposed, it starts to take up a role admirably filled by 
other terms ('autonomy', 'eudaimonia', 'ability', etc.); 
if we define it more narrowly (the liberal conception, 
etc.), the definition becomes arbitrary from precisely 
that moral point of view which indicated the purpose of 
freedom-talk. I have claimed that it is a necessary con-
dition of the fruitfulness of substantive debates that 
people agree on the meaning of those ideals about the 
value of which they can then disagree. My arguments have 
been designed to show that one particular definition of 
'social freedom' is best fitted to serve as the basis for 
substantive political debate, even if this definition 
should not always prove to be in strict accordance with 
the common usage of people in a given society. 
It is important to note that what I have been arguing 
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for is not an arbitrary, stipulative definition of free-
dom. I have tried to show that freedom-talk has a parti-
cular point or purpose in human relations, and have argued 
critically for a particular definition of 'social freedom' 
that best conveys this point. I do not pretend to have 
found the true definition of freedom that has all along 
been lying hidden from view (definitions are created to 
serve a purpose, not discovered); but I claim to have pro-
pos0d a definition that is objective in the sense of being 
objectively useful to those interested in certain 
relations between agents, relations which are of wide-
spread importance for human beings. 
A proponent of Rawls' reflective equilibrium might 
claim that I have not really been proposing an alternative 
methodology. His method is also critical: it is an attempt 
to rationalize our concepts within a system of concepts 
and conceptual relations, correcting concepts to fit the 
system and the system to fit the concepts. Moreover, 
although it perhaps does not come out so clearly in Rawls' 
own discussion, such an enterprise requires (in order to 
be reflective) attention to what a system of concepts is 
intended to do. This may all be true, but what I have been 
trying to add to the Rawlsian insights is a Kovesian 
emphasis on the functional nature of concepts. Notions 
such as table or freedom fulfil a certain function in 
human life. I have claimed that it is possible to argue 
critically for what precisely this function is, and hence 
to show how the terms 'table' and 'freedom' would most 
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usefully be defined. I believe I differ from Rawls in my 
commitment to the non-relative nature of such arguments. 
9.2. The essential contestability thesis 
In addition to the specific arguments about the non-
relative nature of moral responsibility in 4.4, this pre-
ceding account of the general method of my inquiry was 
meant to rebut a charge of conceptual relativism which 
might be brought against it. However, the claim that 
definitions of moral or political terms are ultimately 
relative has recently been superseded by another and a 
different one, namely, that they are essentially contest-
able. It must next be examined what this 'new' claim 
amounts to and if it holds good. 
All the writers whose accounts of freedom can be 
described as 'responsibility views' have explicitly or 
implicitly adhered to a theory of moral concepts which 
accords with that of Kovesi: these concepts concern facts 
of a certain sort and describe them from a perspective 
that we could call the moral point of view. Furthermore, 
they connect the rationale of freedom with the attribution 
of moral responsibility. At the same time, however, most 
of these writers have pledged their allegiance to the 
thesis of essential contestability (ECT) , first formulated 
1 ) 
by W.B. Gallie in 1956. 
To take a few examples, one of the basic ingredients 
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in Lukes' account of power (7.1-7.2) is that this concept 
is essentially contestable, admitting of at least three 
different interpretations. Miller concludes his reply to 
Oppenheim by underlining the claim that the concept of 
freedom is usefully described as essentially contest-
2 ) 
able, and in Connolly's work, the careful investigation 
of political terms is preceded by an elucidation of the 
ECT. Connolly's general conclusion about conceptual 
debates in politics fits into the grid of the ECT: the 
common resources of reason and evidence can illuminate 
these debates but are in the end insufficient to reduce 
the number of possible interpretations of each concept to 
3 ) 
one. Benn is here the only exception. Incidentally, in 
his pioneering paper (with Weinstein) there is no mention 
of the ECT, although one commentator seems to interpret 
4 ) 
his views there as conforming to that thesis. However, 
in his recent Theory of Freedom he unequivocally rejects 
it, claiming that the concept of freedom, although con-
5) 
testable, is not essentially so. 
In general, the light these writers (Benn apart) take 
the ECT to shed on the nature of freedom can be spelled 
out as follows. By explaining the link between freedom and 
responsibility (and, in Miller's case, obligation) we 
have discerned the point of freedom-talk. But that is not 
tantamount to saying that the criteria of reason suffice 
to settle all contests on the correct definition of free-
dom or the application of the concept in particular 
situations. On the contrary, the point is too vague or 
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blunt to constitute an authoritative definition, if only 
because our ideas about responsibility (and obligation) 
themselves conflict in a rationally irresolvable way. 
It has already been noted (po 81) how odd remarks of 
this sort may seem to a reader of Miller's paper. In the 
first half, the air of authority and finality is created 
with an impressive account of freedom which seeks to 
dissipate all confusion about the nature of the concept 
and its correct employment. Then, out of the blue, in the 
second half, the concessions about the essential contest-
ability of responsibility and obligation follow, dis-
pelling the 
the whole 
air of optimism, if not the 
enterprise. However, Miller 
plausibility of 
and the other 
writers do not seem to be the least disquieted by this 
boomerang-effect of the ECT. In any case, we may here ask 
whether this thesis is a necessary concomitant of a 
responsibility view of freedom or whether, as I am 
inclined to believe, it ultimately undermines such a view. 
To answer these questions, a closer look is needed at the 
assumptions and arguments behind the ECT. 
For the sake of clarification, it is vital to 
understand where to place this new thesis with respect to 
traditional views about the relative or non-relative 
nature of concepts. Let us recall two historical stances 
on this issue, both clear-cut if extreme. John Locke tried 
to uphold what might be called the miscommunication 
thesis. Generally, people fail to reach agreement in con-
ceptual disputes because, while they "fill one another's 
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6) 
heads with noise and sounds", amounting to the same 
spoken words, they do not refer to the same underlying 
concepts. Starting from the premises of his empiricist 
epistemology, where all words are supposed to describe 
ideas in the mind of the speaker (in the case of political 
concepts the ideas of simple and mixed modes), Locke 
claimed that by reducing our terms to "determined 
collections of the simple ideas they do or should stand 
for", all disputes would "end of themselves, and immedi-
7) 
ately vanish". More specifically, with political terms 
this is all the easier since they do not refer to any real 
existences in nature but are simply given by definitions. 
Unfortunately, Locke's simple remedy is based on the 
empiricist theory of meaning, now generally discredited. 
Moreover, in light of the history since his time, his 
optimism seems somewhat misplaced. We will see later, how-
ever, that Locke may have been less far off the mark than 
is commonly supposed. 
Kuhn represents the other extreme stance according to 
which concepts (political or non-political) are inextric-
ably bound to a particular conceptual framework. A strong 
(and what seems to me the correct) reading of his 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions attributes to him a 
thorough-going relativism: these frameworks are incommen-
surable (the Isame l terms in different frameworks having 
irreducibly different meanings), and the transfer of alle-
giance from one to another cannot be forced by logical 
arguments; it is more like a gestalt-switch or a con-
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8 ) 
version experience. On a weaker reading, based mainly on 
his "Postscript", there can be better or worse reasons 
(although no final proofs) for accepting or rejecting a 
framework. But this concession is immediately diluted, if 
not abandoned, with the claim that although "good reasons 
for choice provide motives for conversion and a climate in 
which it is more likely to occur", no set of good reasons 
9 ) 
can in the end definitively prescribe such a conversion. 
The irrational element of historical coincidence and the 
effects of propagandism seem to be more important after 
all. 
This whole incommensurability thesis, the idea of 
proponents of different notions of, say, freedom working 
in different worlds under conditions of incommensurability 
and untranslatability, has many counter-intuitive and 
theoretically cumbersome implications. At any rate, it is 
hopelessly at odds with the argument of my thesis. 
However, it has a strong affinity with another famous 
account of the nature of concepts, implied by Wittgen-
stein's talk of family resemblances. As 'resembling' or 
'being related to' are not transitive relations, for Witt-
genstein two games, like football and chess, may have 
nothing in common except their relation to a third game, 
tennis, which is like football played with a ball and like 
chess played by two persons. Similarly, two instances of 
unfreedom would not, ex hypothesi, need to have anything 
else in common than e.g. some resemblance with a third 
instance, perhaps one commending a wider measure of assent 
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as an example of unfreedom. On this view, no definition of 
freedom as such is required or possible. Wittgenstein's 
suggestions here have given rise to what might be called a 
cluster theory of the meaning of concepts (p. 287). 
Locke's and Kuhn's theses, although at first sight as 
different as chalk and cheese, concur in providing us with 
an easy - some would say all too easy - escape route from 
conceptual debates. For example, I could claim on both 
accounts that an alternative view of freedom is irrelevant 
to my inquiry. He who wants e.g. to equate freedom with 
autonomy is simply referring to the wrong (or at any rate 
different) ideas in his mind (Locke), or employing an in-
commensurable paradigm (Kuhn). As against this, the thrust 
of Gallie's ECT is to provide a middle ground proposal, 
rejecting the common assumption of the two extreme stances 
that in conceptual debates people are simply talking at 
cross purposes. Gallie's idea is that while the criteria 
employed in freedom-talk are truly disparate, they are 
nevertheless elements in a common underlying concept which 
gives the discussion its unity. It is at least in a 
partial sense the same freedom that forms the bone of 
contention. Thus, in his frequently quoted paper, Gallie 
claims that there are certain concepts (not only in poli-
tical philosophy but also in aesthetics, religion, etc.) 
which have no clearly definable standard or correct use, 
but of which each party has its own "interpretation" that 
it contends is the only proper one with a stock of con-
vincing arguments. These concepts are, for Gallie, not 
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only contested (as a matter of fact), or contestable (no 
logically coercive reasons having yet been found for pre-
ferring one set of criteria to others), but essentially 
contestable: there is not and never will be any warrant 
for the belief that anyone interpretation is the best 
one, i.e., there will always be good reasons for disputing 
10) 
the propriety of any of its uses. What exactly is then 
the nature of these concepts? They must (1) be appraisive, 
(2) describe an internally complex achievement, (3) the 
explanation of worth be initially unsettled in many 
respects, (4) the achievement persistently vague and modi-
fiable in light of changing circumstances, and (5) the 
contested use guarded both defensively and aggressively by 
its proponents. The proper use of the essentially contest-
able concepts then involves endless disputes, sustained by 
perfectly respectable arguments, although not resolvable 
11) 
by such arguments. 
Plainly, if the ECT is not to collapse into the 
blatant relativism of the incommensurability thesis or to 
be explained away by a Lockean you-are-really-dealing-
with-different-concepts strategy, something must be added, 
namely, good reasons must be adduced for the assumption 
that all users at least tacitly agree that one and the 
same concept is at stake, not a multiplicity of over-
lapping concepts. This is precisely Gallie's point: only 
by insisting that the same concept is being disputed can 
we see and keep sharply focused the differences between 
the conflicting interpretations. What we need, then, is a 
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common core around which the different uses revolve. But 
where can it be found and how can it be explained? 
Two main possibilities have been tried, the first by 
Gallie himself. To (1)-(5) he adds two extra conditions: 
(6) that the concept be derived from an original examplar 
whose authority is acknowledged by all contestant users, 
and (7) the belief that the competition for acknowledge-
ment enables the original examplar's achievement to be 
12) 
sustained in optimum fashion. However, at once many 
objections come to mind, especially to (6). The actual 
historical examples given by Gallie of his "original 
examplars" are not very plausible. Furthermore, why must 
'the democratic society', e.g. (if democracy is an essen-
tially contestable concept), be historical; why cannot it 
simply be postulated, defined negatively, or approached 
through judgements about the pros and cons of different 
societies? Even if we grant that the history of these con-
cepts is important, why should it always be possible to 
trace them back to a single "exemplar"? Perhaps this 
interpretation of Gallie's condition is uncharitable; the 
original examplar can for him simply amount to "a number 
of historically independent but sufficiently similar tra-
13) 
ditions" or a long tradition "of a common ... character". 
But even more seriously, as Gellner points out, does not 
Gallie's constant reference to some non-contested, un-
ambiguously defined exemplar imply that a criterion for 
terminating disagreement really exists, thereby betraying 
14) 
his own thesis? 
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The second possibility is that of giving the over-
arching concept by a schema or canonical form, like Mac-
Callum's definition of freedom (p. 10) where disagreements 
in the end concern only the proper ranges of the vari-
ables, which each party can interpret according to the 
criteria of freedom it holds. However, such formal defini-
tions tend to be so vague that unanimity is gained only at 
the expense of the specificity required to constitute a 
single concept. Others have here tried to invoke Rawls' 
15) 
concept/conception distinction. The common element in 
different conceptions of freedom is then to be encap-
sulated by a specification of the concept, sufficiently 
restrictive for a single concept, but sufficiently broad 
to allow a number of interpretations. 
To make a long story short, I shall claim that the 
whole thesis of essential contestability is wrong since 
the thinking behind it is either circular or paradoxical. 
The proponents of the ECT tend to concentrate on parti-
cular types of concepts: aesthetic, moral or political. If 
asked what is so special about these, opposed e.g. to con-
cepts such as 'table', 'kettle' or 'cancer', the answer 
seems to be that the former are normative whereas the 
latter are not. But why should normative concepts be 
different from non-normative ones? Well, because norma-
tive disputes must be essentially irresolvable! Hence, we 
are caught in a vicious circle. On this reading, the ECT 
does nothing but reintroduce the description-evaluation 
distinction in a new fancy form. 
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Proponents of the ~CT may, however, deny that there 
is anything special about normative concepts as such. They 
may simply claim that the ECT is true of a large number of 
concepts, and that the moral and political ones just 
happen to be among them. But then another objection 
this time in the form of a dilemma. Either the 
alleged 'common core' of these concepts must itself be 
16) 
e~sentially contestable or not. If it is, the 'common 
core' is no longer common and the ECT has collapsed into 
an incommensurability thesis, leading to traditional 
relativism. If it is not, it is hard to see why the 
different conceptions should be essentially contestable 
either, since the best conception could, at least in prin-
be picked out by comparison with the proper non-
contestable core. So, in either case, the ECT is wrong. 
The real dilemma of the essential contestability 
thinkers is that they both want to have their cake and eat 
it. They want to claim at once that debates about e.g. the 
meaning of 'freedom' relate to the same, non-relative con-
cept - and that they are rationally irresolvable. Deep 
down, most of them are nothing but old-fashioned 
relativist wolves in sheep's clothing. Thus, in one of 
Lukes' articles he claims that there are no distinctively 
moral criteria of rationality that are not internal to a 
particular moral belief system: "moral judgments may be 
incompatible but equally rational, because the criteria of 
rationality and justification ... are themselves relative to 
17) 
conflicting and irreconcilable perspectives." This is a 
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typical statement of relativism, since what we end up 
with, in the case of freedom, would not be a definitional 
dispute about a common concept but rather, as Gray puts 
it, "a conflict between adherents of mutually unintellig-
18) 
ible world-views". However, if you are a relativist, 
why not say so - why call it "essential contestability"? 
Christine Swanton has noted how the ECT smacks of 
19) 
incoherence, but she still wants to rescue it. Her 
method is to drop the common core assumption. She claims 
that we may sensibly speak of contested conceptions 
referring to the same ideal without assuming that there is 
a core concept common to these conceptions. A necessary 
condition of communication is only that people share some 
judgements about some cases, enabling arguments to get off 
the ground, e.g. by analogy or counter-arguments. In the 
case of freedom, we would thus only need to agree on a 
reasonable number of sample instances of utterances con-
taining 'free' to be able to say that we were arguing 
about the same kind of freedom. Further, although politi-
cal disputes are not resolvable by inductive or deductive 
arguments (proofs), they can still be rationally resolved 
in specific cases by giving good reasons. This strategy is 
meant to save a writer like Lukes from accusations of in-
consistency in claiming simultaneously that the concept of 
power is essentially contestable and that one of its con-
ceptions is superior to the others (p. 206). On Swanton's 
account, although there is no best wheat, we can separate 
the wheat from the chaff, i. e. , some conceptions may be 
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shown by rational arguments to be better than others 
although there is no best conception. The problem about 
Swanton's recourse is that once the common core assumption 
has been dropped, nothing is left of the ECT as a specific 
doctrine. She may be making some interesting observations 
on the nature of ethical arguments, but I fail to see 
their potential contribution to a defence of the ECT. 
Gallie's aim was to propound a thesis which would 
explain how different accounts of an ideal like freedom 
may be competing (concern one and the same concept), while 
conflicts between them are rationally irresolvable. How-
ever, I have raised serious doubts about the feasibility 
of this enterprise. In the following section, I shall try 
to show that its initial appeal is often based on drawing 
incorrect conclusions from alleged cases of ultimate dis-
agreement, here cases of moral responsibility. 
9.3. Responsibility - a cracked foundation? 
The standing of the ECT is of particular relevance to this 
thesis, since (as was noted at the beginning of the last 
section) most earlier proponents of the responsibility 
view have described freedom as an essentially contestable 
concept. Only in Connolly's book, however, is this claim 
worked out in any detail. His somewhat bleak conclusion is 
that no definition of freedom can be advanced that pre-
cisely distinguishes constraints on freedom from other 
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limitations; what can be produced is at most a flexible 
20) 
set of considerations. The reason is that disagreements 
over where to draw this line are in the end "contests over 
the extent to which a presumption of social responsibility 
21) 
should obtain for the obstacles themselves." But since 
ascriptions of responsibility are in many cases open to 
reply and objection, we are left with a "grey area" in 
which no conclusive arguments are available. The question 
whether a particular obstacle there constitutes a con-
straint on freedom is, however fervently debated, ration-
ally irresolvable; this is why Connolly insists on talking 
about "paradigms" of freedom or power instead of defini-
22) 
tions. 
What Connolly would have to say about my efforts in 
this thesis is something like this: I was right in trying 
to solve disputes about the nature of freedom by moving to 
another level, that of responsibility. In doing so I 
clarified the issue considerably and have perhaps success-
fully defined the concept of freedom. But to say that 
settled decisions at one level can help to set limits to 
conceptual controversies at another level, does not mean 
that such decisions can eliminate these controversies com-
pletely. In the present case, my definition of freedom 
rests upon the concept of responsibility; but responsi-
bility is itself an essentially contested concept. Hence, 
while the basic concept of freedom can (contrary to 
relativism) be fixed, it admits of varying interpreta-
tions, for different notions of responsibility support 
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different understandings of freedom, even within the fixed 
terms of the definition. 
It seems to me that if I grant this, the basis of 
freedom-talk, which I so rejoiced in finding, is not so 
firm after all. I discovered, so to speak, the back of the 
elephant on which the earth rests, only to find that the 
elephant itself is floating in mid air. In that case, 
whatever conclusiveness and finality my efforts have pro-
duced are counteracted to such a degree as to rob the 
responsibility view of most of its value. But this is so, 
of course, just in case Connolly's argument holds water. 
We must now see if it does. 
Connolly's argument takes up Gallie's idea of the 
"original exemplar". Let us say that there is a general 
consensus on the extension of a concept like genocide (= 
the complete extermination of a nation or a racial group) 
when it is originally invented or defined. Then, as time 
goes by, new situations arise that deviate in some way 
from the original case(s) which occasioned its formula-
tions: perhaps the extermination is not complete, or it 
is a foreseeable but not an intended consequence of some 
political decisions. Now, some parties will want to 
revise the criteria of the concept and continue to apply 
it to those new situations also, while others claim that 






and an irresolvable conflict 
for the sake of argument, that 
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Connolly's analysis of the genocide example is right, the 
question remains whether the same applies to the concept 
of responsibility. Connolly wants to maintain that there, 
also, a historical shift has occurred. In olden times when 
responsibility was on the agenda of conceptual inquiries, 
philosophers could restrict their attention to specific 
relations between individuals: the responsibility of the 
sqopkeeper towards his client, the lord towards his 
tenant, etc. But in modern societies, we have to move from 
considerations of individual relations to those involving 
collectivities: organizations, ethnic groups and, especi-
ally, large corporations. May it not be that the tradi-
tional language of responsibility is now insufficient to 
characterize the conditions in which we live? May it not 
be that we are unable to discover within the inherited web 
of meanings an answer to the question if a collectivity is 
responsible for to take one example - the gradually 
debilitating effect of environmental pollution on the 
inhabitants of a given community? Connolly's answer to 
such questions is an unequivocal yes, and that is why the 
concept of responsibility is, at least in modern 
24) 
societies, an essentially contestable one. 
There are, it seems, on Connolly's view two possible 
reasons for an irresolvable conflict over the use of a 
given concept. Either its point is vague, for example the 
point of responsibility, or there are some insurmountable 
difficulties in determining how to fit the concept to par-
ticular situations, e.g. the behaviour of collectivities. 
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In response to the first of these reasons, I could simply 
rehearse my analysis from section 4.3, showing that the 
point of moral responsibility is at least reasonably 
clear. But Connolly's claim is really the other: it is 
not so much the point of responsibility that is contested 
- a point which Connolly says is based on certain deeply 
25) 
embedded "shared ideas" but rather the extent and 
mqnner to which various cases meet this point. 
Again, this second line of objection can be inter-
preted in two ways. Either the problem is an intrinsic one 
with respect to typical, important cases, or it merely 
involves borderline cases and factual uncertainties. It 
must be realized that the boundaries of the sets of things 
to which our concepts refer are generally difficult to fix 
precisely. We can always expect to come across examples 
that puzzle us because they represent situations pre-
viously unheard of, or because they lie near the boundary 
of the concept. (This will be explained in more detail in 
the following section). Such contingencies give rise to 
contestedness, but not to one which justifies the more 
radical interpretation. What we do in such situations is 
to put both the example and the point of the concept under 
further scrutiny. Generally, we come up with a conclusive 
answer; at worst we are left with some controversial but 
atypical borderline cases. New information and better 
arguments can also make us change our mind as time goes 
on. Oppenheim is, for example, right in pointing out that 
the question whether the situation of workers in the nine-
-283-
teenth century constitutes an example of unfreedom is a 
26) 
matter of factual, not conceptual, controversy. The 
question to be answered is whether the 'capitalists' were 
really responsible for this situation or if it was the 
product of inevitable, anonoymous economic forces - and 
that is simply a factual question. 
What we have been describing so far are situations of 
contestedness which is merely factual and/or innocuous. 
So, Connolly must be relying on the more radical inter-
pretation, namely, that there is an intrinsic, irresolv-
able problem in determining whether certain (typical, 
important) cases fall within the province of responsi-
bility. But that contention is notoriously difficult to 
swallow when we have seen how clear the point of the con-
cept of responsibility is. Why can we not simply use the 
test of moral responsibility for the non-suppression of 
obstacles and ask: is this a case of an action/inaction of 
an agent that he could appropriately be asked to justify? 
As we have seen (4.6), the existence of collectivities 
does not as such undermine the viability of this test. So, 
however hard I try, I altogether fail to see where the 
intrinsic contestability could lie in judging these typi-
cal, important cases. 
In sum, the less radical interpretation of the second 
argument merely leads to factual and/or innocuous contest-
ability, while the more radical one, used by Connolly, 
seems to be wrong as far as the concept of responsibility 
is concerned. In 9.2, the ECT was rejected as a general 
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thesis. Now, one of the cases that gave rise to the talk 
of essential contestability has not stood up to scrutiny 
either. Moral responsibility, the basis of freedom-talk, 
is not an essentially contestable concept; it is not a 
cracked foundation. 
9~4. The open texture of concepts 
How can we account for the nature of concepts such as 
freedom if they are not essentially contestable but still 
do not pick out uniquely in advance all the possible cases 
falling under them? The most promising line of explanation 
is to follow Friedrich Waismann in his analysis of the 
27) 
open texture of most concepts. Although the point, or 
formal element, of a moral concept (freedom) or a non-
moral one (table) may be a clear-cut and indisputable one, 
the incompleteness of empirical data makes it impossible 
to give an exhaustive enumeration of all the material 
features which the formal element may assume. That is, the 
set of tables or freedoms is open, not closed as in the 
case of geometrical terms. In the latter case, we can, for 
example, give a strict rule which prescribes the necessary 
and sufficient properties of a rectangle; we can give a 
complete definition which anticipates and settles once and 
for all every possible question of usage. By contrast, one 
cannot specify exactly what shapes, sizes, materials, 
etc., potential tables can be made of, and although we 
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have roughly formulated the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a situation to constitute an example of unfree-
dom, we have not defined freedom with absolute 'geo-
metrical precision' since it may be a matter of doubt if a 
certain situation satisfies precisely these conditions. 
For example, in a given case the responsibility con-
dition may only be minimally met, or the obstacle imposed 
so modest that we doubt whether to call it an obstacle in 
the first place. In addition to such borderline cases, 
situations of an unforeseeable nature can arise, perhaps 
owing to a new technology - situations which could not be 
taken into account when formulating the original defini-
tion of the term but which nevertheless call for cate-
gorization as instances of freedom or unfreedom. Thus, in 
the future we may have to deal with artificially intelli-
gent robots, Martians or who knows what. Perhaps we will 
have to emend or refine our definition of responsibility 
(and hence freedom) to do justice to such cases. 
However, Aristotle would remind us not to feel too 
disheartened about such conclusions, since this is all the 
precision the subject-matter admits 
moral philosophy is simply different 
of. The nature of 
from that of, say, 
geometry - for better or for worse. However, what is dis-
concerting is the impression which this analysis of the 
open texture of concepts may have created, namely, that I 
am now sailing dangerously close to the thesis of essen-
tial contestability which I set out to renounce. Do the 
open texture model and the EeT not in the end come down to 
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the same thing? My answer here is no. On the open texture 
reading, a concept such as freedom has a clear core; 
according to the ECT different interpretations of the con-
cept only share a vague common core. On the latter thesis, 
most conceptual disputes are intrinsically unsolvable; on 
the former they are, in principle, decidable, since there 
is an objective control to the inquiry: an independent 
criterion by which competing answers can be measured. 
That, of course, is the formal element of the concept, its 
point, which none of the parties to the dispute can 
change. Also, there is a method by which this formal 
element can be brought to bear on the questionable cases, 
the process of critical clarification and refinement which 
28) 
should be the chief method of conceptual inquiries. 
The open texture model thus affords us, whereas the 
ECT does not, the sense of objectivity, of rational 
decidability, which alone can satisfy our intellectual 
demands for the subject of ethics in general. This idea is 
admirably expressed by Benn, in arguing against the ECT: 
To the extent that we embark on the task of winning 
assent by rational argument rather than by mind-
bending manipulation, we are committing ourselves to 
the belief that there is no inherent impossibility 
about the enterprise, and though agreement may be 
hard to reach, we never know that it could not be 
found by still more patient exploration ... "29) 
It is this prospect of success by "patient exploration" 
that makes the open texture model so much superior to a 
thesis of rational irresolvability. 
It may be helpful to conclude this discussion of the 
contestability/decidability of (moral) concepts with a 
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schema, showing in a clear, if a somewhat simplified, way 

















According to a), the concept has a clear point and 
any possible disagreement would be caused by a deliberate 
or accidental failure to communicate; according to b), the 
concept has a point that is clear, but it may give rise to 
disputes over borderline cases; according to c), the con-
cept has a point but a vague one which can support various 
interpretations, mutually conflicting in a rationally in-
resolvable way; according to d), the concept has no point 
or essence but designates a family of properties (a 
'cluster'), the most or the weighted most of which must be 
satisfied by a potential member of the set; according to 
e), the concept may have a point, but only one that is 
specific to a particular community or paradigm; no inter-
paradigmatic (non-relative) agreement is attainable. It is 
important to keep these accounts separate; Connolly e.g. 
confuses c) and d) by wanting to hold simultaneously that 
most concepts in politics are essentially contestable and 
30) 
that they are "cluster concepts". But if the latter is 
true, they would not have any common core which could be 
contested. 
I have argued that, in general, moral concepts do not 
fall under a) and e). (Other concepts, however, may: geo-
metrical ones under a), aesthetic ones under e), perhaps). 
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It may be that some general moral and political concepts 
fall under d) (the cluster idea seems to fit well with a 
term like 'politics'); but after examining the ECT, I 
doubt that c) is an important category for the understand-
ing of moral concepts. My main conclusion, however, is 
that the moral concepts which have been my special concern 
in this thesis (responsibility, freedom, power, etc.) fall 
under b). They are concepts with a point - an essence -
but at the same time an open texture. They give rise to 
disputes, but only disputes that are, in principle, 
decidable by the patient methods of conceptual analysis. 
Their 'contestability' is not an essential one. 
It is now time to bring to an end the methodological 
discussion which has taken up these last two chapters. I 
have, I think, produced a helpful account of the nature of 
moral concepts in general and have, furthermore, justified 
the methodology employed in my investigation of one of 
those concepts, freedom. Maybe the most important lesson 
to be learnt is that, as Gray has suggested, accounts of 
moral/political concepts are too often marred by the pro-
miscuous running together of two distinct theses: a) that 
social theorizing cannot avoid being a normative activity, 
and b) that social theory is beset by an ineradicable con-
ceptual relativism which prevents it from yielding any 
31) 
definitions capable of compelling rational assent. The 
former thesis is true but the latter has been shown to be 
false. 
Finally, I would like to indicate more clearly two 
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general implications of the above discussion, for a) the 
nature of political inquiry, and b) the prospects which 
such inquiry holds out for us. First, it should be noted 
that my conclusions about the normativity of moral con-
cepts do not commit me to the view, espoused e.g. by 
Connolly, that by analysing a concept of politics' I have 
implicated myself in politics; that explicating a concept 
such as freedom is "not a prelude to ... but a dimension of 
32 ) 
politics itself" , and that by adopting any definition I 
am taking a stand in an ideological debate. On the 
contrary, my discussion implies, to quote Gordon Graham, 
that "politics being what it is, there are always certain 
facts which the advocate of any ideology cannot, or would 
33 ) 
not, wish to ignore." I have argued that among these 
facts are moral facts, and that they can be utilized to 
arrive critically at the appropriate definitions of moral 
terms. 
What leads Connolly astray is the historically fre-
quent use of seriously flawed 'definitions' of moral terms 
for propagandistic purposes. For example, just as it is 
easier to win a football game by pointing out that the 
opposing team is fielding an illegal player than by scor-
. 1 lng goa~s, so it is 'easier' to claim that the starving 
masses in Ethiopia are 'free', if their situation is not 
the result of deliberate actions, than to grant that they 
are unfree, and then (perhaps) produce good reasons for 
not helping them. Such reasons can often be found, e.g. in 
cases of imperfect responsibility (4.2); but these would 
-290-
be substantive, political or moral, reasons, not con-
ceptual ones. It goes without saying that people's values 
conflict, i.e., their views on what is to count as the 
good life and the well-structured society. The reason may 
partly be that aiming at eudaimonia involves an essential 
trade-off between important but mutually inconsistent 
values (p. 191). Thus, politics is rightly described by 
34 ) 
Connolly as the "sphere of the unsettled" but that is 
not because our conceptual inquiries are irresolvable and 
our concepts vague, but because people, employing the same 
concepts, differ over substantive issues. 
Second, my conclusions clearly support an optimistic 
view as to the general prospects of conceptual inquiries 
in political philosophy. By a painstaking investigation 
into more and more of its concepts and their inter-
relations, we should be able to dissipate gradually the 
confusions that have surrounded their application. In 
this, I concur with Gray in endorsing a "classical con-
ception of political philosophy as an intellectual 
activity capable of yielding determinate results and, so, 
of assisting reflective agents in their search for a good 
35) 
society." 
It could, however, be argued that there is an un-
bridgeable gap, not between facts and values, descriptions 
and evaluations, but between moral facts, on the one hand, 
moral prescriptions on the other. Knowing what is good 
does not commit us to aim at the good; even less does an 
understanding of the definition of freedom commit us to 
-291-
lessen the burden of unfreedom. If I am an evil-minded 
person, I may utilize my knowledge to increase the world's 
misery and injustice. If, however, I am noble-minded, 
being clear about the meaning of freedom may assist me in 
analysing and arguing against particular instances of un-
freedom in the world around me; and in that endeavour, 
perhaps, this thesis will help. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
A distinguished philosopher once remarked that there could 
be no general theory of holes since holes are dug for 
different purposes: by children in the sand, by gardeners 
1) 
to plant lettuce, etc. My thesis should have brought to 
light that there can be no general theory of freedoms 
either. The most we may hope for is to clarify the concept 
of a specific kind of freedom by looking at the purpose it 
can most usefully be made to serve. Indeed, this has been 
my aim here, namely, to arrive at a definition of social 
freedom. In the case of that particular concept, people 
have used the term 'social freedom' like a shopping 
trolley which could be packed with anybody's chosen selec-
tion of separate goods. By contrast, I have tried to show 
how an authoritative definition is possible that catches 
the point which the term should be made to convey and is 
neither unduly subjective nor relativistic. 
As my study comes to a close, it is time to rehearse 
and draw together some of its argumentation. Early on, I 
pledged my allegiance to a responsibility view of freedom. 
There, I took my stand upon sound precedents since such a 
view has been upheld recently by many respected experts in 
the field. However, coming across a prima facie plausible 
account at the start of a conceptual inquiry is merely a 
promise of merit which further investigation can either 
ratify or annul. The natural way to proceed was to examine 
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if every cranny could be blocked through which doubts and 
objections to this original account might enter. Step by 
step, then, my responsibility view of freedom assumed its 
final form as various changes and refinements of the 
original insights proved necessary. 
It would be lighting a candle to the sun to rehearse 
here the numerous arguments employed in the course of my 
discussion; they are to be found in the relevant chapters. 
What I shall do instead is to list the main points made, 
or conclusions reached, in each chapter. However, since my 
polemic targets were as numerous as was deemed necessary 
to reach out to the perplexity of the issues, the more 
peripheral points must be left out of the following 
summary. 
CHAPTER 1 
* Social freedom is logically distinct from other 
freedom-concepts although it may presuppose free will. 
* Freedom is not the same as ability. 
* Freedom signifies a triadic relation. However, 
attempts to employ the triadic schema to span the diff-
erence between 'negative' and 'positive' accounts are open 
to question. 
* An infringement of a person's liberty must be attri-
butable to some agency. 
CHAPTER 2 
* The only account of negative freedom that is free 
from major flaws or inconsistencies is the responsibility 
view. 
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* Hobbes' conception is wrong since it fails to dis-
tinguish between freedom and ability, action and be-
haviour; a moralized conception is wrong since a person's 
freedom can be constrained without a violation of rights; 
the liberal conception is wrong since it rests on a dis-
tinction between 'intentional' and 'unintentional but 
foreseeable' which, in this context, seems irrelevant. 
* There seems to be a principle of freedom embodied in 
our language, placing the onus of justification on the 
freedom-constrainer. 
* The origin of a constraint on freedom must be attri-
butable to an agent who can be held morally responsible 
for it. 
* Miller's responsibility view is the best one so far, 
explaining e.g. the moral significance of negligence and 
avoidable omissions. 
CHAPTER 3 
* The mere 'size' of an obstacle is irrelevant to 
ascriptions of unfreedom as long as it is a real obstacle 
to choice/action. 
* Various views on the necessary size of an obstacle 
do not bear scrutiny, e.g. Hobbes' impossibility view, 
Benn & Weinstein's unreasonableness view, Day's conjunc-
tive impossibility view, and Dworkin & Frankfurt's identi-
fication view. 
* Miller's irrelevance-of-size view fails, despite its 
generally correct insights, to account for the truth that 
whereas threats can, offers cannot constrain freedom. 
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* Coercive constraints form a subclass of constraints 
in general which are, in turn, a subclass of obstacles. 
* There is an important difference between tentative 
and final proposals which explains e.g. why an offer is 
never qua offer an obstacle to choice although some of its 
side-effects or the reward offered may be. 
* Current attempts to distinguish between threats and 
offers by employing a moral or a statistical baseline con-
flate the two distinct tasks of distinguishing between a) 
obstacles and non-obstacles; b) obstacles which do and 
obstacles which do not constrain freedom. For the latter, 
a test of moral responsibility is required. 
* 
CHAPTER 4 
An agent can be held morally responsible for the 
2) 
'non-suppression' of an obstacle when it is appropriate, 
in the given context, to ask him for a justification of 
his not suppressing it. 
* Miller's link between moral responsibility and prima 
facie obligations is misconstrued. His invocation of the 
latter is either trivial or wrong. 
* While we are not responsible for all the foreseeable 
consequences of our actions, many attempts to narrow the 
sphere of responsibility tend to undermine the distinction 
between a moral and a moralized test which is crucial for 
a responsibility view of freedom. 
* For it to be appropriate to ask A for a justification 
of not suppressing an obstacle, it must be possible to 
give some plausible reason why he could have been expected 
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(morally, statistically or otherwise) to suppress it. 
* The application of my moral test is not relative to a 
general moral perspective nor (essentially) to the 
standards of a given society. 
* The problem of attributing moral responsibility to 
collectivities admits of a solution in the responsibility 
view. 
CHAPTER 5 
* Freedom is a relational 
nature entails that internal bars, 
concept. Its irreflexive 
which no other agent 
is reponsible for, cannot constrain our own freedom. 
* The internality of an obstacle does not pose a 
problem for a correct account of negative freedom as long 
as another agent is responsible for it. 
* Self-deception is a typical internal bar. However, if 
only the agent himself is responsible for its existence, 
it does not constrain his own freedom. 
* An internal bar in me can be a constraint on the 
freedom of other persons, and on my own freedom in so far 
as others can be held responsible for not removing it. 
* A responsibility view of negative freedom entails in 
some instances a prima facie case for paternalism. How-
ever, that paternalism is much more limited than the one 
upheld by positive liberty theories. 
CHAPTER 6 
* All accounts of positive liberty proper assume that 
a) a person can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is 
an exercise-, not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are 
-298-
not accounts of social freedom but uphold other, logically 
distinct, values. 
* A number of negative libertarians mistakenly take 
themselves to be upholding positive liberty when they are 
arguing for a conception of negative liberty broader than 
the liberal one. 
* Promethean freedom is a strange form of positive 
liberty found in the most diverse places (e.g. the 
Icelandic sagas). It inflates the value of equanimity in 
times of hardship to a metaphysical entity. 
* Autarchy, but not autonomy, is presupposed in free-
dom-talk and is basically what we mean by a free will. 
Heterarchic persons are not freedom-evaluable. Autonomy 
is not a necessary condition of particular cases of free-
dom, nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of 
autonomy. 
* An obstacle counts as a constraint even if you see 
the need for it and respect the person imposing it (contra 
communal freedom). 
* The traditional view that positive liberty accounts 
lend themselves easily to paternalistic/totalitarian abuse 
is backed up by the evidence. 
CHAPTER 7 
* Social freedom stands in a close relationship to 
other power concepts. For example, to exercise power over 
somebody is the same as to constrain his freedom. 
* Many of the conceptual mistakes made in defining 





account of power, despite its various faults, 
the right direction by suggesting a responsi-
bility view of power. 
* 'Exercising power over' has to be distinguished from 
the general 'power to' and also from 'having power over'. 
Only the first locution is seen as having a direct con-
nection with social freedom. 
* Judgements 
cannot be made 
about net aggregate freedom or power 
on the basis of conceptual truths but 
require a substantive moral theory. 
CHAPTER 8 
* Some insights from recent, well-known methodologies 
can be used to underpin the methods employed in my thesis. 
Unfortunately, however, these methodologies either tend to 
presuppose the description-evaluation distinction or be 
liable to a relativistic interpretation. 
* Ordinary language analysis can be defended against 
most of the charges commonly brought against it (e.g. that 
of conservatism), but it should constitute no more than 
the first step in conceptual inquiries. 
* Rawls' reflective equilibrium, when applied to con-
ceptual inquiries, bears a striking resemblance to the 
methods of my thesis, but I differ from Rawls in my com-
mitment to non-relativity. 
* Operationalists see the need for authoritative 
definitions but wrongly think that it can be satisfied by 
stripping moral concepts of their evaluative dimension. 
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* There is no essential difference between descriptive 
and evaluative concepts since the latter also describe 
reality from a particular point of view. 





possible to construct an 
social freedom which is 
normative but not essentially contestable. 
* It is possible to argue critically for the point of a 
given concept and, thus, to arrive at a non-relativistic 
definition of a term such as 'social freedom'. 
* The thesis of essential contestability is either 
circular or paradoxical. 
* Claims about cases of moral responsibility being 
rationally irresolvable prove to be unfounded. 
* The open-texture model explains the factual and/or 
innocuous contestability of many concepts. 
As this has turned out to be quite a long list, it is 
in order to give, as it were, a summary of the summary -
constituting the main conclusion of the thesis: 
Social freedom is a moral concept which designates a 
triadic relation between an autarchic agent A, another 
autarchic agent B, and some choice/action x. B is socially 
free to do x iff he is not constrained by A from doing x. 
A constrains B when A is morally responsible for the non-
suppression of an obstacle that impedes (to a greater or a 
lesser extent) B's doing x. A is morally responsible for 
the non-suppression when the onus of justification can be 
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placed on him and that, in turn, is when it is appropriate 
to ask him, in the given context, why he did not suppress 
the obstacle. This entails that the same situation could 
constitute a constraint on freedom in Society and not in 
1 
Society, but as the rational arguments used to show what 
2 
a person can appropriately be called upon to justify in 
either society would be of the same nature and mutually 
understandable, the thesis is not relativistic. 
Much of this study has been taken up with answers to 
possible objections. It is fitting to end it with three 
more. Firstly, someone might claim that I have continually 
overstated my differences with previous versions of the 
responsibility view to provide a focus for my own thesis, 
and that it amounts in the end to little more than a piece 
of 'horseback scholarship'. To answer that, I could do no 
better than to direct the objector back to the various 
places where important dissimilarities with the views of 
Benn & Weinstein, Miller, and Connolly manifested them-
selves. Originality in philosophy is preciously hard to 
attain. If it means coming up with ideas that no one has 
so much as thought of before, it is unattainable. 
Secondly, I have taken it for granted from the start that 
the responsibility view is a negative account of freedom, 
whereas Gray, for example, categorizes it as a positive 
3 ) 
account. His reasons, also mirrored in Patrick's 
4 ) 
thesis, are that such a view accepts the reality of 
internal bars and is connected with the idea of the auto-
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nomous individual. However, I have repeatedly pointed out 
a) that a correct negative theory takes account of 
internal bars and b) that the responsibility view does not 
presuppose actual autonomy as a necessary condition of 
freedom. Here, Gray is simply wrong. 
Thirdly, it might be asked why I frequently evade 
embattled topics by saying that they relate to sUbstan-
tive, not conceptual issues. If, as I have claimed, there 
is no gap between description and evaluation, and evalu-
ative (moral) terms often embody a presumption against 
this or that, what is left of the distinction between the 
conceptual and the substantive? The answer is that by a 
'substantive' issue I am referring to an issue where 
different arguments or values have to be weighed against 
one another. For example, the term 'social freedom' 
embodies a presumption which places the onus of justifi-
cation on the constraining-agent(s). That is a conceptual 
truth which people of every political stripe would be wise 
5 ) 
to acknowledge. Thus, as e.g. G. Cohen has realized, 
socialists and capitalists can and should start their 
debates from a conceptual common ground. However, if they 
want to argue for the superiority of their respective 
systems while employing a common definition of freedom, 
they need to bring other concepts and arguments to bear on 
the discussion. How are the values of merit, efficiency, 
private property, etc., to be weighed against the pre-
sumption involved in freedom-talk? These are what I call 
sUbstantive questions and they require a whole moral 
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theory which cannot be supplied here. 
But have I not deprived the concept of freedom of its 
real significance in political debate, since it no longer 
seems decisive or conclusive to describe a state of 
affairs as involving unfreedom if different freedoms have 
to be weighed against each other all the time and a loss 
in freedom can be offset by a gain in other values? There, 
I can do no better than to quote Miller who points out 
that although a charge of unfreedom does not settle a 
political debate, by invoking it we are making a move in a 
6 ) 
political argument. conceptual truths do not settle 
substantive issues but they can contribute to our dis-
cussion of them. 
A person in one of the novels of Halld6r Laxness, the 
Icelandic Nobel-prize winner, remarks that most questions 
can be answered if they are correctly put. In this thesis 
I have tried to put correctly a question about the meaning 
of social freedom and to find an adequate answer to it. 
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